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Preface 
In 1994 we conducted a multidisciplinary research program, combining 
both law and anthropology, into the place of indigenous custom in the 
development of law in the South Pacific. At that time we were already 
convinced, and remain so today, that it was necessary to bring a diversity 
of approaches to the subject. 
Through a diversity of disciplinary approaches, as just intimated, the 
phenomenon known as 'custom' requires just as much an anthropological 
analysis as one from a perspective of the discipline of law. Custom is the 
reality upon which law was originally based. Added to this is the usefulness 
of a political analysis, provided by both the academic and the practising 
lawyer. And on top of this is the diversity of the areas of our study. For 
French academics who are particularly interested in the phenomenon of 
custom in the French territories of the Pacific, it is unthinkable that we 
should limit ourselves to the zone of French influence. Obviously, custom 
is essentially Melanesian or Polynesian, and it would be a very blinkered 
view to explore only Kanak, Tahitian and Wallisian data, even though they 
constitute a strong field of interest. 
When the French Republic solemnly recognised the rights of the Kanak 
people, too long spurned, at the time of the signing of the Noumea Accord 
of 5 May1998, one could only remember the same steps taken by the Prime 
Minister of New Zealand in the name of the Crown, on 22 May 1995, with 
respect to the Maori people. 
So it was that we resolutely sought to learn the lessons which we could 
glean from the Australian, New Zealand and Papua New Guinean worlds. 
After all, it is Pacific people who are the subject of our study. And we 
managed to bring together the comments and testimonies of the most 
qualified people of those countries: a range of well-known people explained 
their different situations and problems and the ways used to resolve them. 
They all addressed the same question: how does one affirm and restore 
the original rights of indigenous peoples? 
The studies which are brought together in this volume may be  
characterised by the diversity of  the countries concerned, and by the 
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diversity of the facets under consideration: land rights, mining rights, legal 
guarantees which are the very foundations of democracy. They all have a 
common ambition: to foster the notion of the right to be different, and the 
peaceful co-existence of the different communities present in the South 
Pacific. 
Paul de Deckker and Jean-Yves Faberon 
1 
usto an el 
Norbert Roul and 
One of the biggest and perhaps main foundations of the 
Republics is to accommodate the State to the character of its 
citizens, and the edicts and decrees to the nature of places, 
persons, and times ... which means that we must diversify the 
State of the Republic to fit the diversity of places, following 
the example of a good architect who accommodates his or her 
building according to the materials found on site. 
J. Bodin, La Republique, V-1 (1577) 
... One cannot see why all provinces of a State, or even all 
States themselves, should not have the same criminal laws, 
civil laws, commercial laws, etc. A good law should be good 
for all people, just as a true proposition is true for all. 
Condorcet (1780) 
I ndigenous custom a nd the devel o pment of European 
Law i n  the French terr itories of the Pacific 
In a few words this topic throws us into the turbulence of the French legal 
tradition.1 Custom? For Montesquieu, it was the 'reasoning of fools', and 
the revolutionary legislator, like our current law manuals, sought to efface 
it as a source of the law. Indigenous? To the annoyance of the United Nations, 
France refuses to recognise this concept2 anymore than it accepts that of 
minorities:3 Article 2 of the 1958 Constitution proclaims the legal equality 
of all citizens ' . . .  without distinguishing origin, race, or religion', and affirms 
their linguistic unity.4 
The territories? The demarcation of territorial administrative regimes 
and the limited variety of legal regimes in the national territory do not 
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undermine the indivisibility of the republic, which continues to establish 
the unity of normative power. Although the 1958 Constitution explicitly 
refers to the 'territoires d' outre mer'5 and their populations,6 by recognising 
the right to self-determination, it nevertheless states that ' .. . the principle of 
the indivisibility of the republic, as well as the principle of equality, insists 
on the unity of the French people and thus forbids any differentiation between 
citizens constituting a same people' .7 The Constitutional Council of 9 May 
1991, stated that the concept of the 'Corsican people' was 'contrary to the 
Constitution, which only recognises the French people, composed of French 
citizens, without distinguishing origin, race, or religion'. 
Custom and the development of the law? Although this question doesn't 
place law in opposition to custom, it does distinguish between the two 
concepts. Sliding down the hierarchy of norms, from the Constitution to the 
most banal of administrative directives, we remain in the mapped out world 
of the law. When it comes to custom, however, we are disorientated enough 
that the outline of our familiar idol becomes blurred-is that law, pre-law, 
or a fact waiting to evolve into a norm? The coarseness of political events 
further confounds this legal uncertainty. In the French overseas territories, 
custom is not just an object of theoretical speculation, but can become a 
political assertion, or a basis for affirmations of identity. In New Caledonia, 
the drama at Ouvea led to reforms institutionalising custom and 'custom 
people', if only on consultative grounds. In Guyana, the Amerindians 
invoked their indigenous rights to their territories, languages and cultures. 8 
The appearance in administrative law of the concept of collectivite 
peripherique could even serve as a basis for the recognition of legal 
particularism beyond the limitation of overseas territories. 9 Finally, 
international law provides much room for the confirmation of the rights and 
specificities of indigenous populations. A project for the declaration of the 
universal rights of indigenous populations by the United Nations is currently 
near completion. 10 Within Europe, the concept of indigenous populations is 
slowly emerging into legal existence.11 Paragraph 29 of the CSCE conference 
of 10July 1992, declares that the States 
in recognising that persons belonging to indigenous populations can 
encounter particular problems in the exercise of their rights, are 
acknowledging that the engagements they have undertaken within the 
framework of the CSCE relate to human rights and fundamental liberties 
which are fully and unconditionally applicable to these persons.12 
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We need then to disentangle the assault on custom instigated by the 
republican tradition, 13 its contemporary reinterpretations, and an exalted 
celebration of identities-which is full of potential pitfalls. 
We will start by establishing certain definitions. Then, perhaps more 
surprisingly, we will not describe the norms related to the emergence of 
custom in the French territories of the Pacific.14 The following discussion 
will address, following the concerns of legal anthropology, the all too often 
forgotten companions of social norms. Representations are what we will 
first see at work in certain theoretical problems. And then we will try to 
reveal the practices of the underlying world of politics. 
I ntroduct ion:  the long h a u l  of defi n it ions 
Our research is about indigenous custom. What do each of these terms 
mean? 
The 'miss ing' a borig ines 
Definitions are even more difficult to establish when they have political 
groundings and ramifications.15 For example, a declaration by the United 
Nations (18 December 1992) concerning the rights of minorities fails to 
define what these are.16 Indigenous populations are-or deem themselves 
to be-different to minority groups (they claim the recognition of themselves 
as a people), but we have to admit a similar kind of inadequacy in these 
terms. 
At its first session in 1982, the UN Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations drew its definition of indigeneity from the Cobo report and 
identified several criteria from it17-indigenous populations ascribe to value 
systems which are either different or in competition with those of the State 
in which they live; they are in a position of inferiority in relation to the 
dominant society; the legitimacy of their rights is grounded in the continuity 
of their historical existence on their territories; the attribute of indigeneity 
depends largely on the individual's self-identification with the group and 
the acceptance by the group of that individual as one of its members. All 
these elements confirm the factual data. Indigenous people throughout the 
world base the legitimacy of their demands in terms of their pre-existing 
occupation of territories, and in terms of their current position of 
dependence-the very etymology of the term indigenous· implies a notion 
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of territoriality. Nevertheless, the UN Working Group currently developing 
the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples does not 
posit any definition of indigeneity. To settle this therefore we need to refer to 
another international device, Convention 169 of the IL0,18passed in 1989, 
which pertains to indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries. 
Article 1, contends that indigeneity applies 
(a) to tribal peoples in independent countries who distinguish themselves 
from other sections of the national community by their social, cultural and 
economic circumstances and who are totally or partially governed by their 
own customs or traditions or by a special legislation 
(b) to peoples in independent countries who are considered indigenous 
through their descent from populations who lived in the country, or a 
geographical region which the country belongs to, at either the time of 
conquest, colonisation or the establishment of the current State borders, 
and who, irrespective of their legal status, have maintained either all or 
some of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. 
The second paragraph of this same article specifies that 
[a] feeling of indigenous or tribal belonging must be considered as an 
essential criterion in determining the groups to which the provisions of this 
convention apply. 
One could ask whether there is a need to distinguish between indigenous 
(aboriginal) peoples, as the second group by comparison to the first, have 
the specific attribute of prior occupation of the land. This would give the 
Convention a larger field of application than that of indigenous people 
stricto sensu. In fact a detailed study by P. Karpe concludes with the identity 
of notions of tribal, aboriginal, or indigenous people.19 The category of tribal 
people was supposedly instigated under the pressure of newly independent 
States (particularly in the eastern part of the world) who, for reasons of 
national unity and territoriality, were opposed to the recognition of the 
existence of aboriginal people on their land, preferring instead a more neutral 
qualification which was less likely to lead to demands of autonomy or 
succession. In any case, Convention 169 contains an important self­
limitation of the rights it recognises for tribal or indigenous peoples, because 
it specifies that the term peoples 'can in no way be interpreted as having 
implications of any sort on the rights that are attached to this term in 
international law'. 20 The sovereignty of the States is thus protected. 
The main difficulties in elaborating a legal definition of indigenous 
peoples occur on the political level. 
Is custom any freer from these contingencies? 
Custom and the law 
The polyserny of custom 
In principle, any lawyer would define custom as more or less a rule of 
practice which is consistent and repetitive over a given period of time, and 
has a restraining characteristic which is recognised by the members of the 
group to which it is applied. These people validate it more according to its 
empirical and ancient nature (whether its age is real or not) than its 
rationality. 21 Habit (custom comes from the Latin term consuetudo) does seem 
to have a determining element. And we must be careful not to exaggerate 
the irrationality of custom-often the absence of explanations is due to the 
secret nature of the legitimating accounts and to the restrictions on divulging 
them. But we are dealing with indigenous customs as they relate to the 
law-it would therefore be fitting to have knowledge of the indigenous 
point of view on the meanings that custom holds for them hie et nunc, and to 
undertake linguistic inquiries. 22 Finally, custom is not miraculously 
protected from the ravages of time. In this respect we need to be reminded of 
the distinctions put forward by E. Le Roy.23 Traditional law is that which 
the indigenous people practiced before colonisation or annexation. 
Customary practice, stricto sensu, consists of a transformation of indigenous 
law brought into effect through codification and/ or jurisprudence. Local 
laws are laws inspired by the state that are often modified in the conditions 
of their application at the local level. Popular law takes shape outside of the 
authority of the state, either in urban or rural areas. It is not to be confused 
with traditional law, often used to resolve problems that did not exist in 
traditional society. All of these cases have customary roots-repetition, 
suitability, autonomy of actors-but their diversity already demonstrates 
that custom is not just about persistence through time, it is not just a relic. 
This is one of the theoretical issues we must now examine. 
The mecha n ics of representation 
Legal norms, or standards, exist independently of the observer. It  is  he or she, 
however, who gives them coherence by gathering them into systems. These 
systems depend on representations, which are interpretations presenting 
themselves as knowledge. Vigilance is therefore required when one wanders 
into these temples, whose foundation pillars can be hollow. Two of these 
edifices are worth visiting here-the principle of hierarchy, which is so dear 
to French law, and the issue of the incompatibility of custom. 
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The i nflexi b i l ity of French law 
Custom, as J.  Larrieu has demonstrated, has only made cracks into the 
openings of applied law; in most cases it is only a supplementary source of 
law, without the weight of contra legem.24 On the one hand, however, historical 
analysis of our legal model highlights its terms and conditions; and, on the 
other hand, the supposed subsidiary nature of custom is only one postulation 
among others. 
The h istoricity of the legal mode l 
'Custom wins over law; all customs are to be upheld.' These medieval slogans 
reflect a hierarchy of values which seems distant today. In fact, the history 
and anthropology of law seem to have shown that the ascension of law in 
the standard hierarchy went hand in hand with the centralisation and 
specialisation of political power. The table by E. Le Roy (Table 1 .1), shows 
that complexity favours law to the detriment of custom.25 
We must be careful, however, not to interpret this general framework too 
rigidly. First, the diversity of levels of complexity, and of historical traditions, 
influences the struggle between custom and law (The traditional state left 
more autonomy to custom than the modern state does, and not all states are 
shaped in the same mould, so that the Romano-civil conception of the law 
gives more weight to written law than countries ruled by Common Law'). 
Second, official representations of the law do not necessarily reflect its 
practice. Custom dominates in some sections of French law (industrial law, 
business law, or even international law), in as much as the rules applied 
and the methods of managing conflict are, by and large, produced by the 
social groups involved. Likewise, relations between the large bodies at the 
top levels of administration are regulated by rules that are not always derived 
from the written codes. 26 
Nevertheless the compelling nature of the law, ideally linked to the force 
of the state, is typical of the legal representations of the modern state which 
relegates custom to a kind of (friendly) folklore.27 The Latin term for law, ius, 
contains this essential characteristic, in so far as it seems to be a derivative 
of iussum, order. 28 The large-scale projects of official codification of the law 
testify to the link between the law and the political powers that instigate 
them. In the beginning of the Digeste, the Justinian Emperor proclaimed, in 
his own terms, the closure of 'the gates of effort' (les portes de l' effort), just as 
Table 1.1 
Social Societal Types of Name of the Sources of Conception of Judicial 
organisation structure relations judicial apparatus law the judicial system organisation 
Elementary Internal to Mythical Original uses Conciliatory justice 
(kin-based kin group or practice internal to group 
power) 
Semi- Internal, or Customary Original Accumulation of Conciliatory justice 
elementary internal- practice/use legal sources internal to group 
(kin-politico external by +custom and techniques + inter-family 
power) alliances arbitrary justice 
Oral and Semi-complex Internal, Legalistic Original Conciliatory justice 
community (duality of internal- practice/use + internal to 
based kin based external, custom + oral group + 
and political external, by laws and inter-family 
llilioll power) treaty or by conventions arbitrary justice + 
agreement contending 
between the political justices 
communities 
Complex Valorisation Legalistic Development Joint utilisation of 
(plurality of of external of traditional the relations (") powers with relations, and law and between human- c: 
a weakening to the detriment conventions. human, l.ll ...... 
of kin based of internal Use/practice human-object, 0 
power) relations and custom human-god 3 
are secondary !l.I ::i sources. 0... Literate Complex Private or Legalistic-stately Law/convention, Weakening or State justice and ...... 
(plurality of public, custom replacing of the inter-state justice ::r-
powers which national or (accessory oldest sources, (international f'I> -
Individualistic are non kin international source) reliance on the jurisdictions) !l.I 
or communal based) act of writing � 
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the Muslim doctors would later do themselves. 29 The Middle Ages concluded 
with the ordinance of Montils-les-Tours, which ordered the official 
codification of the customs of France, thus transmuting them into royal law. 
The penetration of Roman law as a tool of unification for the kingdom was 
favoured by the royal power, under the pretext that the diversity of customs 
was synonymous with anarchy and that customs were of a lower technical 
level (in fact, as I have tried to show elsewhere, these were mainly 
propaganda arguments30). The first codifications of French law took place 
during the reign of Louis XIV, the only monarch that was truly absolute. 
The Napoleonic codes started at the beginning of the Empire,31 and we 
know that Napoleon ordered his prefects to write up inventories of local 
practices so as to better unify them. 32 But how then to legitimise the authority 
that the powers at hand invest in the law? The gods, or the unique God, 
have time and time again brought their precious aid to this aim. This allows, 
as L.R. Menager writes, he who proclaims the law to unfold ' ... the long 
carpet of prayers on which all the appetites for power come to kneel.'33 
Because it is in God that the law34 and power come together.35 God was 
therefore the first fundamental norm. Later, other principles like Reason, or 
Progress would strip him of his place, after having been associated with 
him (at the end of the seventeenth century, Domat contended that legislation 
was inspired from Faith and from Reason). The idea of progress attached 
itself to that of the law: the law became a legal instrument of change, which 
could only be for the good of all people. Thus we come to the credos of 
nineteenth century evolutionism, taken up during the African 
independencies by many new states. In the name of economic development 
and national unity, these states tried to seal the destiny of customs. E. Le 
Roy has summed up this process geographically. 
France, where the state was made a nation as early as the Middle-ages, 
is one of the western countries which has pushed the principle of a hierarchy 
of norms furthest. This hierarchy is arranged in a strictly vertical model. In 
a recent thesis, D. de Bechillon38 clearly demonstrates how this principle 
works as a powerful organising force while relegating custom to the side. 39 
While deconstructing the mechanisms involved, the author highlights how 
the acceptance of this model by most French lawyers shows a representation 
of the law which is radically hostile to pluralism. 
What are we aiding and abetting? Nothing less than the removal of layers. 
Everything happens as if upholding an organic and formal model of the 
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Ancient and traditional societies 
Socio-cosmic order 
Invisible world 
God 
The Gods 
Fetishes, Idols 
Socio-legal order - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(that which is permitted) 
Visible world 
(tolerated, defended) 
Central structure: myths, customs 
Residential 
organisation 
Modern societies 
anthropomorphic representations 
Nature 
Chance 
Reason 
Socio-legal order - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Central structure 
The law, the pontiff, text 
hierarchy of norms allowed for a progressive completion, more or less 
romantic image, one that is frozen off from legal realities. Nothing moves, 
nor escapes, from this terse order of predetermined forms40 • • •  Relative to 
pluralism, the true power of the reference to hierarchy depends on its 
ultimate annihilation of the multiplicity within its sphere, rather than just 
a framing of it.' As a result, a hierarchy of norms, which is conceived of as 
an a priori form of juricidity within the State, can be understood as a state 
instrument for the negation of pluralism, a convenient method for a bridat 
d'emergence. The perfect tool for the flattening of multiplicities. That is 
the essence of the modern continental State; that is the consubstantial 
nature of the hierarchy of its norms.41 
These reflections from D. de Bechillon lead us to think about the link 
between the level of specialisation of political power and the principle of 
legal hierarchy, and they do so by pointing to anthropological data. In fact, 
this principle of legal hierarchy can be exercised in an opposite direction to 
that with which we are familiar. In a system where political units are kept 
Custom and the law 
isolated, the heads of the largest units may have less power than those of 
the smaller political units. The principle of legal hierarchy can also be 
implemented in the way to which we are accustomed 
. . .  authority and power increase from the base to the summit; the superior 
power has a reserved power of decision making and can modify, or even 
eliminate, the decisions of an inferior power.42 
We are dealing here with non-state societies, which have individualised 
governance. The state appears with the existence of a specialised tool of 
government-relations of patronage or of administrative subordination. 
The traditional state is based more on patronage and is more segmentary. 
The principle of legal hierarchy is less pronounced than in a unitary state, 
the more common form of governance for modern societies. If the theories 
of W. Lapierre are correct, the determining factor for the appearance/ 
emergence of a state is the level of heterogeneity that the society has 
achieved, and the consequent invention of a new political form which can 
ensure its unity. We can thus understand why the legal system tends to 
react to increased social and p olitical c omplexification with a 
corresponding increase in hierarchies (or uniformities). But not all modern 
states follow the same path as France, which has clearly demonstrated 
this tendency. This points to the fact that aside from structural factors, the 
history, traditions, and mentalities/perspectives of each country also have 
a role to play, which may or may not compensate for these structural 
determinations. We can only note how difficult it is to do research on 
custom-especially native custom-in terms of reference which are familiar 
to French lawyers. 
The re l ativity of the l eg a list ic  model 
By accepting to move in a world of legal pluralism we are giving ourselves 
more breathing space.43 To sum up, we could say that the representations of 
the law that emerge from it tend to be horizontal, or circular, rather than 
vertical. The role of state law tends to become more relativised through 
different theories. These models no longer show the romantic (soldatesque) 
nature of the French vision-individuals behave as actors, strategically 
adapting and readapting their inclusion in the different legal systems.44 
Finally, as the Japanese legal anthropologist Chiba has convincingly 
demonstrated, different judicial orders permeate one another.45 Through 
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the unfolding of history, and thus of political relations of force/power, 
unofficial laws become official, and vice versa.46 
Within this system of references, custom, as an autonomous mode of 
legal production, can not only have the same weight as, or be equivalent to, 
the law, but can even go beyond it.47 State law can be less constraining than 
the internal law of one of the groups to which an individual belongs. 
Have we just described two extreme and inherently incompatible models, 
from which an observer could choose according to what he or she seeks? 
That is extremely unlikely, because the model of modernity and its French 
interpretation, now seems to have several shortcomings. As P. Issalys notes, 
the link between law and reason has been stretched.48 Legal authority is 
founded on the suffrage of a representative majority. The logic of dealing 
with social conflicts is tending more and more towards notions of transaction 
and compromise (as opposed to the enunciation and application of pre­
established norms). The renewal of the ideology of natural human rights 
weakens the prominence of law by showing how it can be unjust or irrational. 
Over a century ago, Marx claimed that the law was only a superstructure of 
the dominant relations of production. Today, neoliberals are more ready to 
put the control of law in the hands of judges than the state (for Hayek, 'true' 
law is customary before it is anything else). On a more general level, 
individuals, including those in France, are less likely to accept the state as 
the only producer of collective norms (hence the emergence of the distinction 
between 'civil society' and the 'state'). In a recent work, M. Delmas-Marty 
demonstrates how, in terms of internal law, the hierarchy of norms is not 
absolute.49 The European legal order leaves a lot of autonomy to the various 
normative and jurisprudential entities that compose it-we will have to 
learn to live with multiple hierarchies (some of which are incomplete), which 
brings us back to the vision of legal pluralism.50 
Finally, we can note that, although the revolutionary vision according to 
which' ... the deified statue of the Law must be erected, without any rivals, 
on the ruins of old fashioned customs'51 still permeates the civilist doctrine, 
this representation is no longer unanimously shared by all of the privatists. 52 
The theses of the Ecole Sociologique, which contend that the law does not 
have the monopoly of legal production, have been particularly noted by the 
commercial sector. And we can note that, in accordance with the decline of 
custom in the classical sense, 'a growing section in private law of a sort of 
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soft law, with non-formal modes of establishing rules of conduct'53 
corresponds. 
The French vision of the hierarchy of norms, and its apparent inflexibility, 
does not therefore present unsurmountable and eternal obstacles for those 
who are interested in indigenous customs in our state. 
But what, in fact, is custom? 
Immutable  custom 
Custom is no less subject to the entanglements of representation than the 
law. Do we want to legitimise it? When we do legitimise it, we invoke its 
ancientness, its repetition-in other words, its trustworthiness. Immutability 
thus becomes the dominant image--custom persists by surviving. And do 
we wish to safeguard it? We would then insist on the harmony between a 
custom and the needs of the group which generated it, on its infinite capacity 
to adapt. Immutability would become substituted by flexibility ('custom 
stirs itself up/moves about (se remuer)' said the lawyers of the Middle 
Ages); its chronological underpinning, essential to the classical definitions, 
could even quasi-evaporate.54 In such terms, neither of these are true or 
false-it all depends on the context in which custom is appealed to, and 
what people want to make it say. 
Custom belongs to the sparkling universe of 'floating signifiers', and we 
need to ask the pertinent questions of J. Combacau. 
A suspicion then emerges: and what if more dissimilar realities underlie 
all these uniform words? If the apparent homogeneity of customary 
process, with its unwavering partner-practice, opinio iuris-was only a 
facade to cover various modes of the formation of law? What if even the 
qualification of custom made improper assumptions of certain 
procedures in which there is neither the issue of time, that of repetition, 
nor any of the properties which normally characterise it in common 
language?55 
The fact is that custom like the law, suffers from the attractiveness of 
dominant representations which a priori, render such observations irreverent. 
Representati ons of a ncientness 
In the terms of the great divide put forward by A. Comte in the nineteenth 
century between ethnology, the study of primitive people, and sociology, 
which is dedicated to civilised societies, most lawyers have deducted a 
series of binary oppositions whereby custom is systematically devalourised. 
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A summary typology can be drawn up as below.56 
Custom law 
Pre-law Law 
Oral Written 
Empirical Rational 
Archaic Modern 
Legal ethnology, a kind of ancillary history of exotic laws, was consigned 
to the study of custom, whereas most real lawyers maintained more pure 
sources. Thus, the importance of both oral and written customs was (and 
still is) diminished within modem Western legal systems. In the same vein, 
during the 1930s the Ecole du Folklore Juridique (School of Legal Folklore), 
created by Maunier in the wake of his studies of colonial law at the University 
of Algiers, sought to research the survival of ancient systems of norms and 
legal behaviours in the practices of rural France. Here, again, custom is 
defined in terms of ancientness. 
At the same time, nineteenth century social anthropology was dominated 
by Anglo-Saxons, and the diverse modalities of functionalism. These 
presented a vision of traditional society that was distortingly stable, thus 
reinforcing the archetype of the immutability of custom and myth. G. 
Balandier has made an inventory of these representations of traditional 
society so as to criticise them better. 
(a) It is a society that conforms to the models implied by the mythical 
charter ('traditions'), which follows the initial, and ongoing, conception of 
the order of the world and the order of humanity ... 
(b) It is a society of conformity and consensus which leaves little (or no) 
room for dissension, and thus to contestation. It uses effective 
mechanisms of conflict resolution to eclipse all the elements of 
dissension ... 
(c) It is a repetitive society, reproduced from generation to generation 
without any significant variation to its structures. This pure and simple 
reproduction is explained by nature and the consistent functioning of 
social instruments. These are used as a resource by both tradition and its 
agents, and by the impossibility of an alternative, of different forms of 
social agency ... 
(d) It is a society situated out of history or on its margins, a 'cold' society, 
fixed at zero degrees of historical temperature . .. .57 
All of that has changed. 
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The construction of customary identity 
Let us make a rapid inventory of some of these mutations. 
The dynamic school, ethnohistory, has shown that traditional societies 
were not immutable entities, closed off in themselves. Instead it insists on 
the irreversibility of acculturation initiated by colonialism, and on the fact 
that the political independencies of the new states have not hindered these 
acculturations. If customs were appealed to in anti-colonial struggles, the 
leaders of the new states were quick to bury them (and in that sense, the 
contemporary resurgence of customs in the French Overseas Territories may 
not have a long future). In the same way, the current renewal of phenomena 
of identification allow us to discern two concepts of identity. The first makes 
identity an objective reality-in this case, it pulls together a number of 
cultural traits which have been acquired through essentially historical 
processes, as is expressed in the concept of customs. It is identity as lived by 
those who claim it. On a scientific level, however, we must take note of the 
fact that identity is first and foremost instrumental-it is the result of a 
montage, which works hie et nunc, by actors who bricolenf the past, 
reinterpreting their traditions so as to modify the present (as many 
fundamentalist movements do). Thus, customs that are presented as 
immemorial and constant, are often likely not to be so. 
The School of Legal Folklore disappeared at the end of World War II. Its 
themes had been incorporated into Vichyist mythology, which keenly sought 
to revive a golden age prior to the Revolution and the Civil Code. 
French legal anthropology was born in the 1960s. Its theoreticians 
wanted to discontinue the old evolutionist slicing up of peoples. 
Anthropology included modern societies in its field of observation. We 
believe, following Levi-Strauss, that there is not a pensee des sauvages 
(thinking of the savages) and a pensee des civilises (thinking of the civilised). 
Rather the pensee sauvage and the pensee civilise exist, in different degrees, 
in all forms of humanity-rationality is not our privileged domain, any 
more than custom belongs exclusively to exotic societies, it can be as 
'modern' as the law. 
In fact, we would do well to substitute the term custom, a word that is 
encumbered with too many abusive uses and representations, with that of 
'a customary mode of the production of law'. In that way, custom would 
denote autonomous modes of engendering the law, allowing for the 
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recuperation, reinterpretation, and/ or combination of ancient elements 
(traditions) with new elements, rather than their partial, or total, elimination. 
Custom is not necessarily restrained by the past. 
Indeed, has it ever been? Here we should sum up the refined observations 
of J. Pouillon.58 Oral traditions, like writing, allow for a variability of customs 
in terms of processes of transmission, but with different processes. 
Ethnographers have long noted that there is no unique version of a narrative, 
or exact codifications of rituals, but, rather, 'a structured ensemble which 
tolerates, and even favours, a form of creativity.'59 Everything seems to change 
with writing, which instigates a model, thus privileging a conforming 
reproduction of practice-the official codification of customs freezes them. 
In fact, developments are possible, but only through a chronological 
accumulation of textual interpretations. These texts have to be reorganised, 
and it is sometimes necessary to make choices between them. The agents of 
change, however, are no longer the same. Customs continue to develop, but 
under the influence of lawyers and the powers that they serve, they move 
away from those that are supposed to observe them. 
So we are sent back to the notion of a customary mode of the production 
of law-real custom is defined more by its degree of autonomy than its age, 
to the point that, as J. Pouillon notes, the very act of institutionalising a 
custom risks rendering it obsolete.60 In this sense, the 'renewal' of customs 
in the French overseas territories can only be directed towards the future. 
J.M. Tjibaou understood this well, when he declared that 
[t]he return to tradition is a myth. No people have ever realised this. This 
search for identity, the model, for me it is in front of us, never behind; and 
I would say that our present struggle is about being able to put more 
aspects of our past, of our culture, into the construction of a model of 
humanity and society that we want for the betterment of the city. Our 
identity is in front of us.61 
This shows that the study of customs is inextricably linked to the 
perception of problems of a political order. 
The po l it ica l constra i nts 
The problem of the existence of indigenous custom is not new. The history 
of colonial laws attests to this. But the issue becomes different after 
independence, and in accordance with recent initiatives in international 
law, which do not represent the official position of the French government. 
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Furthermore, it is not sufficient to proclaim respect for indigenous custom 
to assure it a place-particularist models can just as easily lead to apartheid 
as to an authentic pluralism, because models become what people make of 
them. 
The troub l i ng evo l ution of i nternational  l a w  
During the last 15  years, international law has seen transformations that 
have moved it away from the official French position. More recently, the 
reinterpretation of the treaties made between indigenous peoples and the 
European nations during the period of colonisation has acted as a vector 
for the promotion of indigenous rights. 
The va lorisation of i dentit ies a n d  its l i m itations 
Who needs to worry about the transformations in international law? As we 
will see, probably not indigenous people, but more the lawyers who are 
committed to the French classical tradition.62 Indeed, immediately after 
World War II, the major international bodies were silent on the rights of 
minorities and indigenous people, who were called upon to dissolve 
themselves within states and dominant societies. In particular, this was 
related to the integrating effect of economic development and the common 
guarantee of human rights, which were mainly considered in their 
individualistic aspects. 
Things turned out differently. Since the 1970s, international law 
(European law and that of the CSCE followed a similar path63) has been 
criss-crossed with normative fluxes concerning minorities and indigenous 
people and declares their right to the preservation of cultural specificities, 
their customs, and their territories. Moreover, some of these rights, against 
French recommendations, are expressed in a collective/ communal form. 64 
This recognition of indigenous rights has its limits however. On the one 
hand, the range of rights recognised is generally tempered by its remoteness 
from legal process. On the other hand, these texts are declarative, and only 
bind states that wish to adhere to them. Often, the obligations they are held 
to are about methods, not results. Finally, one has to notice that the cultural 
values, specificities, and tradition protected by these instruments, are not 
defined. It is therefore up to the indigenous group itself to clarify the content 
of it. As I mentioned above, however, custom is more 'containing' than 
Custom and the law 
'content'-nothing is certain, and it is impossible that the specificities in 
question correspond to the observations made by ethnographers of old, 
some several centuries ago. History has also passed by these people, who 
have had to redefine their identities. 
This leads to at least three questions. How can potential conflicts of 
norms be resolved? The legislative autonomy of indigenous people can 
lead to a formulation of norms which do not correspond to the civil order of 
the states concerned, or even to human rights and fundamental liberties. At 
the moment, the response of the international bodies is clear-indigenous 
norms must conform with internationally recognised norms in the area of 
human rights. Yet, the internal laws of the states also do not allow manifest 
violations of law and order. And it is not at all clear that these answers are 
those of all indigenous groups. Furthermore, what are the criteria for the 
qualification 'indigenous'? In general, they refer to features of a cultural 
order (language, religion), to a territorial link, and, more and more frequently, 
to subjective elements, in order to insure the respective rights of communities 
and individuals. Is an indigenous person one that considers him or herself 
indigenous, and is accepted as such by a group ?65 Besides, how 
representative are those that pretend to speak for their community? It is 
important to be careful here, every answer must be given on a case by case 
basis. Finally, it is necessary to be aware of the fact that the relative uniformity 
of international law on the rights of indigenous people does not at all exclude 
the very large diversity of their by-laws in the internal laws of the states (the 
eventual absence of a corresponding by-law actually reflects a position of 
principle on the question, as is the case for France). Generally speaking, 
indigenous people have the most beneficial legal arrangements (in North 
America and Scandinavia). In fact, 'the indigenous movements that have 
had the most success are those that have most integrated modernity'66-
proof that the renewal of customs is less a return to the past than a 
reinterpretation of it. This can also serve as an explanation for the renewal 
of interest in the treaties. 
A leg a l  a rchaeol ogy of the treaties 
In 1982, Canada put the rights of Amerindians (Indian, Inuit and mixed 
bloods) into the constitution in the shape of ancestral laws and rights 
stemming from the treaties. 
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The rights that exist-either ancestrally or as a result of treaties-for the 
indigenous peoples of Canada are recognised and confirmed . . .  the rights 
stemming from agreements about territorial claims or areas that could be 
acquired in such a way . . .  are understood to belong to the rights that 
emerge from the treaties.67 
One can see how this updating of the past represents a possible source 
of benefits for indigenous people in the present and the future. Until the 
middle of the nineteenth century, international doctrine was dominated by 
the idea that, in making treaties with the indigenous populations of America 
at the time of colonisation, the European states understood these to be 
contractual ties with sovereign nations. 68 This updating of the treaties does 
not concern Canada. In the United Nations, the subcommittee of the struggle 
against discriminatory measures and for the protection of minorities has 
undertaken the project of writing reports on the legal history of the treaties 
and their implications in the present. 69 
Of course, France's position towards its indigenous population is much 
less developed than that of Canada. This kind of research on the history of 
the treaties France made with its overseas possessions may, however, prove 
fruitful. In French Polynesia, the administrative court of Papeete recently 
heard a case where the Government Commissioner based his argument on 
certain arrangements in the Treaty of Annexation of 1880. On 5 November 
1991, the same courthouse passed a judgment which recognised a family's 
ownership of a portion of a lagoon. This was in consideration of the fact 
that the title deeds (the registration had been done in 1862) were previous to 
the French Treaty of Annexation of 1880. The government commissioner 
declared that 
. . .  [t]he Treaty of Annexation of 1880 specifies clearly that Polynesian 
customs must be preserved, which in our opinion, refers primarily to the 
rules of land ownership that are so important to Polynesian society.70 It is 
therefore not at all obvious, considering the higher status of treaties over 
laws, that the definition of the public domain in the Territory . . .  is legal.71 
W hich leads us to reflect on the different meanings of the notion of 'the 
respect of indigenous custom'. 
Respect of indi genous customs 
The principle of legislative specificity allows for a certain number of 
particularities to be manifest in the French Overseas Territories; Article 75 
of the Constitution recognises the existence of a dualism between the statute 
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of local law and that of common law. The development of the legislation 
applying to New Caledonia gives new impetus to Melanesian customs and, 
in the Department of Guyana, Arnerindians claim their indigenous rights.72 
Indigenous customs are emerging from obscurity. 
This movement takes shape within a much larger framework-that of 
the acceptance of cultural diversity in French law. As for actual indigenous 
customs, the New Caledonian example seems to demonstrate that it is mainly 
up to the judges to determine how they can be reconciled with the law. 
The a cceptance of cultura l  d ivers ity in French l aw 
Cultural diversity sterns from many different phenomena, and the law takes 
these into account in different ways and to different degrees.73 Colonisation 
was a situation which necessarily highlighted the manifestation of cultural 
diversity 
Following B.W. Morse, one can distinguish four ways of articulating the 
relation between indigenous laws and those of the colonisers.74 
• Total separation {the solution adopted by some eighteenth 
century British colonies in North America in respect to certain 
Indian nations with which they had signed treaties). 
• Cooperation-some criteria (territorial, personal, ratione 
materiae, etc.) can determine respective fields of expertise of 
several jurisdictional systems. One can thus decide that the law 
and colonial courthouses apply to both colonisers and 
indigenous people in all cases in the colonised areas. On the 
other hand, indigenous law only applies where the population 
of the territory in question is almost completely indigenous (the 
solution adopted for relations between the federal government, 
the states, and the tribal courts in the United States). 
" Incorporation-the dominant society integrates those aspects of 
the indigenous law that are not in flagrant contradiction with 
its fundamental values into its own system of internal law. 
Thus it admits the validity of certain forms of traditional 
marriage or adoption, or else it applies indigenous law through 
courts established by the colonisers (the solution adopted in 
Canada, in New Zealand at the moment, or in the old English 
colonies of Africa and Asia). 
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• Dismissal of indigenous law by the colonisers (the solution that 
has long been held by the Australian courts in relation to 
aboriginal law, or by some new states (the Ivory Coast) as a 
reaction against old customs). Of course, these models can be 
misleading. 
[T]he recognition of Indian and Inuit customary marriages by the 
Canadian courts is not well known by the Amerindian population, and 
has little actual effect on their lives. The dismissal of traditional aboriginal 
law by the Australian courts75 has not lead to its disappearance insofar as 
a lot of aborigines and inhabitants of the Torres Strait Islands continue to 
adhere to its principles, even though it may provoke conflicts with state­
controlled law. In other words, geographical isolation can diminish the 
impact of legal and legislative decisions.76 
Moreover, as the cases of certain Indian reservations in the United States 
demonstrate, the existence of an indigenous jurisdiction does not 
necessarily imply that traditional legal solutions are always sought out. 
On the contrary, a lot of justiciables have adopted western models.77 
All of this is food for thought for those of us who are interested in the 
renewal of customs in the French Overseas Territories. The chosen path 
seems to be that of incorporation, with the motif of respecting indigenous 
custom. Not all the ambiguities have been highlighted. On one hand, as we 
will see later,78 jurisprudential observations of customs can strongly modify 
them. On the other hand, the old experiences of colonial law show that 
respect for indigenous custom does not necessarily benefit the indigenous 
people.79 In his recent thesis, P. Ngom argues that in fact, behind the veil of 
the principle of respecting indigenous custom, the duality of statutes was 
mainly a technique of colonisation. 80 It allowed for an uneven distribution 
of power and of economic advantages between the mass of the indigenous 
population, who were by and large left to their original laws and the 
European minority and the indigenous elite, who were thus able to reap the 
benefits of modern law. We know that the French empire was, in principle, 
assimilationist. In fact, assimilation was rejected by the colonials in the 
name of respecting customs, or on the grounds that the desired transition 
towards civilisation needed a lot of time and required the planning of a 
dualistic regime. Under these conditions, valorisation of custom was the 
political tool of a colonialism which sought an alliance with the indigenous 
elite, who had a vested interest in appearing to respect customary law, 
insofar as the colonisation of customs comforted the authority of the 
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'traditional' chiefs, whose powers had in fact been deeply modified by the 
colonisers. Of course, the contexts have changed, and one would like to 
believe, alongside Y. Pimont, that81 
. .. the duality of statutes gives the legal systems of the TOM a complex 
and generally unrecognised character, but it also reveals that France did 
not, as it has often been accused of, systematically ignore the other in its 
politics of colonisation. It reveals that France knew how to maintain 
existing customs, to pay attention to the traditions of the countries and 
their populations, and was sometimes able to refuse the imposition of all 
aspects of what was considered to be modernity. 
However we must remain prudent here and continually ask who it is 
that benefits-or will benefit-from the renewal of customs. 
On a more general level, one can wonder how far the recognition of 
cultural p articularism can extend in our legal system. The French 
ideological context is generally unfavourable to its wide extension.82 A 
real rampart of constitutionality has been erected to repel any temptation 
of discrimination, which is constantly being surveyed by the constitutional 
judge. 
• Article I of the Declaration of Human Rights of 1789 says: 'All 
people are born and remain free and equal before the law . . .  '. 
" The preamble to the Constitution of 1946 says: ' . . .  The French 
people proclaim once again that all human beings, without 
distinction of race, religion, or belief, possess inalienable and 
sacred rights.' 
• Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Constitution of 1958 says: 'She 
[France] insures equality before the law for all citizens, without 
distinction of origin, race, or religion.' 
Then, the Code of criminal law, like the labour laws (Auroux laws of 
1982), contains several dispositions condemning discriminatory practices 
based on ethnicity or race. 83 What democrat would complain about this? 
If, however, insistence on the equality of the law can lead to a reduction 
of actual inequalities (the developments of the status of Jewish people is a 
good example), it can also conceal, and even permit, the increase of these 
same inequalities. Many examples throughout the world show that this is 
all too often the case for indigenous populations. The constitutional judge 
has ascertained that the principle of equal treatment does not prevent the 
legislator from treating differently certain categories of people in different 
situations. Positive discrimination, however, is still much less widely 
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accepted in French law than in North America, where indigenous people 
benefit from a more favourable status, at least on a legal level. 
Despite all of this, there are some signs that the French model is susceptible 
to reinterpretation. 84 The recognition of indigenous particularism seems to 
have been thwarted by the reiteration of the condemnation of ethnic 
discrimination. In France, ethnicity is almost synonymous with race. In 
fact, as I have attempted to show, ethnicity is a floating signifier-one can 
read into it whatever one wants.85 We must take note of the fact that from a 
scientific perspective, it is mainly cultural elements (notably linguistic) that 
define the notion of ethnicity. 86 In itself, ethnicity is not a racist concept, but 
it can obviously become so according to the use that one intends to make of 
it. French law does not in fact use the notion of ethnicity in an exclusively 
prohibitive way. D. Lochak notes that 
. . .  ethnicities have been defined by the legislator as specific 
administrative-and therefore legal-categories, thus determining the 
setting up of specific structures (such as the customary consultative 
councils instigated by the law of November 9, 1968, relating to the statute 
of New Caledonia).87 
In the same way, the constitutional judge who was summoned by a request for 
the annulment of a government bill aiming to define the regions of New 
Caledonia, and was criticised by the authors of the summons who argued that 
it sanctified ethnic difference did not annul the aforesaid project. Without either 
taking up, nor condemning, the word ethnicities, the council decided that 
. . .  the legislator, in defining the regions of a TOM, can take into account all 
aspects worthy of consideration, particularly that of the geographical 
distribution88 of populations.89 
Without it being possible to properly discuss the term of 'origin' here, 
which is the subject of Article 2 of the Constitution of 1958, there is a need 
for more research which seeks to explicate its content.90 
On a more general level, various indicators91 testify to a softening of the 
French model. As Dean Favoreu has noted 
[b]efore the decision of May 9, 1991, [relating to the statute of Corsica], 
the indivisibility of public life was supported, according to the 
jurisprudence of the Council, by two main pillars: the unity of normative 
power and institutional identity. Today, only the first really remains . . . .  92 
Indeed, the legislator can now extract an existing territorial community 
from the category to which it belongs and put it into a new category, in 
which it is the only example. If the TOM, according to Article 74 of the 
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Constitution, were already able to benefit from specific forms of organisation, 
the legislator was, on the other hand, until then bound/ compelled to respect 
the unity of every category of territorial community. The unity of normative 
power itself does not correlate with a uniformity of laws applicable in the 
territory, to the point that one could speak of France as a pluri-legislative 
State.93 The principle of legislative specificity proves this for the TOM­
Article 73 of the Constitution allows the Overseas Departments to make 
derogations and adaptations of metropolitan common law. 
In terms of the right to self-determination, R. Debbasch and A. Roux 
have noted that during the decision on Corsica the Constitutional Council 
referred to the Constitution of 1958, affirming that it ' distinguishes between 
the French people and people overseas, who are recognised as benefiting 
from the right to self-determination', whereas, in fact, Article I of the 
Constitution refers to the people of overseas territories. They conclude that 
[t]he Constitutional Council certainly implies that people of the DOM also 
benefit from this right, which on the other hand is excluded for 
communities in metropolitan France. 
As we all know, however, these various considerations do not signify 
the existence of several French peoples, as was decided by the Council in 
the case of Corsica. This case founded the unity of the French people much 
more on Article 2 (paragraph I) of the Constitution, prohibiting distinctions 
of origin, race and religion, than on the notion of the indivisibility of the 
Republic. In our understanding, one cannot avoid noting that this runs 
into an important problem. If the overseas populations are the only ones to 
benefit from the right to self-determination, how can we reconcile the unity 
of the French people with the fact that the Constitution (Preamble and Article 
I), in mentioning the Republic and the populations of the overseas territories, 
makes a clear distinction between these two concepts, though it does not 
oppose them, even though they are both clearly part of the Republic? The 
problem doesn't appear to have been properly resolved yet, and the attention 
given to indigenous custom brings the need for solutions into focus. Will 
the new jurisprudence on these customs allow us to progress on this front? 
The j u risprudentia l  observation of customs 
The New Caledonian example-the creation of customary assessors in 1982, 
the planning of separated sections for the islands and within the Grande 
Terre by a law of 1989-seems to show that in the renewal of customary 
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practices, judges will increasingly become the intermediaries for the 
institutionalisation of custom. 
The role of the judge has always been essential to the theory of custom­
it is understood that the judge does not create the rules, but limits him or 
herself to deciding what are already perfectly legal norms.94 Along the same 
lines, at the time of the installation of the Customary Consultative Council 
in New Caledonia in 1992 
. . .  the minister of the DOMS-TOM declared that the French government 
did not actually create the legitimacy of the customary authorities, but 
that it only recognised it. . . .  95 
Yet, although custom is certainly of foreign origin in relation to a judge, 
it would be delusional to believe that the judges only reveal custom.96 The 
jurisprudentialisation of custom necessarily transforms it. This is because 
judges must qualify custom to keep some of its elements or entrench others 
according to the litigation upon which they are acting. The history of colonial 
law,97 once more, requires vigilance. Under the pretence of clarifying 
(clarification has always been one of the arguments for opponents of custom, 
which quickly slips from the issue of rationalisation), one can easily succeed 
in creating rules where previously there were none. A judge can (and even 
has to) separate customs deemed contrary to public law and order; in which 
case he or she would have to choose (on what criteria?) between different 
customs. 
Moreover, the proof of a custom can require the judge to have a type of 
ethnographic and anthropological knowledge that he or she does not 
necessarily possess. These customs descend from traditional oral cultures, 
and could be proven by references to myths, proverbs, and to ethno-historical 
data.98 Clearly, it would not be easy for a judge to appreciate the value of 
historical or anthropological proof. The nature of sources correlates with 
the capacity for interpretation, and one can easily see how he or she could 
become a co-creator of the custom. Thus, it is necessary to properly take into 
account the degree to which a judge is representative of the indigenous 
population whose customs he or she is called on to express. 
Condorcet wrote that 
[u]niformity, in all objects of public law and order, is an added good 
between men; all difference is a seed of dissidence. 99 
Custom and the law 
At the end of the twentieth century, which has seen so many false 
ecumenisms erected and then destroyed, one can only hope that the message 
of the famous mathematician won't be heard, because an imposed 
standardisation can lead to conflict, as can a rejected difference. In today's 
world, a culture cannot hope to fully preserve its specificity any more than 
customs express an impermeable past. Any customary revival that takes a 
bygone past for a model is ipso facto doomed to failure. This does not mean 
that dissolution into the uniformity imposed by the stronger or most numerous 
is desirable. It is more fitting, on the contrary, for every culture to enter into the 
great game of exchange and mutual reinterpretation, accepting that its own 
autonomy is only relative. 'To start with diversities so as to transcend them 
better '-this is the biggest stake for legal anthropology today . 
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. . .  A Melanesian is attached b y  the very fabric o f  his being to the 
group . . .  his worth is relative to the group and the specific 
position he occupies within it . . .  he is qualified by this position, 
and is only 'real' through it and the role attached to it; he is one 
of the personas in the large game of the group . . .  which must 
insure its own perpetuation and glory . . .  
M .  Leenhardt, Do kamo. 
When the large European powers decided to set up colonial dependencies, 
the dominant doctrine for relations with the colonised society was that of 
assimilation. 1  It had the systematic effect of directly transposing the 
metropolitan laws to the newly acquired territory. 
France, which has a written law inspired by Christianity, did not escape 
this influence. But, when the French administration was confronted with 
populations who often had an elaborate social and legal organisation, but 
whose basis was noticeably different (such as, for an example of a 
irreconcilable case, the practice of polygamy), it tried to imagine a legal 
framework which would allow it to apply the essentials of French laws, 
while maintaining, as far as possible, the reality of the sociological identities 
of the indigenous populations. Obviously this did not stop a certain amount 
of acculturation in the colonised society, and even sometimes a quasi-total 
legal deculturation. The issue is important, and here we will only explore 
the initiatives that were undertaken to at least recognise, if not integrate, 
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the specifics of the populations France had decided to administer when it 
took control of New Caledonia on 24 September 1853. 
It was essentially the civil code that was adapted for New Caledonia, 
either along the same lines as for other Overseas Territories, or by giving 
itself, or being given, new legal structures. 
In order to discern the initiatives which led towards a recognition of 
these rights to be different, we explore the tools used for implementation. 
Thus, this chapter examines the actions undertaken by 
the constituent 
the legislator 
the territorial organs. 
The work of the constituent-pa rt icu l a r  c ivi l status 
This is  the centrepiece of compromise-currently it  only exists in the 
Overseas Territories, and then only in New Caledonia2 and in Wallis and 
Futuna.3 Itno longer exists in French Polynesia as a result of the application 
of the decree of 24 March 1945, which decided on the unification of statutes, 
and was finalised by the decree of implementation of 5 April 1945. 
Rem i nder of the ori g i ns of part icu lar  civi l status4 
Particular civil status can be seen as being centred on the 1946 Constitution, 
which eliminated the word 'colonies' in favour of 'Overseas Territories'. 
Before 1946. At that stage the distinction between status corresponded to 
a distinction between citizens and non-citizens. People who were subject 
to French common law in its entirety were considered citizens, and non­
citizens were governed by a different set of laws. 
This distinction was grounded in the law of 24 April 1833, which was 
essentially created with the so-called plantation colonies in mind. In 
practice it led to difficulties in certain other territories, particularly Africa 
and India. 
After 1946. The constitution of 1946 marked an important turning point in 
the conception of the civil status of persons, because the qualifications of a 
citizen were to be generalised. Article 80 of the constitution declared that 
all the inhabitants of the Overseas Territories will be classed as citizens, on 
the same level as French nationals in the metropolis or in the Overseas 
Territories. 
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Thus citizenship and nationality became perfectly assimilated. Yet this 
did not entail a unification of civil status-the two regimes would continue 
to co-exist, representing two different categories of people. 
The d u a l i ty of status in the con stitutio n a l  texts 
In the 1946 constitution. Article 82 of the constitution stated that 
Citizens who do not have French civil status, maintain their personal status 
as long as they have not renounced it. 
People who maintained their personal status were sometimes called 
citizens of local status. As far as the category of citizens of French status 
was concerned, it included 
people originating from the Metropole, the French West Indies, 
Guiana, Reunion Island, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Sainte 
Marie, and the French establishments of Oceania 
people of foreign origin who acquired French nationality 
either by law or by naturalisation 
people who, through the application of previous texts, had 
obtained a legal recognition of citizenship and those who 
were given this qualification by decree or as the result of a 
judgment 
the descendants of all of these people. 
As Article 82 indicated, the two categories were not rigidly separated­
it was possible to move from one to the other by abandoning local status 
in favour of French status. This one-way movement is typical of the doctrine 
of assimilation-the indigenous person can only evolve along the lines of 
one model, that which is exemplified by 'French status'. 
The duality of status after 1958. The 1958 Constitution retained the 
principle of the duality of status by virtually copying the formula of Article 
82 of the 1946 constitutional texts. Thus, in the words of Article 75 of the 
new constitution 
Citizens of the Republic who do not have a common law civil status, retain 
their personal status as long as they have not renounced it. 
The only modification is the introduction of the expression common law 
civil status to replace French civil status. 
The possibility of moving from one category to the other has been 
maintained, with the same restriction-according to the constitution, the 
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renunciation of status is only open to citizens with a particular (personal) 
status and not to citizens of common law status. 
The modal ities of moving from one category to the other 
The main objective of the writers of the constitutional text was to allow 
people who had retained their own status to obtain common law civil 
status as soon as their lifestyle was close enough to metropolitan concepts 
and thus to the characteristics of common law status citizens. 
The possibility of changing categories had been long foreseen. Even 
before the 1946 constitution it was possible to pass from a non-citizen status 
to that of citizen. There were three procedures used for this, in the countries 
that were attached to France. 
Admission to citizenship by decree. According to this procedure, the 
passage from one category to the other came from an individual 
administrative decision, as it was instigated by a statement declaring 
'admission to the benefits of the rights of French citizens' (for New 
Caledonia, it was the decree of 3 September 1932). The government would 
only apply this measure if certain conditions were met 
level of assimilation (language knowledge, lifestyle and social 
habits similar to those of the metropolis) 
moral condition (lack of condemnation) 
sometimes, level of qualification (diploma, accomplished 
services, military grades, state decorations). 
When these conditions were amassed, the government was able to decide 
whether to bestow citizenship. 
Admission by judgment. This technique was only applied in two territories 
(West Africa and Madagascar); it did not exclude admission by decree but it 
was more rigorous, because it required the condition of qualifications. On 
the other hand, the court had only to verify whether the conditions were 
met, and if so they were obliged to bestow the change of category. 
Renunciation of personal status. This procedure was already controlled 
by a decree of 21 September 1881, which only concerned the settlements 
in India. It was not an admission to citizenship, only a renunciation of 
personal status. Any doubts which could have emerged were dissipated 
by the Cour de Cassation which confirmed that the effects of the two 
procedures were identical. 5 
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The change of category stemmed neither from an administrative act, 
nor from a legal decision, but from a simple declaration by the person 
wishing to change status. This renunciation could be made before an officer 
of the state, or before a judge or solicitor. The option was open to minors 
as long as they were accompanied by a person whose agreement was 
required to attest to the validity of a marriage. 
Whatever the procedure (renunciation or admission), the consequences 
were identical-complete change of personal status. If this situation was 
of consequence to future events, however, it had no effect on the validity 
of past acts, or of situations acquired under the old status. 
With regard to New Caledonia, people who come under a particular 
status can still, to this day, renounce it. The procedure involved was the 
subject of a memorandum of 15 January 1963, which was a reminder that 
the competent authority for the renunciation of personal status is the civil 
court of Noumea, which should be presented with a written statement 
detailing the motives for the request. It also stated that the request of the 
head of a family includes the change of status of all of his children who are 
not y et of legal age, and of his wife, should she appear in the request and 
sign it with him. 
The automatic change of the status of children has been criticised 
because it has been deemed contrary to the principle of individual choice 
of renunciation. 6 If this contestation were to be sustained, however, it would 
entail resolving the problem of the homogeneity of the family, as a child 
born after the renunciation of his or her parents would come under a 
common law status that would not apply to his or her elder siblings. The 
competence of the court was confirmed by the code of legal organisation 
which gave the Court of Great Instance (tribunal de grande instance) exclusive 
competence in matters of the status of persons (Decree 78-329 of March 
16, 1978 which became article L-311-2). 
The effectiveness of particu l a r  civ i l  status in New Ca ledonia 
This corresponds t o  the existence o f  two civil states-common law civil 
state, and civil state of citizens of particular status-whose acts and 
procedures differ notably (marriage, birth, adoption, death). But its daily 
implementation poses a number of problems, which are amplified in 
several hypotheses of the encounter between the two.7 
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The field of application of particular civil status can be approached in 
two ways, according to the criteria used. 
Material criterion. The main effects of the difference between 
statuses are in the realm of civil law. This applies both to 
persons, whose status differs notably (birth-adoption­
marriage-death), and to goods, as inheritance is regulated for 
citizens of particular status, by rules which are outside the 
realm of common law. 
Personal criterion. Particular status applies to Melanesians 
who have not articulated a renunciation of their status. In 
1990, the services of the particular civil state estimated them to 
comprise a population of about 78,000; taking the birth rates 
given by this service into account, we can reasonably estimate 
them to number about 86,000 in 1994. In contrast to contemp­
orary administrative practice, it also applies to people origin­
ating from Wallis and Futuna, who were either born in, or 
came to, the territory. In fact, following Article 2 of the law of 
29 July 1960, Wallisians and Futunese retain their particular 
status as long as they have not formally forsaken it. To the best 
of our knowledge, the acquisition of a maritime or aerial 
transport licence and the fact of being born outside of a TOM 
have never had the legal effect of a remission of status. The 
communal administration, which is responsible for managing 
the civil state, currently bases many of its actions on a mis­
understanding of applicable law. Having said this, it is easy to 
discern the explicitly political dimension of this attitude in 
Noumea and the bordering/ surrounding communities. 
The situation is problematic when citizens of particular status migrate 
from New Caledonia or Wallis and Futuna, even if only temporarily. 
Studies, military service and professional activities are only some of the 
possibilities which can instigate civil acts. Because of the absence of a 
register for particular status outside these two territories, this can lead to 
a situation where, for example, a child born of parents of particular status 
is in fact a future common law citizen. The problem will be amplified when 
the citizen concerned returns to New Caledonia, or Wallis and Futuna, 
and tries to obtain a particular civil status which, judicially speaking, he 
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never lost, but which the administration will not recognise, or will only 
grant with great difficulty. Yet the solution is simple. Ratification of a 
regulatory text which would complement the current dispositions on civil 
matters would suffice to resolve the problem. 
Disputes that a ri se from the encounter of the two statuses 
These types of conflicts, which are relatively frequent, have often been the 
focus of administrative initiatives, a fact which allows us to discern some 
practices. For a number of years the civil jurisdiction and the Noumea 
court of appeal have attempted to build a coherent system of jurisprudence 
by trying to impose the principle of the equality of civil status whilst still 
adhering to the rights of children.8 Actually, as we will explore, the long­
standing applied rule, although it has been contested, has been the primacy 
of common law status. 
Here we will limit ourselves to the problems encountered in mixed 
unions and adoptions, thus setting aside the difficulties encountered in 
land tenure matters which could easily justify a specific symposium 
themselves. 
• The consequences of mixed unions. The absence of any 
regulatory or legislative text other than the Resolution 424 of 
the Territorial Assembly (3 April 1967)9 relating to the state of 
citizens of particular status, means that vast areas of 
uncertainty plague the issue. Administrative practice has 
attempted to overcome these gaps for reasons of pragmatism. 
The difficulties can be divided into two large categories, 
depending on whether the mixed union is legitimate or 'free' 
(libre). 
Legitimate mixed unions. According to Article 42 of the 
resolution of 3 April 1967, 'mixed marriages . . .  can only take 
place in front of an officer of the state of common law'. The 
primacy of common law is affirmed-even if the spouses ask 
for it, they cannot follow the procedures which apply to 
particular status citizens. These allow the marriage to be 
celebrated according to customary practice before being 
certified, within 30 days of the event, by the mayor of the place 
where it happened. 
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One may also wonder what would happen should two citizens of 
particular status wish to celebrate their marriage in front of the mayor 
according to the procedures set out for common law citizens? Lacking a 
choice, it appears that one would have to refer to the words of the extremely 
restrictive Article 40, which stipulates that '[m]arriages of particular status 
citizens are regulated by custom'. 
We can extract two outcomes from this text 
a mixed marriage entails common law effects and thus 
involves a partial renunciation of status by the spouse of 
particular status (so that, for example, the marriage could only 
be dissolved by judgment) 
any acts that stem from the marriage (including births) are 
registered under common law. 
However, we must take note of the fact that this situation does not lead 
to a change of status for the particular status spouse, which is quite logical 
as the renunciation of particular status in favour of a common law status 
can only be made by a personal declaration presented to the civil court/ 
tribunal. 
Children born of such a union are therefore registered under common 
law status. The attitude of the applied law marks a radical change. 
According to a memorandum of 9 August 9 1959, it was the father who 
was the determining element . 
. . .  [A] child born of a mixed marriage will be of common law status if the 
father is also of common law status, and of particular status if the father is of 
that status. 
There is still one major problem with this-when the child attains legal 
age, he or she will not have the option of choosing whether to maintain his 
or her common law status or reject it in favour of particular status. The 
absence of any choice has to be conceived of within the hypothesis that the 
difference in status has no other effect than that of being inscribed in one or 
the other civil register. This is a disturbing gap as it is perfectly reasonable 
to assume that the lifestyle of the child could lead him or her to prefer a 
customary social structure over a European one. As this is a regulatory text, 
the only necessity for its modification is the desire to do so by the competent 
authority. However, the recognition of customary rights would probably 
allow for a complete re-analysis of this state of affairs and of the law. 
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Defacto m ixed u n ions 
In the above case there are no real problems for the parents who can, of 
course, maintain their personal status. The two issues that can become 
controversial are 
the civil status of the child 
choosing the name that the child must have. 
The status of a natural (biological) child of a de�facto mixed union. The 
silence of the texts on this issue leaves much room for doubt, which is 
further compounded by the administrative practice of relying on two points 
whose legal foundations are shaky. The first is the primacy of common 
law status over particular status, and the second is the implicit existence 
of a link between the recognition and the civil status of the child. 
Practice has interwoven these two elements so much that it is often 
admitted that the recognition of a natural/biological child by the parent 
who is of common law status entails the attribution of this status to the 
child, whatever the means of recognition (simultaneous, deferred, with or 
without prior recognition by the parent of common law status). This 
unwritten rule was a potential source of serious problems in cases of 
deferred or later recognition by the parent of common law status. 
In reality, this case is quite common. A mother of particular status 
recognises the child at birth, and the father only does so later. In this 
situation, according to current administrative practice, the child will be of 
particular status when recognised by the mother, but will move to a 
common law status once the father has recognised it.10 There is thus an 
implicit link between recognition and civil status, along the same lines as 
the link between legitimation and nationality. Yet there was nothing to 
confirm this theory, and it could be maintained that the child in this case 
retains his or her particular status. This rationale was finally adopted by 
the Noumea Court of Appeal, which passed a judgement on 3 September 
199011 deciding that, in this case, the child was of particular status and 
could not be changed for circumstances which were beyond his or her 
own desire. The only exception for this rule, which now seems firmly 
established in the court, relates to (natural) children who are later 
legitimised by a marriage-the change of status (to a common law status) 
allows for consistency in the statuses of children born before and during 
the marriage.12 
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The name of a child of a defacto mixed union. If there is a simultaneous 
recognition of the child by both parents, then the situation presents no 
problems. Difficulties arise when the case is as cited above (posterior 
recognition by the parent of common law status). In fact, the solution differs 
according to whether the child is of particular status or not. 
If the child is of particular status, the rule in use is that put forward by 
the decree of 25 August 1967 which states that 'the child always takes the 
father 's name if it has been recognised by him, even if it was registered 
under the mother's name at birth'. 
If the child, according to the above theory, changed status when the 
father recognised it then the following pattern applies. 
After recognition by the mother, the child is of particular 
status and carries the maternal patrynomic name. 
After recognition by the father, the child becomes a common 
law citizen and Article 334-1 of the civil code applies-he or 
she will keep the mother's name. To take his or her father's 
name the child would have to be situated within the scope of 
Articles 334-2 and 334-3 of the civil code.13 Although the 
situation has not given rise to an abundance of cases, there is 
still an interesting invalidating decision by the Noumea Court 
of Appeal,14 which had to decide that 'in the absence of specific 
measures for the naming of children of mixed unions, it is 
appropriate to apply the measures of the civil code'. 
The p roblem of adoption 
The problem is similar to that of mixed unions/marriages, because in this 
case as well administrative practice sought to sidestep the inadequacy of 
the rule of law before the civil jurisdiction elaborated a number of rules of 
jurisprudence. Three situations are possible. 
Adoption of a person of particular status by people of the same status. 
Article 37 of the ruling of 3 April 1967 is clear on this point-the adoption 
is managed according to customary rules and a consensual agreement 
between the involved families. The administration consults the involved 
families or clans through a statement of agreement drawn up by the 
Syndicate of Melanesian Affairs. 
But in most cases the adoption is not brought to the administration's 
knowledge unless there are financial consequences (for example, family 
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allowance grants). Customary adoptions can therefore happen without 
the acknowledgment of the civil state, particularly as customary practice 
recognises two forms of adoption, these being 
• the straightforward gift of a child, which can be seen as 
provisional care situation, but as more than the western 
mechanism of parental delegation 
• the permanent giving of the child, which can be classed as 
adoption but without the French legal distinction between 
simple adoption and plenary adoption-customary adoption 
must therefore be considered plenary in light of its 
implications. 
Adoption of a person of particular status by common law citizens. The 
rules of adoption in common law apply here, meaning those delineated in 
the text of the civil code (Articles 343 to 370-2). The difficulty lies in 
determining the status of the adopted child. Legal and administrative 
practice agree on this point-the adopted child takes the status of the 
parents, thus that of common law. Because there are no specific regulations, 
or legislation, however, uncertainty clouds the issue. If we admit that there 
is a change of status in the case of a plenary adoption, the case of a simple 
adoption still poses problems. 
Adoption of a person of common law status by people of particular 
status. This situation is delicate and has not been categorically resolved, 
either by the administration or by the civil judiciary. 
If one starts from the principal of the superiority of common law (as 
the administration does), and bases oneself on the letter of the constitution, 
which only makes provisions for a change of status from particular status 
to that of common law and not in the other direction, then one ends in a 
double bind. 
In relation to the civil status of the adopted party: if we follow the 
position outlined above then the adopted party must carry the status of 
the adopting party (parties). In practice, however, that would mean moving 
from a common law status to a particular status, which is not provisioned 
for by the Constitution; this outcome would in fact be considered contrary 
to the word of the Constitution.15 
In relation to the form and procedures of the adoption: as outlined 
above, it is the status of the adopters that decides the procedures to be 
followed. But this principle cannot be applied to the case in question, for it 
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is hard to see how a person of common law status could be adopted 
according to customary rules because of the primacy of common law. 
The Court of Appeal of Noumea, in an audacious judgement, 16 decided 
that a child of common law status who has been the subject of a plenary 
adoption by parents of particular status acquires the status of the parents 
for three reasons 
the change of status follows the logic of plenary adoption 
which entails the complete integration of the adopted person 
into the family of the adopters 
the initial difference of status between the adopted person and 
the adopters does not block this consequence, because in those 
terms no status has prominence over the other 
the identity of the statuses after the adoption offers the 
adopted party the best conditions for integration into his or 
her adopted family. 
The work of the l eg is l ator 
The right to difference, expressed by the constituent, has been applied 
throughout the work of the legislator, particularly the laws relating to the 
status of the Territory and the chain of decrees between 1982 and 1985. 
This legislative intervention can be seen to have come late. That is 
perhaps due to the idea that regulatory initiatives, or the proposal of a 
law, should have stemmed from the proceedings of the Territory or its 
parliamentary representatives. Whatever the case, we will limit ourselves 
here to three particularly interesting legal aspects 
the institution of customary assessors 
the creation of the customary consulting council 
the creation of the concept of grouping particular local laws. 
The institution of customary assessors 
The institution of customary assessors is founded, it seems, on the 
observation of the absence of written local law and of the primacy given 
to the practice of writing in common law. 
The postulate-the quasi-absence of writing in local law. The absence 
of a written local law, 17 or of a sufficiently codified legal system to serve as 
a reference base, creates the greatest difficulty in establishing an approach 
which recognises the right to difference. 
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Indeed, while common law has its own codes and a jurisprudence based 
on supporting cases, this is not the case for local customary norms. We 
might speculate on the consultation of customary wise-men, the only ones 
able to describe a customary rule, evaluate a transgression of it, and inflict 
a punishment for the transgression. But we are confronted with the 
difficulty of adequately specifying what the real structures of the customary 
organs are. On top of that, it is nearly impossible to unite the conditions of 
repetition in space and time of elements that would allow us to rationally 
elaborate the functioning customary norms-custom also involves silence 
on procedure, which often makes it impenetrable to the outside observer. 
The primacy of common law. We have already mentioned that common 
law seems to have primacy over local law. That stems on the one hand 
from a quasi-absence of knowledge (and thus of recognition) of local law, 
and from the theory according to which the situation of a particular civil 
status person does not conform to the general rule when it involves a 
relationship with another person of the same status, but not in their 
relationships with persons of a common law status. 
This means that in the context of a difference between two particular 
status persons, the possibility of opting for a jurisdiction does not exist. 
This has caused some surprising confusions, particularly in criminal 
matters when a person who, having violated the customary rules, was 
punished by the customary authorities, goes to the common law jurisdiction 
and presents the punishment received as a violation of his or her rights. 
The common law jurisdiction, ignoring the existence of customary 
punishment de jure, functions not as a jurisdiction of appeal but as the first 
degree jurisdiction that it really is-it will thus refuse to acknowledge the 
customary procedure, and will only consider the alleged violation of rights. 
It would be desirable to consider creating a jurisdictional body-a kind 
of court of conflicts-which would be able to establish whether a dispute 
should be brought to the common law jurisdiction, mixed jurisdiction, or 
purely customary jurisdiction (if this could be institutionalised). Other than 
its purely legal benefits, the creation of such a body would bring a certain 
clarity to the problem of the entanglement of particular civil status with 
that of common law. 
In the absence of this, the administration and the legal institutions have 
tried to resolve the problems presented to them pragmatically. This is how 
the practice of inserting the notion of a prior agreement by the concerned 
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local law collectivity into hearings was born. It is the so called proces-verbale 
de palabre procedure, an authentic act established by a syndicate of 
Melanesian Affairs18 (a clerk who writes down the wishes of the 
collectivity-lineage, clan, tribe). The range and strength of such an act 
can be subject to controversy-the proces-verbale de palabre is not a legal act 
but a simple means of proof, which can still be contested within 30 days of 
it being established. Nevertheless, whilst it may not have an absolute legal 
value, the proces-verbale de palabre has a moral, or even political, force. The 
importance given to this practice should be influential for the development 
of a customary legal system which is still trying to define itself. 
For some years now, the legal profession has made laudable efforts to 
try and find solutions to disputes between persons of particular status 
which draw on, or at least respect, customary rules. Having said this, there 
has been no defined perspective seeking to put a jurisprudential conception 
of customary local law into place. 
Thus, an interesting initiative was proposed in 1982 to take pro-active 
steps in this direction. 
The indirect recognition of local law-the ordinance (decree) of 15 October 
1982. It was not until 1982 that the phenomenon of customary law was 
recognised, and even then only implicitly. This was through ordinance 
Number 82-877 of 15 October 1982,19 which introduced customary assessors 
to the first degree court and the court of appeal of Noumea. 
The motivation for the ordinance is clear-having observed the 
existence of two civil statuses in which ' . .  . local law civil status draws on 
customary rules', the writers of the ordinance recognise that litigation 
between two persons of particular civil status can be settled by customary 
authorities or deferred by the plaintiffs to the civil court. 
The decree thus notes, first, that the customary authorities have the 
conciliatory powers in anything touching on matters governed by 
particular civil status (Article one). It is worth noting that this affirmation, 
at the beginning of the decree, is voluntarily symbolic-it is a recognition 
of customary rules as norms of reference for a certain type of jurisdiction. 
In some ways, customary rules are institutionalised in New Caledonia. 
Second, the decree opens the summoning of the first degree (premiere 
instance) civil court by either of the parties, within the framework of 
litigation discussed in Article 1 .  In this case the court is complemented 
with an even number of particular status assessors (Article 3), so that the 
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custom of each party is represented by at least one assessor (Article 5). 
The procedure for the court of appeal is the same. 
Yet the parties can, if there is a consensual agreement, renounce this 
option and request that their dispute be judged by a straightforward 
common law jurisdiction (that is, without the particular status assessors). 
The meaning of this consensual condition for the two parties is obvious­
the normal process for matters of disputes over issues pertaining to 
customary norms is with the institution of the assessors; the appeal to the 
common law jurisdiction should therefore be the exception. Innovation is 
important-these customary assessors, who have full voting rights, will 
shed new light on the functioning of justice. The reason for these measures, 
according to the presentation of the report, is based in the extremely 
complex nature of customs, which ' . . .  being oral, are difficult for the 
professional judges posted to the Territory to apprehend'. 
Whether it was based on the aversion of the judges, or the ignorance of 
the concerned parties, this mechanism was virtually never used until the 
1990s. Since then, the institution has started to function satisfactorily since 
the jurisprudential solutions cited above, in terms of the application of 
particular civil status, have been rendered by formations which include 
customary assessors. 
Custom a ry consu lti n g  procee d i ngs 
A first observation is necessary-their instigation by the law is quite recent, 
because their form and responsibilities were extremely variable until the 
referendum of 9 November 1988 owing to the statutory instability that the 
territory experienced between 1984-88. 
It was not until the dispositions of the Statut Lemoine of 6 September 198420 
that we could see, in Section 3 of Chapter III, a customary representation­
L' Assemblee des Pays. This institution, however, is not a true customary 
institution, because it is a mixed body, comprised equally of commune 
and customary representatives. 
These are from the six districts which correspond to the eight linguistic 
areas in the Territory. Proof, if we need it, of the arbitrary use of sociological 
realities when it is convenient to adapt them to politics-the three linguistic 
areas of the Loyalty Islands are regrouped under one district. The specific 
regrouping of the representatives of custom constitutes the customary 
chamber which is defined by three main attributes 
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a consulting competence for matters of 'particular civil law' 
a conciliatory mission between citizens of particular civil 
status 
the establishment of relationships with Pacific Melanesian 
communities sharing the same culture. 
Because of time constraints, this structure will not see the light of day, 
as is the case for those that follow. 
The law of 24 August 198521 refined the structure by making 
provisions for the creation, in each of the regions, of a regional 
customary consulting council with general consulting powers. 
These general powers disappeared with the decree of 20 
September 198522 which created a customary consulting 
council in each district of each region. These councils had their 
traditional consulting powers enhanced with two new 
domains-land tenure reform and the teaching of vernacular 
languages at the level of the Territory. The customary body 
took the name of Territorial Consulting Council. 
The law of 22 January 198823 created a customary assembly 
which must be consulted for all matters of land tenure. It can 
also be consulted on matters of planning and economic, social, 
and cultural policy. 
This hurried series of texts had only one consequence-the impossibility 
of the customary body constituting itself in an operational way. For that, a 
p eriod of institutional stability was needed-the referendum of 9 
November 198824 presented this opportunity. 
The referendum of 9 November 1 988 
This law created two hierarchical bodies with consulting powers. 
The Customary Consulting Council of the Territory (CCCT). This council 
must be consulted on all matters concerning particular law civil status 
(we can note that the legislator, even if it is the sovereign people, is not too 
concerned with respecting the constitution to the letter, which may mean 
taking a new approach to certain legal concepts) and land tenure. It can 
also be consulted on any other matter. This point is very interesting-the 
council has important powers in that it can summon the Territory Congress, 
or a provincial assembly, for matters of statute concerning Melanesian land 
Legal adaptations to local sociological particularities 
reserves. One can wonder whether this may have been set up so as to get 
a proposal for a solution to the problem of the reservations, a real 
impediment to economic development, which would not incur the kind 
of scepticism which may have surrounded any initiative coming from 
another, more politicised, organisation. 
A customary council by customary area. This body is consulted by the 
customary consulting council of the Territory for projects and proposals 
for debates in the provincial assemblies concerning 'particular civil law 
status' and land tenure, and by the provincial presidents on any other 
matter. 
These 'area councils' were all set up relatively slowly, and the last one, 
of Xaracuu, was only formally set in place at the end of 1992. As for the 
Customary Consulting Council of the Territory, which was set up a little 
hastily and on the margins of legal procedure, appointment of its members 
was annuled by a judgement of the administrative court (19 September 
199125) on the request of its own president. It was, however, legally 
reconstituted on 29 January 1993. 
Particu lar  loca l law g roups (G D PL) 
This is probably one of the most original inventions that the legislator has 
come up with. The concept appeared for the first time in the ordinance of 
15 October 1982 relating to the organisation of land tenure,26 which was 
called 'groups under particular law'. It had the effect of not corresponding 
to anything concrete in terms of written law 
all known groups come under common law 
'particular law' only concerns individuals and not groups. 
The decree of 13 November 1985 was supposed to make the issue 
clearer: the report referred to the ' . . .  needs of particular local law groupings 
and common law owners'. By contrast, the GDPL seems to consist of a 
group of physical persons who are subject to particular civil status, unless, 
in a more restricted manner, it refers only to 'owners' whose needs do not 
go out of the particular law domain. 
The concept was taken up again in Article 42 of the law of 17 July 1986.27 
Since then it has found its place in written law as a midpoint between a 
commercial company and an association of the '1901 law' type. It is 
surprising, however, that it espouses neither the constraints nor the 
Custom and the law 
obligations of either of these other forms, precisely because of the extremely 
concise nature of the definition of its functions: 'a moral personality is 
recognised for the GDPL, who have put forward a declaration to the 
provincial assembly and have designated an attorney'. As this kind of 
group had long been shunned by the banking establishments, it had the 
effect of mitigating a deficiency-the clan had no legal standing, and 
through this action it now has one. 
The reg u l atory work of l oca l a utho rities 
Although it is more discrete, this form of regulation originated as much 
from the initiatives of the state as from the locally elected authorities. It 
has the merit of trying to organise reality into legal terms that delight the 
ethnologist but cause despair to the jurist and the administrator. How can 
these last two translate into practice what Leenhardt has described? 
. . .  Melanesians are attached by the very fabric of their being to their group; 
they are substantiated by it and their place in it; they are defined by that 
place and have 'reality' through it and the role attached to it; they are a 
person in the big game of the group . . .  which must insure its continuation and 
its glory . . . .  28 
We should therefore not be surprised or offended that the terms used 
by the administration (reservations, tribes, high chiefs, petty chiefs, Council 
of Elders, Clan Council) often have a meaning or substance which has no 
link with the original concept. 
G u bernatoria l effects 
This consists of quite old legal concepts-reservations, tribe, district and 
chiefly system. 
Reservations. Reservations are still considered by many to be a 'Kanak 
institution', whereas they are in fact the creation of an administration 
motivated by the principle of colonisation-'for all colonies we need 
settlers, and these settlers need land'.29 
This attribution of land went hand in hand with a 'dispossession' of 
traditional owners. Although certain measures were taken to ensure Kanak 
rights to land, these were usually ignored by the administration that was 
in charge of enforcing them. One of these measures was Governor Du 
Bouzet's declaration of 20 January 1855, which recognised indigenous land 
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ownership on occupied land and provided for state ownership of all 
unoccupied land. Later, the decree of 10 April 1855 made it compulsory to 
set aside ten per cent of the state land intended for sale for the benefit of 
Kanaks. The aim of this was to augment the land Kanaks already owned. 
Finally, the decree of 24 December 1867 gave the tribe a legal existence 
and confirmed its right of ownership of the land that it occupied. 
Then came the decree of 22 January 1868, made by the governor of the 
time, Guillain, which created the indigenous reservations. This decree, 
which set out the principles of the delineation of lands by villages and of 
the inalienability and collectivity of tribal land ownership, made some 
serious errors due to a total misunderstanding of Kanak social systems, a 
mistake which persists today.30 Based on the principles of the 'Fourieriste' 
doctrine which he seemed to espouse,31 Governor Guillain judged that the 
Kanak community did not acknowledge individual property. This decision 
would thus make official a mistake which was full of consequences because 
it would give birth to the administrative notion of collective customary 
goods. In addition to this decree, we should not forget the decree of 6 
March 1876, which stated that delineated land would be proportional to 
the type of ground and the population, but that the delineation would be 
made ' . . .  as much as possible on the territory which the tribe has 
traditionally benefited from'. For 20 years, based on this text, the 
administration would only proceed to simply modify some of the 
reservation boundaries. But, as colonisation evolved, the need for land 
became more pressing and the decree of 3 November 1897 would mark a 
radical change. In the dispositions that it set out, the administration 
proclaimed its right to ' . . .  purely and simply appropriate delineated land 
and to section off tribes on a foreign land, which it can freely choose' .  The 
new territories that were reserved for the indigenous population were 
delineated on the basis of 3 hectares of land fit for cultivation per head. 
This practice, commonly called the cantonement, would continue for the 
first quarter of the twentieth century. 
Since 1950, an effort has been made to enlarge the indigenous 
reservations, but this is hardly a solution to Kanak reclamations, because 
the reservation has become a real obstacle to Kanak integration into modern 
technical civilisation. It is obvious that the creation and maintenance of 
reservations has played a protective and securing role for Kanaks, but it 
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seems that they are creating an ever more anaesthetic influence. Enlarging 
reservations is a poor solution to a false problem, but eliminating them 
seems inconceivable as long as the individual is not in a position to integrate 
into the European economic system. 
The experimentation with land tenure reform, the last of which was 
the creation of a state establishment, Agence de developpement rural et 
d' amenagement foncier (AD RAF) by Article 94 of the loi referendaire is too 
recent for us to draw valid conclusions.32 
The tribe. The tribe was quickly recognised as the traditional community 
in New Caledonia. The decree of 24 December 1867 gave the tribe legal 
existence-in the terms of the first article 
. . .  the indigenous tribe was and continues to be constitutive in New 
Caledonia; it forms a legal aggregation with attributes of property and 
organisation under the only form which was and continues to be valid 
within the indigenous population. 
The reports of this decree prove that the administration was in no way 
unaware of the traditional structures of the population. They state that, if 
the legislative acts that govern the administration of New Caledonia never 
mention that its territory is divided into communities, in the decisions 
and decrees that have been implemented there exists ' . .  .irrefutable proof 
of the recognition by the colonial government of the collectivities of 
individuals called tribes'. For these collectivities, all that touches on land 
ownership, the administration, the police, responsibility and submission 
to the colonial regime is regulated and has been, since the original 
possession of the Territory, maintained or extended as required. 
The principle of responsibility (for the tribe as much as the chief), which 
was established from tribe to tribe by the indigenous population and 
confirmed by the colonial government, has often been applied for crimes 
and misdemeanours committed either by all or some of the individuals 
constituting the said collectivity. As a result, whilst the tribe must submit 
to general obligations, it also has rights which it can exercise under the 
immediate authority of the chief, under the control of the colonial 
administration, and which consequently can make it responsible for 
damages caused on its territory due to offences and crimes committed 
openly, by violence or by armed or unarmed gatherings. The report on the 
decree states 
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[t]he indigenous population linked to all the parties that are subjects of New 
Caledonia are constituted in distinct tribes. Each of these forms a community 
with both a common and multiple interest in the cultivation and distribution 
of foodstuffs, the defence of the community, the guarantee of individual 
security and the maintenance of public order. 
[t]he legal non-existence of the commune for the colonial population does 
not lead to the conclusion that the tribe has no legal existence for the 
indigenous population. That would be an unacceptable confusion and a 
denial of a fact which needs neither decree nor senate vote, for its raison­
d' etre. 
[f]rom all the previous and subsequent laws, it is clear that the indigenous 
groups called tribes are politically and administratively constitutive in New 
Caledonia. Each of them represents a collective moral being, which is 
administratively and civilly responsible for offences committed on its 
territory, either against people or against property. 
Soon after, the Kanak tribes would receive the other side of the coin of 
this recognition of responsibilities-through the decree of 22 January 1868, 
the tribes obtained the right to initiate legal proceedings; they were 
represented by their respective chiefs who acted with the authorisation of 
the secretary general. 33 
The reorganisation of the tribes and the creation of districts. The 
governance decision of 1898 was made as an application of the decree of 
18 July 1887, which entrusted the nomination and delineation of the tribes 
to the head of the colony. Although the decision confirmed the autonomy 
and the legal existence of the tribes, it also considerably modified the 
morphology of Kanak organisation because it displaced the framework 
and the scale of the decree of 24 December 1 867-the collection of 
individuals known as the tribe. 
The decree of 1898 turned the old tribe, the sociological grouping 
mentioned above, into a purely territorial group. A group which, in the 
terms of Article 19 of the decree, was thereafter called the district. The 
village, or sub-tribe, was to become the indigenous collectivity recognised 
as a tribe, with all the corresponding legal attributions that ensued. The 
creation of the districts was the logical conclusion of the statement made 
in the first article of the decree of 27 October 1877, which states that 
. . .  among the indigenous population of New Caledonia, there are established 
high chiefs who have authority over several tribes. 
High chiefs and tribal chiefs. The decree of 1898 established a hierarchy 
between the high chiefs of the district and the chiefs of the villages (or 
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the new tribes) and set the respective attributes of high chiefs and tribal 
chiefs. 
[T]he territory of New Caledonia and its dependencies is divided into 
indigenous districts. Each district is subject to the authority of a high chief 
who is appointed by the governor (Article 19), [e]ach district is divided into 
tribes. Each tribe is ruled by a chief of the tribe called a 'petty chief'* who is 
also appointed by the governor. 
The role of the high chiefs was the subject of Articles 22, 23, 25 and 26 
of the 1898 decision. The high chiefs were made responsible for the 
maintenance of public order in their districts and undertook all necessary 
measures to ensure that the security and tranquillity of the public was not 
threatened by indigenous people (Article 22). With this in mind, they could 
implement punishments against the tribal chiefs and indigenous people 
who lived on territory under their authority. They were obliged however, 
to immediately inform the head of the gendarmerie, upon whom they were 
dependent, who then notified the Head of Indigenous Affairs and the 
Territory Administrator. 
Tribal chiefs had a more or less analogous role within the limits of their 
tribe. They were responsible for maintaining public order and could, in 
pursuit of this, either impose their own punishments or call in the high 
chief to impose a sanction. They were also obliged to inform the head of 
the gendarmerie of any punitive measures they implemented, as well as of 
anything that happened in the territory under their responsibility. This 
obligation was reaffirmed in the memorandum of 4 December 1880, 
directed to the chefs d' arrondissements, in Article 128, which set out that 
. . .  all the indigenous chiefs are to report directly to the chef d'arrondissment, as 
to the general atmosphere and mood (etat d' esprit) of their tribes, as well as 
about any happenings or events that they are aware of. 
The chiefs therefore remained, as in the p ast, resp onsible for 
administering their subjects. There was an added nuance that, in tandem 
with their powers as customary and traditional chief, they were invested 
with particular administrative functions by the colonial authorities. This 
meant that beyond the responsibility for public order which was incumbent 
on them, there were several more or less specific functions and obligations. 
Thus the report of the decree of 24 December 1867 gave them the mission of 
. .  . looking after the general well being of the community, as well as ensuring, 
by the authority given to them, or if need be, the support of the commandant 
des circonscriptions, that there are no offences against persons or their goods. 
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Other ordinances would commission them with ensuring the 
cleanliness of villages, with maintaining roads (or pathways), ensuring 
the supply of a work force for European colonisation, managing the 
implementation of aid projects, collecting the head tax, and ensuring the 
isolation of lepers. 
Nevertheless,  this double origin of powers (customary and 
administrative) could not last for very long. This was partly because of 
the modes of designation and partly because of the conception held by the 
administration of what constituted a traditional chief. 
In actuality the chiefs were maintained only ' . . .  by recognising the 
sovereignty of the emperor', as outlined the decree of 14 May 1863, which 
stated that 
. . .  their first obligation is obedience to his [the emperor's] delegate, the 
governor. Any voluntary non-compliance to this obligation removes all 
justifications for the chiefs, as instead of serving as intermediaries between 
the colonial authorities and their ex-subjects, they would present a bad 
example and undermine the steps taken to civilise the indigenous population 
and develop colonisation. 
Furthermore, the governor was only supposed to intervene in the 
designation of a chief at the last stage of the process-the official 
appointment. In principle, therefore, Kanak chiefs were appointed according 
to traditional rules for the distribution of power. This meant going through 
the Council of Elders,34 which still had to notify the Syndicate of Indigenous 
Affairs. A representative of the Syndicate would then go to the village and 
ask, at a communal meeting, whether the people would ratify the choice of 
the elders. If there was any contestation, it was up to the Syndicate to 
nominate the candidate, who would then be presented to the appointment 
by the governor. 35 This, of course, contradicted custom. What followed was 
a deterioration of the customary structure due to the manoeuvring of the 
colonial administration, which did not show any hesitation in regards to 
their methods. These methods included creating chiefly systems whose 
authority had no traditional foundation, disposing of customary chiefs who 
were not cooperative enough, sectioning off the tribes outside of their 
geographic and sociological areas and the framework of their mythical 
habitat. Kanak social organisation vacillated and almost crumbled, but the 
practice of the administrative chief could only last for a little while. 
Gradually the appointment of chiefs returned to more customary ways. 
The turning point was the law 76-1222 of 28 December 1976. This law 
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stated that the High Commissioner, the representative of the state in the 
Territory, would intervene only to acknowledge the appointment of 
customary authorities. 
This principle would be set out by the successive legislative texts relating 
to the status of the Territory and would no longer be questioned. 
Furthermore, the non-recognition of this principle was punished by the 
administrative judge in the decision of 19 September 1991 cited above. 
The role of l oca l representatives 
The elected Assembly of the Territory36 became very interested in the 
manifestation of this right to difference. We have already pointed out the 
decision of 3 April 1967, relating to the civil status of particular status 
citizens, but its effects also extended into two other d omains-the 
institutionalisation of the councils and the succession of patrimony. 
The institutionalisation of the councils. If the Kanak institutions that we 
have explored here all seem to have a regulatory basis to them, that is not 
the case for what we usually call the Council of Elders. This council, which 
seems to be a projection of a European kind of Council of Wise-men or 
Senate into a Melanesian context, is based on the actual existence of a 
circle of people with whom a customary chief would surround himself 
and consult regularly. Although they are currently organised along very 
administrative lines (president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer), 
appointments to these positions do not follow any written rule. In 1981, 
following decision Number 116 of 14 May 1980, which recognised the clans 
as the functioning structure regrouping all the lineages, two new decisions 
were adopted. 
Decision number 351 of 10 December 1981, relating to the Clan Council 
and the Council of Clan Chiefs. 37 Three essential characteristics were 
confirmed in these texts 
• the Clan Council consists of the representatives of each family 
group of the clan 
.. on the level of the tribe, there can be a Council of Clan Chiefs 
consisting of the customary representatives of each clan 
belonging to the tribe 
• the Council of Clan Chiefs, when it is fully constituted, 
substitutes for the existing Council of Elders. 
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Unfortunately these dispositions have only been partially applied, and 
there seems to be no current political will to reactivate them. The necessity 
of creating a customary registrar may provide the occasion for that to 
happen. 
Decision number 352 of 10 December 198138 created the Council of High 
Chiefs, the forerunner to the Customary Council of the Territory, instigated 
by law number 85-892 of 23 August 1985. Although strictly speaking, the 
creation of this council does not seem to have been annulled by any 
subsequent texts, it has not met for several years now. 
The succession/devolution of patrimony. Patrimonial succession poses 
no real problems. Its exceptional nature is due to the procedure involved, 
which indirectly recognises a social system that stands outside common 
law. This procedure was formalised as early as 1962 by deliberation of the 
Territorial Assembly.39 The text, according to its motive, was elaborated so 
as to acknowledge 
. . .  the urgent need to regulate the liquidation of inheritance for particular 
civil status citizens according to the rules corresponding to their own civil 
status. 
Customary law could have been recognised, but the Assembly preferred 
to regulate forms of inheritance-the recognition of a legal system which 
corresponds to a different social order was, once again, sidelined. 
On the level of regulations, Article 2 of the decision made provision for 
the inheritance of a particular status citizen to go through the establishment 
of a certificate of heredity, or of property, following receipt of a statement of 
palaver from the concerned tribe. This practice, which was refined by several 
explanatory memoranda, became codified in the following procedure. 
Following the death of a person belonging to particular civil status, the 
family or any person with a vested interest must solicit the relevant 
administrative authority to authorise a palaver regrouping the family or 
clan concerned with the inheritance of the deceased person's goods. A 
report of the palaver, established by the Syndicate of Melanesian Affairs, 
states the desire of the concerned collectivity (for example, family, clan). 
This report can be contested up to 30 days after it has been made public by 
any person who might have an interest in the affair. 
After that time, a certificate of inheritance is made. This designates all 
the people who have rights over the goods and states the details of the 
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inheritance. Currently, this certificate is written up ad hoe by the service of 
each province. Once established, it is tacitly understood that no more 
contestations can be made, at least in front of a common law body. The 
procedure was mainly based on the desire of the administration to identify 
clearly the goods being inherited and the persons who have rights to them. 
The sociological foundation of the transmission of patrimony has been 
ignored and could only serve as a valid basis if the knowledgeable 
customary authorities are consulted. At the moment they only have the 
jurisdiction to collect information and act as observers to a decision. To 
this day, there has been no jurisprudence to either confirm or reject this 
administrative construct. 
We can also note that according to the written law there is nothing to 
stop a common law citizen from inheriting goods through the above 
procedure. 
In 1980, an interesting initiative emerged in a decision of the Territorial 
Assembly, deliberation number 148 of 8 September 1980,40 which related 
to the inheritance of real estate belonging to particular law citizens but 
acquired under the .common law regime. This decision opened the path 
for particular status citizens to use the techniques of common law in 
inheritance matters without renouncing their particular status. This option 
of inheritance is exercised by a simple declaration by the owner of the 
property, either to the mayor of the commune where he or she resides, or 
to the appropriate service of each province. 
This declaration places real estate inheritance under the common law 
regime on the condition that the real estate was acquired under the common 
law system. Thus, according to the letter of the text, a property acquired 
by a statement of a palaver, or a certificate of inheritance, could not be 
transmitted by common law procedure. 
Concl usion 
Given such a vast subject, this presentation could only be succinct, 
abbreviated, and perhaps even insufficient. 
If we need to draw an idea from this inventory of texts which have 
been more or less applied, it would be that we need to redress the image 
of the French administration, which has too often been accused of blind 
colonialism and being deaf to the indigenous voice. 
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Can we, without being emotional, criticise the administration on the 
basis that the legislative or regulatory texts, which it must apply, spring 
more often from political aims than from research in the interest of the 
public or the recognition of otherness? Since locally elected representatives 
are now responsible for local affairs, as part of the much acclaimed 
decentralisation, the initiative to make the system better now belongs to 
them. 
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The Customary Counci l of the 
Territory of New Ca ledonia 
Customary rules, as  distinct from the written rules of  state law, are 
maintained orally. They are rules of social organisation, with mythical 
origins and varied uses, which are transmitted from father to son within a 
clan. 
The Customary Council of the Territory has shown reservations about 
the choice of the word 'rules'. For some, the problem lies in the abstract 
nature of the term, which could lead to negative interpretations. Others 
consider it too rigid, preferring the flexibility of the term custom and/ or 
customary usage or customary practice. 
Before exploring two dimensions of the practice of custom, the first 
relating to traditional social organisation, and the second to its diverse 
uses, we need to examine the different polarities of customary organisation 
in order to better understand how they interact. 
Customary structu res 
The chief 
There is no equivalent for the term 'chief' in Kanak vernacular. The term 
was inherited from the colonial administration. The corresponding notion 
is that of 'elder brother' or 'eldest son'-he who is above all others, and 
towards whom all the clans identify themselves. In a hut, the quintessential 
symbolic image of Kanak society, the chief is represented by the central 
post or the ridgepole arrow. But the chief does not have absolute power, 
and it is the clans who manage the tribe. Prior to colonisation, chiefs were 
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only responsible for their own independent tribes. After colonisation when 
the tribes of New Caledonia were regrouped into districts (in 1867), a 
distinction was made between high chiefs, at the head of the districts, and 
tribal chiefs who led the different tribes. Both high chiefs and tribal chiefs 
became extensions of the administration, their services were even rewarded 
with military decorations. 
Although local people were free to chose their own chiefs, the French 
administration retained the right of approval over the nominations of 
persons who were to serve as intermediaries between itself and the 
indigenous population at large. It was the administration that set out (by 
a decree of 18 July 1867) the rights and obligations of high chiefs and tribal 
chiefs. This p rerogative allowed the a dministration to dismiss 
uncooperative chiefs and replace them with more obedient individuals. 
The situation of course produced internal conflicts, some of which still 
reverberate today. Indeed people continue to pay allegiance to a high chief 
who was replaced by the administration, in recognition of all the existing 
customary and mythical ties. 
The c lan 
The clan is the basic entity of  Kanak society. 
The 'mound' (tertre) refers to several families who share a common 
ancestor who founded the clan, and who remember him and his name. 
The clans regulate tribal life. Each clan has a specific function, and these 
functions become particularly apparent at ceremonies like marriages, 
deaths, the yam harvest and so forth. Yet, although people (and clans) are 
often scattered, the clan continues to exist and claim the same place of 
origin, which is where the common ancestor was born or lived. Custom 
organises the relations among the clans, and each of them manages the 
politics of the tribe. It is within this framework that manifestations of 
custom are the strongest and most crucial. 
The tri bes and the d i stricts 
Prior to colonisation, Kanaks were divided into tribes. These formed 
genuine towns (cites) that were organised according to parental ancestry. 
That is, the people living there spoke the same dialect and referred to a 
common land. Each tribe was led by a chiefly council, which served as a 
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decision making instrument under the authority of a chief. The tribes were 
completely independent of each other, with their own concerns and 
interests, and their own languages. 
Traditionally, Kanak society w as divided into classes in a strictly 
hierarchical order 
the chiefs 
• the nobility 
the people (subjects). 
In the Loyalty Islands, there were many more social divisions and these 
were even more marked. There was, of course, a hierarchy, but it was based 
on specifically human sentiments, on a kin-based conception of group 
adherence. In 1867, in order to facilitate administrative tasks, Governor 
Feuillet regrouped all the tribes of New Caledonia into districts under the 
authority of the high chiefs.1 
The Counci l  of E lders (The Cou nci l  of Districts) 
This is an assembly of respected tribal elders, where e ach clan's 
representation is (in principle) assured. This system provides an efficient 
counter-balance to absolutism, as its powers are considerable, while its 
decisions are made by consensus. Decisions are often taken after a long 
process of debate which could, for example, involve the nomination of a 
chief, a land dispute and so forth. 
This body continues today on a tribal scale. Since the creation of districts, 
councils with the same name have been set up, functioning according to 
the same principles as the Council of Elders. The District Council organises 
the life of the district and manages the most important problems (such as 
the nomination a high chief). 
In the case of litigation, the District Council can decide on an appeal. In 
principle, the District Council consists of the chiefs of the tribes, the 
presidents of the Councils of Elders, and of high-ranking dignitaries.2 
As in any human society, there are rules for living, such as those which 
demand tolerance, respect, and so on. On this subject, Fote Trolue' s younger 
brother (whom we would like to thank for the help he has given us on this 
project), reminded us quite correctly that 
[i]n Kanak society, these rules of life revolve mainly around the relations 
between people, the relations of people to the land, and the relations 
between the clans and the chiefs. 
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These rules, which are based in mythic origins, correspond to an 
emotional understanding of the universe and of the individual. This vision 
of the world was considerably disturbed by the contact between the two 
civilisations. The situation does not help a Kanak's adaptation to the new 
dimensions of his or her society. As an illustration of this, the Customary 
Council decided that it was most useful to focus its interventions on the 
rules concerning the status of persons, the family, and land tenure. Precisely 
because it is within these domains custom can, on the one hand, be applied 
in its fullest and on the other hand is most susceptible to transformation. 
Pa rticu l a r  civi l status 
Particular civil status is founded in the constitution itself. Article 75 of the 
1958 Constitution stipulates that 'citizens of the Republic who do not have 
a common law civil status, retain a personal civil status as long as they 
have not renounced it'. In New Caledonia, Kanaks maintain a personal 
status, but have the option of acquiring a common law civil status 
either by voluntary renunciation 
or by kin affiliation (children of a mixed marriage, or who 
were born outside of the territory). 
The primacy of common law over particular law poses problems at 
both the level of the status of people and that of goods. Before exploring 
these, it is worth noting that, if the principle of irrevocability is applied to 
those who choose to renounce their particular status, it has no effect on 
the status changes undertaken by children of mixed couples or those who 
are born outside of the territory. 
M arriage, d ivorce a n d  i n h e rita nce sett l e ments 
Tra d it ional  m a rriage 
We will briefly remind ourselves of the principles of traditional marriage­
it is a matter for the clan. Usually prepared for a long time prior to the 
event, traditional marriages were held on the initiative of the parents and 
the maternal relatives and followed a long series of exchanges, sometimes 
since the children were of very young age. Marriages were therefore 
arranged, and there was no freedom in choice of spouse. 
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Customary marriages aimed to ensure the continuity of the clan and to 
forge, or strengthen, links between clans. Today, this principle is losing 
favour. More and more young people wish to marry the partner of their 
choice while remaining a member of the clan. In some cases their chosen 
spouse is of a different civil status. 
M ixed marriage 
Mixed marriage consists of a union between two people of different civil 
status. 
The principle is that 
the marriage is registered according to common law and 
carries with it all the consequences of common law 
until a judgment passed in a legal case in 1991, the children 
came under common law, and were not allowed to be adopted 
according to custom 
a person of common law civil status does not have the option 
of choosing a particular civil status, and cannot therefore be 
married according to customary rules, even if they so desire. 
M e l a nes ian r ig hts of l a n d  ten u re 
As we have already seen, certain texts have attempted to give legal 
consistency to the tribes. This was the issue of the decree of 24 December 
1867. This text conferred legal agency on the 'tribe', by giving it rights of 
property, and consequently of patrimony. Furthermore, it recognised the 
tribe's right to make use of its responsibilities to the courts for crimes and 
misdemeanours committed on its territory, and the tribes were assured 
legal representation by a chief. 
The 22 January 1868 decree finalised these affirmations, mainly by 
giving the tribes a certain number of legal characteristics which limited 
rights of property. As a result, Melanesian land reservations became 
inalienable. From this perspective the individual became eclipsed in favour 
of the collectivity. That is, the tribe became the sole holder of rights and 
obligations and the only entity who was responsible for land. Thus, from 
the outset France had recognised the land rights of Melanesians based on 
their status as original inhabitants. 
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However, the general framework of the declaration of 20 January 1855 
was later considerably restricted in response to the demands of 
colonisation, but the principle of the recognition of land rights specifically 
linked to prior occupation was never put aside. The historical foundation 
of Melanesian land rights is therefore very solid. The law of 3 January 
1969 expressly recognised a specific category of land-indigenous land 
reservations. To respect these properly also means confirming the rights 
that are attached to them. 
Custom comprises a number of rules that cement the obligations of 
chiefs, clans, and subjects: mandatory rules and restrictions (or taboos). 
These rules are accompanied by punitive sanctions, which give them their 
obligatory nature and tum them into authentic rules of law. 
To be Kanak, however, does not exclude modernity. Some have broken 
the links with custom (for instance, a Melanesian woman who has married 
a citizen of common law civil status), others try to reconcile tradition with 
modernity, and others choose to remain in the traditional system. In this 
context we can ask whether custom should disappear, remain, or renew 
itself. 
O bservations 
Opting for common law civil status is seen by certain tribes, particularly 
those of the Loyalty Islands, as a relegation of customary rights. That is 
why Melanesians fear the repercussions of a 'mixed marriage' for the 
children, who could, at the death of the parents, come into conflict over 
the inheritance of customary goods. 
There is hardly a need to emphasise that this fear is an erroneous 
assessment of the consequences of belonging to the common law regime, 
which in no case can lessen the rights of the individual. The Melanesian 
family is based on patrilineal descent. This family itself rests upon a 
relatively large basis-the clan. It includes all the children except those 
that have been adopted according to custom by the mother's family, or by 
a clan other than that of the father. That is why Melanesians do not look 
favourably upon the primacy of common law civil status over particular 
civil status, especially when the woman is of common law status, even if 
she is Melanesian herself. Of course the politics of the issue, often abusively 
taken up by certain politicians, do not make things easier. 
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In terms of goods, the Melanesians do not differentiate between goods 
situated outside the reservation and those within it. In fact, from this 
perspective, goods follow the person and it is the clan that owns them. 
Thus, they are surprised to learn that a Council of Elders, whose members 
may not belong to their own clan, can at the time of death, decide on the 
fate of the goods situated outside the reservation. They are just as surprised 
to learn that, should they renounce their personal status, their children 
will no longer have any guarantees over the inheritance of their goods 
within the reservation. The status of persons and of goods opens the way 
to situations of conflict .  Furthermore the law can only provide 
unsatisfactory solutions if the parties involved refuse to compromise. 
All of this legislation was established without consulting the 
Melanesians. This is why, after a 150 year long period of colonial slumber, 
Melanesians today are shocked to find that so much that concerns them 
has been decided without their input. At times they have to accommodate, 
which does more to hinder than to help their adaptation to the new 
dimensions of their own society. 
People of particular civil status can be in possession of goods outside 
the reservation under the auspices of common law. Likewise, people of 
common law civil status, either those who chose to change their civil status 
or those who are common law children of a mixed marriage, can retain, 
within the reservation, rights over goods belonging to the regime of custom. 
These situations do pose problems, particularly during inheritance 
settlements. Currently, common law goods belonging to citizens of 
particular civil status are passed on to the customary regime. This 
sometimes gives rise to feelings of injustice. 
Inversely, when it comes to inheritance settlements of real estate situated 
within the reservation, but belonging to a common law citizen, the 
customary regime is applied. Whilst this follows a certain logic, it does 
not have any firm justification. This practice avoids conflicts but, legally 
speaking, inheritors of common law status, whose custom restricts their 
rights-women and children, for example-would be justified in receiving 
the shares of the inheritance which are protected for them under the civil 
code. It is not hard to see the kinds of embroiled situations that could 
result from the current inadequacies of the status of persons and of goods. 
Once again, satisfactory solutions do not seem apparent. 
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It is worth noting the advantage of settling from the outset what 
happens to a possession at the death of its owner, particularly when a 
legal statement forms the basis of the case put forward. It is recommended 
that the person who is to inherit a good at the death of its owner, be 
named in the statement. 
The p rotection of women a n d  c h i l d ren 
There is the case of a wife who, through her own work, contributes to the 
acquisition of real estate when both spouses are wage earners. She can not 
be excluded, along with the children (especially the eldest son) who 
traditionally inherit goods and property. 
Melanesians are evolving socially. It is not appropriate to fix them in a 
singular and static system. It is much better to give them the choice, an 
option to negotiate between an evolving customary system and an adaptive 
modern system, which should be inspired by the provisions of the civil 
code. The customary option would allow the Clan Council to decide on 
the inheritance settlement, and this body would unite only the heads of 
families belonging to the clan. It is not desirable for others to intervene in 
a matter that only concerns a limited sphere of people. 
Goods s ituated with i n  the reservation 
Judicial logic would hold that in the case of divorce, goods belonging to 
the community would be shared between its members. If the goods are in 
a reservation, then customary rules must apply and the status of the good 
has primacy over the results of the legal regime, because customary 
marriages cannot be classified as contracts. It would be beneficial in this 
case for the positioning of the good to determine which regime and which 
judicial rules it comes under in terms of inheritance, sharing and so on. 
Custom a n d  cri m i n a l  l aw 
Previously, a crime of blood was punished by blood. There were ways of 
obtaining pardons, and means of paying compensation for the blood of 
the person killed. In principle, blood was paid by blood. 
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M isdemeanours 
As it was a matter of the life of the group, any minor attack, or any kind of 
theft, could undermine the solidarity of the group and was seen as a serious 
infraction and consequently punished. The sanctions imposed were related 
to group life. An example is provided by the case of a young man who 
raped a girl. The chief, or high chief, assembled the whole tribe. The two 
antagonists were summoned to present their versions of the facts, and 
then every person of the tribe was given the floor and gave his or her 
advice as to what was the appropriate path to follow. The occasion was 
also used to discuss all the trouble caused by boys-theft of chickens, of 
fruits and loud and rowdy behaviour at night among other things .  
Sanctions were carried out. 
The execution of p u nishm ents 
Tribal police were in charge of applying the sanctions which usually 
consisted of beating all the offenders with a club. And this is where the 
group spirit manifested itself-all the people of the same generation 
would kneel down to receive the beatings with the offender. To avoid 
isolating the offender, people would submit to the beatings with him, to 
show their solidarity, that they had not abandoned him. Being beaten 
with a club may seem barbaric to Westerners, but for many it is preferable 
to prison or a criminal record. In custom, the punishment exorcises the 
error, which is no longer mentioned, and the offender is pardoned. 
Punishment in the Western world does not exorcise the error-one risks 
going to prison. A lengthy criminal record can restrict one's rights for 
years to come. Rights such as voting eligibility, running a business or 
holding public office. 
As time has passed, attitudes have changed. Young people no longer 
accept being beaten. In certain cases, young people who have received 
this kind of punishment have lodged a complaint for assault. It is a 
paradoxical situation, because the offender from the customary perspective 
becomes the victim in French criminal law. Those who carried out the 
sanctions are charged by French justice. Young people refuse physical 
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punishment and ask for community work instead (for example, cleaning 
a cemetery or a road). This kind of punishment has been applied in Kanak 
circles for several years. In this respect, Kanaks were ahead of French 
criminal law, which only instigated community work in New Caledonia 
about a decade ago. 
The evo l ut ion of custom :  what is its fut u re? 
Custom is becoming more and more frayed with the problems of modern 
life. People refer to custom and thus seek an identity that is linked to 
political demands. Customary chiefs are becoming less and less respected­
decisions made by customary authorities are not respected, children feel 
further and further distanced from their decisions, and they see numerous 
customary values as 'out of date'. The elders speak more and more of 
preserving customary values, precisely because they feel people are drifting 
away from them. 
How will custom resist the evolution of its own people? Custom, as it 
is lived today, is different to that which was lived by the ancestors. The 
ancestors would not recognise it. Custom is flexible and it can, and must, 
respond to anything, evolve. Some say that for custom to be respected it 
must be written down (as in Fiji for example), but aren't we in danger of 
freezing custom, of codifying it by writing it down? 
There are so many questions that the Customary Council of the Territory 
will have to reflect upon before coming to some of the answers. Fijians 
took nearly sixty years to codify their custom, and the Customary Council 
of the Territory has never pretended to be able to do better than the 
custodians of custom in Fiji. 
Notes 
1 Note that the term district was deemed not true to tradition by the Customary 
Council of the Territory, which decided to replace it with the term 'cultural 
territories of the chiefly councils'. 
2 The Customary Council of the Territory chose to replace the term Council of 
Clans with that of Council of Elders. 
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An n ex 
Working Group on C ustomary Law (Report, 29 N ovember 1 993) 
The conclusions of the fourth committee working on the Matignon Accord 
note that 
Mr Parawi-Reybas has highlighted the persistent difficulties encountered by 
Melanesians of particular status under Article 75 of the Constitution, 
particularly as regards descent, inheritance, and the rights of women. He has 
decided to start a working group to explore the possibility of ratifying 
customary laws on the matter. The group would bring together partners of 
the accord, representatives of the Provincial authorities, representatives of 
Custom appointed by the Customary Council, and lawyers. 
The group met under the presidency of the High Commissioner on 7 
and 21 October, 18 and 30 November, and on 4 November 1993 under the 
General Secretary. It consisted of the heads of the Court of Appeal or their 
representatives and, as official observers, of representatives of the 
Customary Council of the Territory, the RPCR, the FLNKS, and various 
heads of departments. 
On the recommendation of Mr Parawi-Reybas, the group's objective is 
to specify the contents of the laws of particular status, and it was pointed 
out that many Melanesians affected by it are not aware of these contents. 
This objective led the group to examine 
the texts relating to particular status 
the changing of personal status 
the contents of particular status 
relations between persons of different status. 
The texts 
(a) A reminder that the law of particular status is established by Article 75 
of the Constitution of 4 October 1958 which states that 'citizens of the 
Republic who have no civil status in common law . . .  retain their personal 
status as long as they have not forsaken it.' Consequently we can infer 
from this that citizens of the Republic can have and retain a personal status 
which is distinct from their civil status in common law. Also, we may note 
that it is possible to renounce a particular personal status. 
Until now, the expression 'as long as' has been interpreted as meaning 
a change from a particular status to a status in common law, and not the 
other way around. 
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(b) The law of 9 November 1988, ratified by referendum and providing 
the statute of the Territory, specifies the distribution of authority and 
responsibility in matters of civil and particular status. 
Civil status comes under the domain of the state (Article 8-9). 
It therefore follows that the organisation of the civil state 
comes under the responsibility of the state in regards to both 
statuses. 
Civil law is the responsibility of the state, 'except for 
customary law'. 
As customary law is not mentioned in the responsibilities of the Territory 
(Article 9), only the provinces can certify customary laws through 
resolutions. 
Furthermore these collectivities have no greater right to govern over 
custom than the Territory itself. Custom, by definition, springs from 
customary oral traditions. The provinces can nevertheless inscribe and 
codify customary law. Until now they have not used this possibility, unlike 
the Territory, which has used its authority by adopting several important 
resolutions on clan organisation and property. 
( c) The ordinance of 15 October 1982, which has not been repealed, creates 
customary assessors for the first degree courts and the court of appeal. 
This allows these jurisdictions to apply the principle of customary law, 
but not 'customary procedure', as litigation is processed directly by them, 
and not through the intermediary of a customary authority. This presents 
certain difficulties. 
(d) The law of 9 July 1970, which addresses the civil status of common law 
in the TOM. 
The change of persona l status 
In considering the constitutional principle that a particular status can be 
renounced in favour of a civil status in common law, and not the other 
way around, several questions remain unanswered and seem to have no 
uncontroversial solutions to this day. 
How should a change of status be executed? The spirit of Article 75 of 
the constitution implies that any renunciation of status must be made with 
full awareness of the reasons and according to a specific procedure in a 
ceremonial form. Yet no legal text specifies what these are. 
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These conditions would avoid any change of status without the 
concerned party being aware of it, or for reasons that should not, by 
themselves, justify it (such as the desire to divorce where custom does not 
allow it). 
In fact, as certain operations of the civil state are erroneously recorded 
in a register of common law (for example, marriages or births that took 
place in metropolitan France), it is sometimes wrongly inferred that these 
matters come under the realm of the common law. 
On this issue, the group came to the following conclusions 
the renunciation of personal status should proceed by judicial 
declaration, on a request made to the judge and based on the 
information and consultation of the customary people 
concerned 
in the case of an error, a rectification procedure should be 
commenced, also in front of the judicial authority 
to avoid errors due to the absence of a single control over the 
two registers of the civil state (etat civil), because the legal 
authorities control the register of common law civil status, and 
the administrative authorities control the register of particular 
law civil status, it would be preferable for the legal authorities 
to control both of these 
a memorandum specifying the conditions of inscription in one 
or the other register, should be completed by a group of town 
clerks and distributed to the mayors. 
More importantly, the group has ascertained that many people come 
under common law through kin affiliation, sometimes for several 
generations, but live according to customary rules. In these cases it would 
be necessary to seek a legal solution which would bring the law into line 
with practice, for example by using the legal notion of state possession. 
What is the status of minors? This question is linked to that of the two 
statuses. It arises when a child is the offspring of parents of different status 
or when a child is adopted by parents of a different status to his or her 
own. 
Under the primacy of civil law status, it has long been held that if one 
of the spouses came under the status of civil law, then the children also 
came under that status, regardless whether their relationship is based on 
descent or adoption. 
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A judgment of 3 September 1990 (in Annex) declared that this does not 
constitute a 'final decision', which means that a different judgment could 
be made in an analogous case, without having to go through the Cour de 
Cassation (civil branch of High Court) . The Noumea Court of Appeal ruled 
that the recognition of a child whose mother is of particular status, by a 
citizen under the status of common law, 'could only entail a change of 
personal status if the texts allowed primacy of one status over the other, 
but legally neither of these statuses, in terms of maternal affiliation, has 
primacy over the other.' 
The court specifies that the renunciation of a civil status of particular 
law 'has to be analysed in an act of declaration stemming from a person of 
legal age, who is already informed of the irreversible nature of this 
renunciation and of the consequences that it entails' .  
The status of  a minor could therefore not be changed until he or she is 
of legal age. 
What are the consequences of a change of status? The rejection of 
particular status entails the loss of property rights linked to the clan or 
tribe and more generally is often considered, or felt, to be a rupture with 
the customary community. There is also the danger of the loss of identity 
that results from this. 
The motivations for renunciation are often specific (divorce cases), and 
this kind of total rupture is not desired. It results in social situations that 
are rendered even more uncomfortable by the fact that victims of this action 
often feel that they had no choice in the matter when their status was 
determined in their childhood. 
Thus, we need to ask whether the renunciation of particular status is 
necessarily total? 
It was pointed out that in Wallis and Futuna, partial renunciation was 
frequently allowed. 
For New C aledonia, a resolution of the Territorial Assembly (8 
September 1980) allowed goods that were acquired outside the provisions 
of inheritance according to customary law, to be extracted. This can be 
analysed as an exception to customary status without renunciation. 
The customary authorities who were members of the group insisted 
that it was impossible to accept a 'multiple choice' status, where everyone 
could choose what was most convenient in each status. 
The group came to two conclusions on this point. 
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• The path opened by the Territorial Assembly seems 
interesting. Shouldn't the rules of customary inheritance be 
applied only to goods situated within the reservation (at least 
it could be an open option)? 
To avoid renunciation of particular status for specific reasons, 
custom could accept, without renouncing its principles 
(prohibition of divorce), that the inevitable consequences of a 
situation (such as, children or goods) could be arranged within 
the framework of customary procedure. 
In general the group deems that a law is necessary to specify the 
conditions and consequences of a change of status, based on Article 75, so 
as to put an end to the uncertainties that stem from hitherto undetermined 
jurisprudence. 
The content of customary status 
Customary status is oral, and changes from one custom to the other. It is 
therefore difficult to specify its content. The group has nevertheless 
recognised the need to define at least the principles of customary status. 
Furthermore, the chiefs have stated that custom is not opposed to this. 
Some of these chiefs have declared that writing is not 'taboo' in custom 
and that certain chiefly systems have, in modem times, amassed a kind of 
archive of situations or decisions. 
This written text could deal with 
principles-the customary areas and then, if common 
principles could be ascertained, the Customary Council for the 
entire Territory could write down customary laws of a general 
nature (which the provinces could then adopt by resolution). 
individual situations-it was contemplated that customary 
marriage contracts could be written to specify the conditions 
of the uses and distribution of the goods of the couple in cases 
of either separation or death. 
land tenure-lands would be delineated, starting with the 
establishment of a public register. Leasing acts which would 
ensure customary guarantees (before recording the never­
ending debates in legal statements) could be written down and 
preserved by the customary authorities (such practices already 
exist). 
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The chiefs who were present indicated that the Territorial Customary 
Council would discuss these questions in a subsequent meeting. The group 
then conceded that it would have to wait for the opinion of the Council 
before proceeding any further in this direction. 
Relations between people of d ifferent status 
This question is particularly difficult. It arises not only in the Territory, but 
in any multiethnic country (such as Fiji) and even in the other Oceanic 
countries, as soon as it is admitted that certain rights of the person can be 
established by the state and not by custom. 
It is subdivided into several series of problems 
(a) According to status 
relations between a person of common law civil status and a 
Kanak of particular status 
relations between a Kanak of particular status and a Wallisian 
or Futunese of particular status 
relations between a person of common law civil status and a 
person of foreign customary status (or vice versa), or between 
two people of customary status, one of whom is foreign. 
(b) According to rights 
rights of the person-kin affiliation, marriage 
goods-property, inheritance. 
The group could not explore every situation, but chose to retain the 
following directions. 
Marriage between a person of common law civil status and a person 
under the realm of particular law. For the moment, the act of marriage 
comes under common law civil status, which seems to imply a settlement 
system for goods according to common law. Until now the children of 
such unions came under common law jurisdiction, but it now seems that 
they have the possibility of making a choice at legal age. The group 
maintained its position in favour of a legal requirement for the creation of 
a regime of 'mixed marriages' which would allow more b alanced 
reconciliation of the two statuses. 
Marriage of two people of different particular status. Further research is 
required to establish the rules, and wherever possible those that have been 
written, which allow for the accommodation of two customs. In the case 
where one of the individuals is a foreigner, the problem lies in the realm of 
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international private law, as it is not appropriate to marry two people 
governed by customary law under French common law. 
In regard to these issues, the group insists that the changing nature of 
morals (divorce) and of the economy (goods, especially real estate outside 
of the reservation), means that the uncertainties of the current situation 
can no longer remain without considerable risk. It will be necessary to 
inscribe customary rules and to govern mixed situations both by the law 
and by written customary rules. 
Divorce. On the customary level, the restriction on divorce poses problems 
in relation to children of adultery (who have no rights, or remain in the 
paternal clan) and for goods (for which a settlement should be able to be 
foreseen). 
Adoption. In view of the frequency of adoptions in customary society, 
reinforced by the rules of CAFAT which allow for state benefits to be paid 
to the family, it seems necessary to have a better definition of the rights of 
the adopted and to avoid adoptions of convenience (which are sometimes 
followed by an annulment of the adoption). The delegation of parental 
authority could provide an alternative solution. 
It is worth noting that the Court of Appeal has ruled that the plenary 
adoption of a child of common law civil status by parents of particular 
status gives the child that particular civil status (which he or she can repeal 
at legal age in favour of a common law civil status). 
The group has decided to submit the analyses and conclusions of this 
report to the permanent committee, the advisory committee and to the 
Customary Council. It intends to resume work according to the directions 
of these three bodies. 
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In the Dictionnaire de l' ethnologie et de l' anthropologie, G. Augustin draws on 
Max Weber to distinguish between two definitions of the term custom. In 
the first case, which is favoured by anthropologists and sociologists, custom 
stands as common practice grounded in routine, which nevertheless 
includes a non-compulsory dimension (such as customary food, funerals 
and so forth). The second type delves into the realm in which jurists 
understand the term custom-'when written law bases itself in the 
acknowledgment of traditionally common practices'.1 For Weber 
[t]he continually renewed devotion to certain types of behaviour sometimes 
instills in the minds of those who organise the public order that they are no 
longer a practice or convention, but a judicial obligation which must be 
observed: it is this kind of norm, which enjoys a simple authority of fact, that 
we call customary law.2 
Far from being opposites, these two definitions can be seen as extensions 
of each other. The difference between them seems to lie in the notion of 
obligation, that is, in the existence or inexistence of punitive sanctions for 
those who do not respect custom. Yet this distinction is not satisfactory 
and we would be wrong, on two levels, to assume that only the disregard 
of legal customs entails sanctions, and ignoring ' social' or ' cultural' customs 
has no consequences.  
First, legal customs have no intrinsic, or ontological, characteristics of 
obligation. They are only respected to the extent that means of coercion 
exist, whereby punishments demanded by the legal apparatus can be 
applied. It is not the custom of law, or the law itself, which constrains 
people in modern societies, but rather the use or threat of force, the police. 
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Second, the disregard of legal customs in modern societies leads to 
sanctions of a legal or penal nature, whereas the disregard of religious 
customs in traditional societies can induce divine or supernatural 
punishment, which can be far more serious and frightening. Legal customs, 
therefore, do not necessarily hold greater weight than certain 'cultural' 
customs. 
The very idea of distinguishing between obligatory customs, because 
they are of a legal nature, and customs which are more or less arbitrary 
stems from a Western perspective in which judges-rather than priests, 
sorcerers, or divine forces-are in charge of issuing punishments for 
breaches of matters that the community deems crucial to respect. In the 
West the matters to which the community gives priority are inscribed 
within a specific framework-the law. 
From this perspective it would be tempting to begin presenting 
'customary rules' in French Polynesia by opposing the values underpinning 
traditional Tahitian customs to those on which French law, as applied in 
the Territory today, rest. By Tahitian customs, I refer not only to a particular 
culture and lifestyle, but also to those lying within that culture which 
Western lawyers would see as belonging to the realm of law. 
One w ould also have to reflect on the possible existence of an 
autonomous legal domain in the traditional Tahitian Ma'ohi society, even 
if it is clear that contemporary 'custom rules' stem only partially from it. It 
is in the nature of custom, or customs, to evolve and transform, and rules 
we might identify as traditionally Polynesian have probably been modified 
and reinterpreted several times. Today, what we call traditional Polynesian 
legal customs or customary Ma' ohi law can not be presented as legal rules 
having come 'straight down' from time immemorial. 
The specific difficulties in delineating customary rules in French 
Polynesia stem less from conceptual disparities between anthropologists 
and lawyers in regards to the meaning of custom or from the evolving and 
fluctuating character of what the term includes, than from the apparent 
absence, at first glance, of indigenous legal customs in Tahiti. 
In contrast to New Caledonia, civil law in French Polynesia has no distinct 
status, and French law seems to have absorbed, marginalised, or annihilated 
many traditional customs that Westerners would classify as legal. 
French civil law was applied in Tahiti as early as 1874, and penal law 
in 1877. In the Leeward Islands and in some of the Austral Islands, these 
Custom and the law 
measures were installed later, in 1945. Thus, a Ma'ohi civil state or an 
indigenous court (even clandestine, not recognised by the state) does not 
exist, nor have they existed for some time in French Polynesia. 
As far as political representation is concerned things are no different. 
We know that the chiefly systems and the roles of 'tribal' and 'high' chiefs 
in New Caledonia were created by the French colonial administration, 
which tells much about the supposed 'authenticity' of Kanak custom. 
Nevertheless, chiefly systems continue to coexist (side by side) with 
municipal councils, and the potential for conflict between these two 
institutions remains. In Tahiti and its islands, district councils, which had 
themselves replaced chiefly systems in the nineteenth century, were replaced 
by communes in 1972 without any of the institutions being split up. 
The Polynesian case is therefore somewhat paradoxical in as much as 
there is a specific culture, and an indigenous, Ma' ohi, way of doing things, 
yet these have no legal extension into local institutions (such as courts and 
chiefly systems), as they were eradicated by the forces of colonisation. I 
will attempt to give an account of this violent process of legal 
acculturation-a process which does not prevent certain Polynesians from 
talking about 'Ma' ohi law' (ture Ma' ohi), without specific reference to either 
an historical period of Tahitian society or to any laws in themselves. 
For the present purpose, we will consider Tahitian customary rules or 
laws to include all cases that come under Western categorisations of civil 
law (such as marriage, inheritance, property) and criminal law in which 
French written law and the jurisprudence of courts are either opposed to, 
or recognise and justify themselves in reference to, traditional practice. 
Obviously traditional rules are not limited to this domain, but as this 
symposium seeks to establish links between French law and Ma'ohi 
practice, it is fitting to pay special attention to the space in which these 
laws and practices meet, even if they may clash in doing so. 
Furthermore, we will be particularly careful not to put forward the 
equation 'culture = custom', and risk transforming a presentation of 
traditional Tahitian custom into one on traditional Tahitian culture by 
forgetting the realm of law and the specific issue of legal customs. 
Having thus defined our field of study, it is now possible to question 
not only the reality of customary rules in French Polynesia today, but also 
their representations in people's consciousness. It seems that religious 
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acculturation and French colonisation have drawn on, and made use of, 
many Ma' ohi legal and cultural practices, while simultaneously giving 
rise to new practices and a new conception of the law. Nevertheless, for 
historical as much as geographical reasons, there are relatively well­
preserved sub area spaces, and in Tahiti there is widely expressed political 
desire to revive certain traditional institutions. 
Tahiti was 'discovered' by Samuel Wallis in 1767. The first English 
protestant missionaries arrived in 1797, and allied themselves with the 
Pomare family. In 1815, Pomare II triumphed over the supporters of the 
traditional order, which engendered a radical religious acculturation that 
effectively marked the end of many Ma' ohi customs. A new conception of 
both law and custom was then put in place, when U1e French colonial 
administrator, who arrived in 1 842, elevated changes made by the 
missionaries to the rank of (new) Ma'ohi custom. 
Ancient Tahitian society was extremely structured and ordered. And if 
we define the law as all the rules that regulate relations between people in 
a society, or as that which is required and permitted in a collectivity (which 
comes to much the same thing), then the task of collecting all the obligations 
and practices entailed in the respect and maintenance of the social order 
seems immense. As royal power was grounded in the sacred, this society 
was characterised by the severity of tapu restrictions protecting people, 
objects, and ceremonies linked to divinity. 
I will not present an inventory of usages and customs relating to persons, 
goods, contracts and obligations, to compare a previous way of doing things 
with that of the French civil code. Luckily, such an undertaking has already 
been attempted by R. Cochin in 1947 and it belongs outside of the realm of 
an anthropological reflection on the concept of legal custom.3 On the other 
hand, it is necessary to ask how much autonomy the law could have had 
in such a society. Was there a specific legislative apparatus, a set of (oral) 
precepts and prescriptions, coupled with a legal apparatus capable of 
punishing those who did not meet these obligations? 
In her memoirs, Queen Marau Taaroa refers in length to her ancestor 
Tetuna'e, whom she calls the Tahitian 'legislator'. He established austere 
laws, two of which (and she doesn't tell us which ones) 
. . .  were of primordial importance and personified the strong spirit of 
fraternity in the people; they were the basis of the hospitality that has always 
been, and will always be, the distinctive mark of Tahitians.4 
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In fact these 'laws' (that Marau Taaroa calls 'ture', using a post­
missionary neologism) revolve around two themes-respect, te tura, or te 
faaturaa, and honour, te tara or te hanahana. Respect was to be held for the 
king, the other nobles, the high priest, Taumihau (the government of nobles 
or landowners appointed by the king), warriors, marae (the temple), the 
days and places for prayer, tapu food restrictions, rahui (restriction of 
harvesting a particular plot of land, decided by the aari) and so forth. 
Respect, in a traditional society, means staying in one's place-that is, 
submitting to the social order. Honour stems from one's capacity to manifest 
a particular respect towards others, which in turn generates the respect of 
others towards oneself. 
These laws were of two kinds-those which addressed the future aari 
(king), and those which applied to all of his subjects. 
The first type was more like a code of honour describing principles for 
being respected as a governor and consummate chief. A chief was 
recommended to avoid lasciviousness, show dignity and restraint at all 
times, except when it came to hospitality where his generosity was expected 
to be limitless. 
It was the same for the commoners, who were told 
[d]o not be indifferent to the traveller who passes in front of your door. You 
must invite him to enter your home, kill your pig, and grease your bowl with 
the food you will offer him. Whoever does not obey this order will be 
dragged into a public place and humiliated; his error will not be hidden; the 
aari will be able to confiscate his land as punishment. . . . 5 
It is easy to see how these codes contain links with penal justice, but 
that does not help us understand the social position ( ti 'ara'a) or rights of 
the individual. 
Blood must pay for blood. The aari must assume the justified revenge that is 
asked of him. 6 
The life and death of men is under your command . . .  May your verdicts of 
death not be too frequent, as your own bones could follow on the same 
path.7 
When Tetuna'e had established his laws, it is said that he entrusted or 
transmitted them to the high priest of the marae Farepua at Vaiari-Tahiti, 
'and under his authentication, they became sacred' .8 This is clear testimony 
to the indivisibility of political and religious functions in ancient Tahiti. 
How was justice actually carried out? Was there a legal apparatus which 
was independent from royal and priestly powers? 
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Despite some COI}tradictions in the sources, the answer to this question 
appears to be negative.9 The tahu'a (religious specialist) could determine 
if someone was guilty of theft through processes of divination and could 
force that person to return the stolen object.10 Above all, no one would 
dare oppose the sentencing of the aari, who held the right of life and death 
over his subjects, without provoking the king himself. Nevertheless, the 
aari would refrain from intervening in minor affairs. On the other hand, 
the most serious crime was to undermine royal authority. 
Ellis informs that the king, should he feel strong enough, would have 
banished any chief who resisted his authority, and would have sent another 
chief to take possession of the guilty chief's land and office . .  .Simply 
speaking badly of the king or his government was considered a serious 
enough crime to warrant exile or death, and a human sacrifice was required 
to repair the offence and appease the anger of the gods towards the 
inhabitants of the land where the crime was committed.11 
This information is significant in so far as an inventory of the causes of 
rebellion (orure hau) and trouble (aitamai) would form the most detailed 
and authentically Polynesian chapter of the future code of missionary and 
aristocratic laws of King Pomare II in 1819 .  The French colonial 
administrator would react in the same way at the end of the nineteenth 
century, when, during the annexation of the Leeward Islands, he ordered 
the dispossession of all land belonging to 'rebel' families or Ma' ohi patriots. 
Moreover, references are made to the common occurrence of banishment 
in pre-European Tahiti, and this was generally preferred to death as a 
maximum sentence in the missionary codes of the nineteenth century. 
Another interesting fact is the severity of the punishments for theft in 
ancient Tahiti-a crime which is so ordinary in Tahiti today. 
Williamson also wonders whether the Society Islands had a court of 
law or a consultative authority comparable to the Jona of Samoa. 
It seems to me that the administration of the law for those who were not 
chiefs or nobles, was in the hands of the district chief. There was a right of 
appeal to a higher chief but not to a collegiate court. On the other hand, that 
kind of legal structure did exist for the chiefs to judge each other.12 
This hypothesis is highly probable and was later confirmed by the 
existence of class separated juries (with one for the aari) in the Tamatoa 
code of the Leeward Islands of 1820 and in the special measures of the 
Rurutu code of 1889 and 1900. 
Who could the members of this tribunal have been? The answer surely 
lies in the memoirs of Arii Taimai, and those of her daughter Marau, when 
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they refer to the iatoai, or district sub-chiefs, and the raatira, or landowners. 
The definition of these two classes is crucial as they are both be found in 
the legal institutions of the nineteenth century codes. For Marau Taaroa 
[t]he iatoai were a class said to descend from one of the younger branches of 
the arii families. They formed the country's nobility, and had a recognised 
right to a marae .13 
We must keep in mind that being attached to a marae, the seat of familial, 
political, and religious power, allowed one to confirm one's property rights 
over land. As for the raatira, they were the landed bourgeoisie of the district. 
The people qualified to act as judges were most certainly recruited from 
the iatoai. Arii Taimai writes that 
[t]he entire body of 'iatoai' in every district was referred to as the 'hiva'. For 
those who are curious about the origins of things, they are the most 
interesting part of our old society, because the 'hiva' of Papara could have 
been the source of all modern institutions-assemblies, the administration, 
the army, justice, the police, the aristocracy, democracy and communes.14 
It is also worth noting that the founder of the hiva order, was Tetuna' e, 
the 'legislator '. They constituted a formidable counter-power to the aari, 
whom they could depose and exile. 
The omnipotence of the king at that time, did not therefore exclude the 
simultaneous existence of consultative or even decision making bodies. I 
have already mentioned the Taumihau, or government council. Furthermore, 
Marau Taaroa refers to the council of three (which might have been called 
Tootoru). This consisted of the aari, the high priest, and the aari chief of the 
royal guard of the hiva charged with enacting the decisions of the high priest 
over the marae.15 She also mentions councils which took care of matters of 
war and sporting competitions. It is unlikely therefore that justice would 
have been rendered by a single individual, even if the name of the institution 
responsible for this seems to have been lost. 
Marau Taaroa makes an anecdotal reference to a trial with judges in 
which the sentencing appears neither wise nor respectable. 
A poor man of the 'vao' class (the lowest) was wrongly accused of having 
hidden a 'urupiti' ('tapu' fish) to eat with his family. When he stood in front 
of the judges, there were so many accusers that, despite his proclamations of 
innocence, he was condemned to having his stomach opened. To the 
subsequent confusion of the judges, no one could find a justification for his 
condemnation.16 
Following this, the guilty party (the accusers) was killed and their land 
was offered to the descendants of the first victim. The necessity of repairing 
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a previous legal error obviously does not protect against even further 
misfortune, when the sentencing is either too strong or irreversible. 
When all is said and done, the existence of precepts, obligations and 
sanctions shows that ancient Tahitian rules, or legal customs, were geared 
more towards a legal ideal of order than of equality. 
According to our ancient laws, everyone was subjected to the laws assigned 
to them by right of birth. An ancient Tahitian law stipulates that 'it should be 
as difficult to overcome this as it is to reach the sky.'17 
The rapid and definitive success of English missionaries in converting 
Pomare II and his people led to a code of written laws called the Pomare 
code. It was written in English, mainly by Pastor Nott who translated it to 
the king and other chiefs.18 Ellis states that the chiefs 
. . .  having embraced Christianity, were unanimous in their desire to see their 
civil and legal institutions in perfect accord with the spirit and principles of 
the Christian religion.19 
Rather than referring to this code and those that followed in Tahiti and 
the other islands as simply missionary codes, I will use 'missionary and 
aristocratic codes' to describe them.20 They stem more specifically from a 
compromise between the puritanical, monarchic, and democratic values 
of the London pastors and the purely aristocratic values of the Tahitian 
chiefs, than from ill defined general Tahitian and English values. 
The Pomare code was proclaimed at Papaoa-Arue on 13 May 1819, a 
few days before the baptism of the king. He was to be the first Tahitian to 
embrace the Christian religion officially.21 Although the text was initiated 
as much by the Polynesians as by the English pastors, its content left little 
place for the respect of ancient Tahitian customs. 
It consists of 19 laws relating to: people who kill, theft (of food), pigs 
(wandering animals), stolen objects, lost objects, exchange, the non­
observance of the Sabbath (Sunday), troublemakers, two men with one 
woman, married men and women, abandoning one's spouse, men who 
do not feed their wives, marriage, lying, judges, the form of judgments, 
courts of law, and laws in general. 
Only the law related to troublemakers (Law 8) is of Ma' ohi inspiration, 
yet it is still stated with rather frightful missionary fervour. It enumerates 
no less than 71 crimes and offences punishable by death, except in the 
cases of a royal pardon. Included are the offences of tattooing, rebelling 
against a chief, wearing long plaited hair, frowning (a sign of worry), 
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insomnia, grinding teeth (a sign of anger), having a 'sweet' v oice 
(hypocrisy), and even making too much stomach noise. 
This extremely puritanical code, which, in the case of Law 8, was 
impossible to apply, would be revised several times until 1842, the year 
the French protectorate began. It would also serve as a basis for codes 
elaborated in islands which were not under King Pomare's reign. 
But, was it widely accepted by both the people and the leaders of Tahiti? 
Moerenhout suggests not. 
By criminalising activities which are not crimes, and by inflicting the guilty 
with punishments which they do not believe they deserve, we have 
distanced them from the missionaries and made them forever their enemies. 
Furthermore, these sessions and judgments, always held publicly, are a 
thousand times more indecent, and immoral, than the actions they 
condemn.22 
The reality of the situation was more subtle. The code held appeal on a 
formal and theoretical level, even though its application entailed injustices 
which replaced others that had existed in ancient times. 
The chiefs who ratified the code had no reason to complain, because 
they maintained immense authority and control over the populations of 
their respective districts. The administration of justice was in their hands, 
whether it was in the capacity of judge or high judge in a court, or because 
certain legal powers were automatically conferred on them as chiefs 
(thereafter called tavana, from the English word governor). The new legal 
institutions established by the codes were far from democratic. I will 
describe them in more detail at a later stage, particularly the famous toohitu. 
They became more democratic as time passed and certain revisions were 
made, but in 1820 magistrates were recruited according to the same 
aristocratic principles that had prevailed in ancient times. Despite the fact 
that the criteria for passing judgments were new, the privilege of rendering 
justice or of pardoning a guilty person, fell into the same hands as it had 
before. 
Another point that is worth noting is that in the years following the 
declaration of the Pomare code, protestant culture became more and more 
enmeshed with Polynesian culture. The missionaries 'literacised' the 
population, fixing the Tahitian language by translating the Bible (finished 
in 1835). A new identity was created and Christianity became, in the words 
of Jean-Frarn;ois Bare, 'something internal' (no roto).23 This was so much 
the case that the missionary laws that were modified over the years seemed 
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in retrospect extremely protective of the Ma' ohi when the French colonisers 
arrived. 
In fact, according to some of the provisions, this was particularly true 
in relation to land. Thus, when the Huahine code was revised in 1826 
[i]t is envisaged that the limitations of land litigation will be brought to the 
district judges and their juries. Their decisions will have to be inscribed in a 
specific register. Nevertheless, Colin Newbury contends that there is no 
proof of the development of the notion of individual property, which the 
English missionaries sought to instil!. 24 
It is not so important that the concepts of land tenure held by the pastors 
and the Polynesians differed, what matters is that the Ma'ohi were 
protected from dispossession of their land. In March 1825, for example, a 
new law was passed in Tahiti that restricted marriages between Polynesians 
and foreigners (whites). This was as much to block the sale of land as it 
was for reasons of morality. 25 While the Tamatoa code of Raiatea did not 
go as far as that, the revised version of 1836 included an article which 
stated that a popa'a man (foreigner) who married a Polynesian woman 
could not inherit her land should she pass away. The land would be 
attributed to their children or, if that was not possible, it would go back to 
the wife's family. 
Apart from the fact that these missionary laws protected Polynesians, 
they also seemed to become enmeshed with Tahitian society. They appeared 
as an extension of the divine laws of the Bible, providing the basis of the 
new Tahitian identity in the nineteenth century. This encounter between 
English Protestant culture and Ma' ohi culture produced a conceptualisation 
of the law and of rights that has survived, in p art, to this day. 
The neologism Ture, derived from the Hebrew term Torah, has been 
successfully incorporated into the vocabulary and consciousness of 
Tahitians. This is so true that the law, whether it be civil or penal, is still 
anchored in a religious model inherited from ancient times but also from a 
Protestant biblical education which emphasises knowledge of the Old 
Testament. 
Pastor Daniel Mauer has stated quite correctly in Tahiti: les yeux ouverts 
that 
(e]ven if the English missionaries had not sought to become preoccupied 
with legislation, the Tahitians would have been anxious to hand them the 
management of their affairs . . .  and to ask them for laws, as that was 
ingrained in their nature, even if they were not so concerned with respecting 
them . . .  Through fear o(offering their converts food that was too strong, or 
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honey of which they were not worthy, they offered, through the Decalogue 
used as a springboard, a Jewish religion which was blocked at the doors of 
Grace, and which had not really known its own Bethlehem.26 
Two points are worth exploring in trying to understand better not only 
the quibbling character of Tahitians today (the overload of the courts attests 
to this, and it is not only due to the confused legal system that emerged 
from colonisation), but also their representations of the law. These appear 
in claims relating to indigenous custom, presented as Ma' ohi laws, or Ture 
Ma'ohi. 
First of all, Polynesians have always been admirers of principles, 
whether they were to be found in the ancient Tetuna' e codes of honour, the 
fables of La Fontaine today, or, of course, the biblical psalms and parables 
which were so popular. The papa' a missionaries were quick to notice how 
Tahitians moralised their speeches, encouraging each other to do good 
things, showing their knowledge of, and their interest in, good principles.27 
This should not suggest that they actually apply these morals in their day 
to day life. They often operate as an encouragement (fa'aitoitora'a) at the 
level of rhetoric and speech. These morals appear as a course to follow, 
rather than something that can be lived by in themselves. They fascinate 
people, but do not constrain them.28 
On the other hand, the acceptance of Christianity, which was conceived 
of as a new set of laws and parables, had the overall effect of replacing one 
system of restrictions or taboos (tapu) with another. 
The missionary and aristocratic codes were written according to this 
perspective. There was no radical transformation of Ma'ohi thought. 
Hence the importance that Polynesians place on the Old Testament-it 
represents the alliance (fa' aauraa faufa' a) between the God of Israel and his 
people, through the person of Abraham (Genesis 17), and the gift of the Ten 
Commandments (Ture ahuru, meaning the ten laws) to Moses (Exodus 20).29 
It is also a text that emphasises issues of revenge, divine anger and 
punishment, over grace, redemption and salvation for mankind. A 
relatively easy parallel is made between the history that Tahitians are living 
and that of the Hebrew people-a move from polytheism to monotheism, 
from idolatry to true religion, on the basis of disasters, diseases, and 
political enslavement. But the alliance that God made through the persons 
of the missionaries, who brought these laws, is what would allow Tahitians 
to be saved. One could even argue that peace on earth could happen 
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without Christ, but instead, through strict adherence to the Ten 
Commandments (meaning the laws that God desires for His Kingdom) 
and to the laws of the kingdom in which one lives. This is the explanation 
of Daniel Mauer's statement about a 'Jewish religion which was blocked 
at the doors of Grace, and which had not really known its own Bethlehem'. 
It applies perfectly to Tahitians' Old Testament conception of both 
Christianity and the law. 
The formalism of Ma'ohi thought, which is the product of a culture 
based on rituals and restrictions, served not only to facilitate the acceptance 
of the missionary laws (apart from the mamaia episode, which the pastors 
and high chiefs managed to shake off as early as 1831, although it continued 
in the Leeward Islands for several years),30 it also illuminates why these 
missionary laws, which neatly replaced the ancient prescriptions in 
people's minds, came to be seen as having always existed, as having already 
been Polynesian customs when the French colonisers came to settle in 
Tahiti. 
The arrival of the French opened the door to a new religion, Catholicism, 
which the Protestants condemned with as much energy as they had spent 
in the struggle against the Paganism of ancient times. It posed a threat to 
the new Christian social order that had been in place since the 1820s. Thus, 
the Tehauroa codes of Raiatea and Tahaa underwent a final revision in 1884, 
four years after the annexation of Tahiti by the French and four years before 
these islands themselves would be annexed. There was a double edge to 
the changes-the sale of land, which had been controlled until that point, 
became illegal, even between indigenous people (Law 37, Article 10). As 
for Protestantism, it became the only authorised religion in these islands, 
because it was 'the one we are used to, and the only one that suits us' (te 
haapaoraa i matarohia, o te haamoriraa la e au, hoe roa ra) (Law 43). 
Therefore, we are still left with the problem of ascertaining whether or 
not these codes, which were fully applied in certain islands from 1819-
1945, belong to the category of the law, or to that of customary law(s). 
Anthropologists of law, who also have their own customs, have tended to 
follow E. Le Roy in distinguishing between traditional laws and customary 
laws.31 
Traditional law refers to the laws practiced prior to colonisation, 
including Islamic law in Africa. Customary law, on the other hand, only 
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appears during the period of colonial administration. Customary law is 
the result of writing down customary traditions, which then become 
partially distorted, modified and reinterpreted. 
In the case of French Polynesia, the English missionaries arrived in 
1797, and the French protectorate intervened 45 years later in 1842. Yet 
the intensity of the acculturation shock produced by the missionaries, 
p articularly in matters of civil law, should be considered on the same 
level as the enforced legal acculturation that later occurred w ith 
colonisation. 
In relation to marriages and contracts, the positions of the British 
missionaries were not far from those of the French civil code. Even in 
matters of land, they advocated private property, whereas the Ma' ohi mode 
of appropriation was centred on the family and the collectivity. 
Having said this, the missionaries never sought to force the Polynesians 
to abandon the indivisibility of land. Because they were not running a 
state, they never sought to procure goods for reasons other than the 
construction of parishes. On the other hand, France under Louis-Phillipe, 
and particularly under the Third Republic, instigated procedures for the 
declaration of individual land tenure as soon as 1852. This entailed the 
establishment of a public domain which incorporated all land that was 
not claimed within a specified period. This domain was intended to serve 
for the development of colonial agriculture. 
Beyond the objectives pursued by the various parties involved, the 
missionary and aristocratic codes were nevertheless based mainly in 
Western concepts. In his research on L' application du droit civil et du droit 
penal frani;;ais aux autochtones des Etablissements frani;;ais de l'Oceanie, R. Cochin 
described these texts, which emerged from compromises between the 
values of the missionaries and those of the Ma' ohi chiefs, as intermediary 
legislation. As for the Pomare code of 1842, he states that 
in no way are we confronted with a codification of Tahitian usages and 
customs, but rather with the revolutionary work of the English Protestant 
missionaries. 32 
Under these circumstances, we need to ask whether such an 
'intermediary' legal system should be considered as part of traditional 
law (pre-colonial), like the Islamic law of Africa. It does seem traditional 
in comparison with the modernity represented by the French legal system 
which came to replace it-a system which was more democratic, secular, 
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and predisposed to the individual, but which was unfortunately stained 
by the colonial domination underpinned its application, or imposition. 
We should therefore make a distinction between three, rather than two, 
types of laws 
traditional law, which existed prior to the discovery of Tahiti 
in 1767, or at least until the arrival of the missionaries in 1797 
neo-traditional law, which was put into place under the 
leadership of the missionaries before the establishment of the 
French protectorate of Tahiti in 1842, or before the annexation 
of the Leeward Islands in 1888 
customary law, which resulted from the codification of neo­
traditional laws by France. This meant not only a transitory 
and partial integration of these laws, but a modification of 
them as well. 
From 1842 onwards in Tahiti, we are confronted with a synthesis, or a 
concoction, of legal elements stemming from Tahitian aristocratic culture, 
English missionary puritanism, and French colonial law. These already 
bore little relation to the laws as they existed before the arrival of the first 
Europeans. 
The issue here is not the making, or the remaking, of a history of the 
law in French Polynesia since the protectorate. For that we refer to the 
work of Bernard Gille and Pierre-Yves Toullelan, Le mariage franco-tahitien. 
Yet we would also like state that from our point of view the whole affair 
resembled a rape more than a marriage, a rape to which the victim 
consented only after the act.33 But that is a different issue altogether. 
What is at stake here is an understanding of the ways in which France 
came to see the laws and institutions instituted by the missionaries and 
the Polynesian aristocrats as indigenous, particularly those relating to land 
tenure. The Ma'ohi 'authenticity' of the court of the Toohitu is due as much 
to the Polynesian desire to maintain control over land as to a colonial practice 
which gradually came to focus exclusively on matters of land tenure. 
Article 3 of the Treaty of the Protectorate of 9 September 1842 established 
that 
[t]he possession of the land of the queen and of the people will be 
guaranteed to them. This land will remain theirs. All disputes relating to 
property law or to the ownership of land will come under the special 
jurisdiction of local courts.34 
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In practice, a whole set of texts relating to land tenure were assumed/ 
read, in violation of the treaty of 1842, to allow the agricultural development 
of the Kingdom and the installation of colonial settlers.35 
The restriction on marriages between foreigners and Tahitians inscribed 
in the Pomare Code of 1842 was reversed in 1845. In the same year the 
conditions relating to the sale, the lease, or the donation of land were 
slackened. 
The civil code was making its entry into the Marquesas Islands as early 
as 1843 and, in the States of Pomare IV, by 1845, but with some reservations. 
The Royal Ordinance of 1845 included the provision that 
[t]he Court of first instance, and the Appeals Council will apply French civil 
law modified either by royal ordinance, by local decree, or by the customs of 
the place. 36 
While this was a recognition of local customs, it seems minor compared 
to the measures taken at the same time to deprive the Tahitian courts of 
their competence and extend the sphere of the French civil and criminal 
legal system. A few of these should suffice to make the point. 
On the first of December 1843, a decree by Governor Bruat limited the 
jurisdiction of indigenous courts to civil cases between the Queen's subjects 
and to criminal cases between Tahitians, on the condition that they did not 
concern the safety of the Colony. A decree of 13 April 1 845, signed by the 
commissioner and the regent . . .  withdrew the Tahitian courts right to judge 
over real estate litigation between Tahitians and foreigners, etc.37 
As for Cochin, he states that 
[t]he Pomare Code of 1842 was applied until March 13, 1869, when French 
laws became effective (in the States of the Protectorate) in accordance with 
the decree of August 18, 1868.38 
Through this decree, French law became applicable in the Etablissments 
Frarn;:aise de l'Oceanie (EFO), except for matters of land tenure where 
disputes property between Ma' ohi continued to come under Tahitian 
jurisdiction. This effectively marked the end of the Pomare code in Tahiti, 
except for matters of land, despite the fact that the statutory move from 
subject to that of French citizen would only come about at the time of the 
annexation treaty of 28 June 1880. 
In those islands which had not yet come under French care, however, 
the missionary and aristocratic codes continued to be applied until 1945, 
even if they were substantially modified by France. 
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Rurutu in the Austral Islands, which was armexed in 1900, had evolved 
until then under the rules of a missionary and aristocratic code, which 
was only slightly modified during annexation.39 A decree of 5 May 1916 
confirmed the validity of indigenous jurisdictions and codified laws in 
correctional and criminal matters, except in cases of legitimate suspicion. 
Another decree, that of 25 August 1917, specified that 
Nothing changes for the special tribunal mentioned in title 69 of the codified 
laws, which made provisions for cases where an offence is committed by the 
king, the chiefs or judges and other public servants. The offence would be 
judged, in conformity with the law, by a court consisting of island judges or 
high judges, who are free to choose those assessors they wish, to join in the 
task. 
By 1880, in the eyes of the colonisers, Tahiti no longer had any traditional 
legal customs or even neo-traditional customs or rules forged by the 
missionaries between 1818-42, except for those relating to disputes of land 
tenure. Yet if the forces of religious acculturation or colonisation had gained 
the upper hand over traditional law, they had not necessarily done so in 
relation to all the practices. 
The vastness of the Territory, coupled with the varying durations of 
the missionary and aristocratic codes and the differing degrees of 
acculturation in the islands, meant that certain practices continued to resist 
French law, or had difficulty accommodating it. 
We will leave aside those practices relating to names and especially to 
adoption, instead referring briefly to Marie-Noelle Charles' solid analysis 
of traditional concepts of the family and the legal implications they entail.40 
What we will explore here is the issue of land, which is so important to 
Ma' ohi identity and so prominent in the discourse of contemporary cultural 
and political reclamations. It appears that while traditional or customary 
concepts of land tenure (ownership, management and transmission) persist 
in some of the more distant islands, this is not the case in Tahiti. In Tahiti, 
where customary practice is regressing, a discourse of identity is 
nevertheless developing around Ma'ohi culture and custom. It has led to 
some concrete developments such as the recreation of the toohitu, which is 
conceived of today as a council of elders on issues concerning land. 
Until now we have made much of the collective mode of land 
appropriation for the Ma' ohi, without specifying what it entails. First of 
all, it is important not to confuse family ownership with a pseudo-system 
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of primitive communism, in which everything would belong to everybody. 
Individual exploitation of land does exist, even if ownership is collective 
or family based (in the widest sense of the term). Frani;ois Ravault was 
correct in stating 
Polynesians make a fundamental (cultural) distinction, which constitutes an 
exceptional provision in (French) law, between the ownership of land lfenua) 
and that of plantations lfaapu). Plantations belong to the planters or their 
inheritors, but are always harvested individually (as in the case of the copra 
rounds).41 
Traditionally land can not be separated from, and indeed is a part of, a 
system of kinship. 42 People are kin because they live together on the same 
land, whether they are actually kin by blood-from the same opu fetii (large 
kin group) and members of the same opu ho' e (consisting of brothers and 
sisters and their descendants over two generations)-or whether they are 
kin by adoption. Furthermore, residence validates the rights over land 
that one inherits from one's family origins. In the range of land over which 
an individual may have joint rights, he cannot claim ownership of land 
which he has never exploited, developed, utilised, or lived on. As Paul 
Ottino has clearly demonstrated for the island of Rangiroa, absence for 
more than three generations annuls potential rights over land. A person 
originating from two different islands, and marrying someone from a third, 
therefore has to make a crucial choice as to where to reside. His or her 
grandchildren will, when they become adults, have definitely lost all rights 
to land on the other two islands. 
Such an enmeshment of land and family leads to the idea that to sell 
land, or even to share it, is to sell or divide one's family, which is completely 
opposite to Ma'ohi values. Land is inalienable in the sense that it cannot 
be given to a stranger, but that does not mean that one's rights over it are 
eternal. Yet, that is what a number of claimants believe today. They are 
proclaiming their attachment to the land of their ancestors through the 
device of French laws, but they would have lost their claim over that land 
anyway in Ma' ohi tradition because of lack of residence and usage. 
The custom which leads to an individual losing their rights over certain 
land is therefore not in total contradiction with the effects of the thirtieth 
prescription of extinction contained in the civil code, even if the motivations 
for these two types of loss of rights are very different. Tahitian legal custom 
or rather traditional arrangements, in matters of land tenure, provides for 
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a possible renunciation of rights. The big difference lies in the fact that this 
' s tripping' of an individual i s  voluntary and constitutes a fair 
counterbalance to the 'stripping' of the other family members in relation 
to the land that they no longer live on, but on which the person involved 
still resides. 
The other main difference is that Tahitian custom does not allow for 
prescriptive acquisition, or usurpation. A foreigner can never become the 
owner of land, under any circumstances, even though he may have lived 
on it for more than thirty years, or his family lived on it for more than 
three generations. If he resides on this land it is because he has family 
based rights to do so, either through his lineage or through adoption. 
Polynesians had never considered that a man could be without family or 
land, let alone want to become the owner of another family's land. 
So where does this traditional conceptualisation stand today? Is land 
tenure, meaning 'the system of obtaining, dividing and imparting rights 
of usage of land', the same for contemporary Polynesians as it was for 
their ancestors?43 
The installation of property title deeds in the Society Islands in the 
nineteenth century had the initial effect of giving weight to the claims, or 
potential rights, of certain individuals over land that they or their ancestors 
had claimed. This land was called tomite land. Whilst the concept was 
foreign to Polynesian culture, or to Ma' ohi ideas of land tenure, the 
declaration of ownership became a powerful protective tool for people 
whose ancestors had thought to tomite their land. 
Jean-Frarn;ois Bare described the evolution of the situation very well. 
From now on 
[t]he mana over land could appear to have been replaced by a tomite over 
land. As the most important ancestors, those from whom one gained one's 
identity, were those who had transmitted the rights of land tenure, the tomite 
came to serve in some ways as ancestors; there was the impression of a new 
era being born with them . .  .In the same way that the residence of an ancestor 
and his or her children had induced a process of successive residential 
choices, of evictions and aggregations, so did the initial act of the tomite set 
in motion a series of movements which resulted in groups of people who, 
several generations later, had a common tomite. Whatever decisions were 
taken within these family and territorial groups, which the anthropological 
notion of 'residential lineage' describes relatively well, or the justice or 
injustice of the various cultural codes, the tomite came to be a founding 
element in island life.44 
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Hence the fanciful nature of a project that sought to re-establish the 
land rights of people on the basis of ancient genealogies and of the marae. 
With the tomite a new era had begun and a new concept of the transmission 
and tenure of land was born, one which strayed from the customary designs 
of ancient times. 
So what happened to the notion of indivisibility? An expert on land 
tenure in Tahiti, Gabriel Tetiarahi writes that '90 per cent of Territory's 
land is undivided', seeing in this the proof of a resistance to acculturation 
and especially of the desire to continue living together. Unfortunately, this 
perspective seems overly optimistic, as many of the abolitions of indivisible 
land have not yet been finalised. 45 Apart from certain islands which we 
will discuss, the sharing of land is both desired and practiced by the 
majority of Polynesians today. 
The abolition of indivisibility is not an obligation in Polynesia, even if 
an entire legal arsenal has been put into place to facilitate individual 
ownership. In sum, the spirit of the civil code is unfavourable to the 
indivisibility of land, whereas Polynesian custom sees it as the norm. The 
fact remains that today it is most often the complexity, length and cost of a 
court case that discourages people from attempting to procure a release of 
indivisible land, rather than the cultural motivation pushing them to 
maintain the indivisibility of their land. 
The abolition of indivisible land is difficult to procure, because it 
presupposes the existence of written property titles, which is not always 
the case. Much land was not tomite (aita i Tomitehia), having not been 
declared to the tomite registration committees of the nineteenth century 
(created by the Tahitian Law of 24 March 1852), and is thus considered to 
belong to the public domain. It is also restrained by the surveying and 
registering of land, as one cannot divide what is not delineated. The 
Territory administration is far from completing this task, which depends 
on very expensive private surveyors. The lack of surveyed land helps the 
persistence of indivisible land, but that is not the result of people's desires. 
Finally, in the case of land that has been both surveyed and registered, a 
sharing system can be put into place, but it must take into account the 
large number of title holders based on the rights of indivisibility. 
Amicable sharing, which needs the agreement of all the indivisible holders 
and concerns small undivided plots of a few people, is the exception, 
whereas legal sharing has become the norm.46 
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The unification of these two elements, ownership titles and survey 
plans, means that there will not be an abolition of indivisibility in all the 
cases brought forward. There are outlying islands in French Polynesia 
where these two conditions are met, but where nobody has access to a 
judge (French, of course, because they are the only ones recognised, or 
who recognise themselves, as competent) necessary to share land officially. 
It is difficult in these rare cases to talk of legal custom in so far as no 
appropriate jurisdiction exists. Indigenous c ourts have either all 
disappeared or been suppressed. Nevertheless, occasional marginal 
subspaces of traditional practice do appear, in which Ma' ohi realities are 
in total contradiction with French law. 
How are we to draw a table of the various cultural and legal situations 
for the five archipelagoes of the Territory? 
On Tahiti island, which has not yet been entirely surveyed, half of the 
land between Papeete and Mataiea to the south, and Papeete and Paenoo 
to the east 
. . .  has been the focus of a sharing arrangement or is in the process of 
becoming so. In the other communes, the percentage is less. At Moorea, an 
essentially touristy island, there have been many releases from the 
indivisibility of land. 
This was the 1990 estimate produced by Denise Girard-Goupil and 
Teriivaea Neuffer in their outstanding report on indivisibility.47 They 
specify that sharing seems to work in layers, that is, by large branches of 
the descendants of a common ancestor, who then either make arrangements 
between themselves or can once again go to the courts to make use of their 
rights. 
In the Leeward Islands, an initial survey of the land was established in 
the 1950s but proved unreliable. New surveying operations are currently 
being carried out. The push for the abolition of indivisibility comes less 
from the Polynesians who have remained on the land, than from their fetii 
(kin) who grew up in Papeete and who wish to return to their family land, 
but in clearly defined individual plots. Despite the surveying 
. . .  much of the land is still undivided, although the 'Services des terres' 
(Land Service) has established 400 subdivisions since the creation of its 
branch in Uturoa.48 
In the Marquesas Islands, the situation varies according to the island. 
For historical and demographic reasons, much of the land was never 
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declared and remains in the public domain (the law on the declaration of 
property was only applied in 1902, at a time of depopulation). Other land 
belongs to people who had no descendants. On the other hand, and 
p articularly in the north of the archipelago, mixed Marquesan and 
European families (demis) own enormous areas of land. Much of the land 
remains in the category of 'uncontrolled indivision', particularly on Tahuata 
and Fatu Hiva, meaning that the legitimate landowners are not known. 
The authors of the report state that the situation is such that everybody 
wants to share . . .  but, we are confronted with a lack of structures (courts, 
judges, solicitors, etc.).49 
In the Austral Islands, Raivavae and Tubuai, which were already 
integrated into the Pomare Kingdom in 1842, evolved along the same legal 
lines as Tahiti. While Tubuai underwent the tomite procedures 
. .  .in Raivavae, much of the land was not claimed. Such is the case of the 
fenua piipii for which a magistrate had to visit in 1976, and spend three 
weeks recording the declarations of the claimants . . .  When he returned to 
Papeete he passed judgments against the Territory for each of the 
declarations of property, by means of the thirtieth prescription.50 
The distant Rapa Island was annexed in 1881 and attached to Raivavae 
and Tubuai, from an administrative and legal point of view, from 1887 
onwards.51 Finally, Rurutu and Rimatara were annexed in 1900 under a 
regime d'indigenat, like the one in the Leeward Islands, until 1945. There 
were no tomite either at Rapa, Rurutu, or Rirnatara. 
Four of these five islands have been surveyed and registered, with Rapa 
being the exception. Yet in order to abolish the indivisibility of land, the 
existence of an airstrip and regular flights to Tahiti carries more weight 
than the official surveys. Whereas a turbulent geographical configuration 
restricts the construction of an airport in Rapa, in the cases of Rimatara, 
and especially Raivavae, the population has always been opposed to 
greater interaction with the outside world, so as to maintain their traditions. 
Thus, for the three islands that are only serviced by boat (which pass around 
once a month), the problems relating to land tenure are settled between 
family members, virtually without any reliance on the courts of Papeete. 
Only on very rare occasions does the Service des Terres de Papeete deal with 
requests for the release from undivided land. 
In Tubuai, supposedly the most 'modem' island and definitely the island 
with the most individualistic attitude of the archipelago, there is an 
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abundance of land disputes in the courts. Although undivided land remains 
the norm, multiple subdivisions of land are being negotiated. Only the 
existence of vast areas of fertile land has restrained extreme partitioning 
of the area into small plots. 
In Rurutu, which holds a reputation of authenticity in the eyes of the 
Tahitians, the desire to subdivide land is getting stronger. Rurutu had not 
installed the tomite, and people did not always see eye-to-eye on issues of 
land tenure in earlier times, but nevertheless operated with a modus vivendi 
which was crucial in such a small island environment. People who lived 
next to each other and worked together in parish or village groups on 
agriculture or craft could sometimes hate each other and occasionally fight, 
as Alain Babadzan says, 'with strikes of puta tupuna (family textbooks 
containing genealogies and traditions)'. 52 On this island, the installation 
of an aerodrome in the 1970s further enhanced the transformation of 
customary land tenure. It certainly changed day to day lifestyles, but more 
significantly it instigated the first reliance on property title deeds, following 
the thirtieth prescription. This was a consequence of the expropriations 
caused by the construction of the airstrip, and of the necessary 
compensation payments that followed. Once again, the decisive factor crune 
from the outside. 
Finally, in the Tuamotus atolls the same remark can be made on the 
subject of air strips and their impact on economic and land related matters. 
Due to the isolation of these atolls, for a long time the only people to show 
any economic interest in them were those who lived there. By leaving one's 
island, and by not coming back, one relinquished one's rights to land 
according to Ma'ohi tradition. Consequently, there were almost no 
demands for the abolition of indivisibility. Furthermore 
[t]he situation is particularly complicated in this archipelago, and more 
entangled than elsewhere, as indivisibility originally existed, since the claims 
were made by several individuals jointly. Often they were brothers and 
sisters, cousins, or even a whole family. Ninety per cent of land in the areas 
used for coconut plantations is in indivisibility. It usually consists of small 
plots, or else sometimes people argue over the ownership of a specific tree.53 
The opening up of some of the atolls went hand in hand with the 
development of commercial fishing to supply Papeete, tourism (Rangiroa, 
Tikehau) and especially black pearl cultivation in atolls like Manihi, Ahe, 
Takaroa, Takapoto, Arutua, and Apataki.54 As the industry can be highly 
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profitable, it has stirred jealousies and conflicts that have often turned 
violent in relation to the maritime tenure of the lagoon. Although lagoons 
are said to belong to the public domain, the section of a lagoon that faces 
land belongs to the owner of that land according to Polynesian tradition. 
The pearl cultivation boom brought people who were not originally from 
the island, or at least who had never lived on it. They came to claim a plot 
of land, so that they could then ask for a maritime concession and start 
cultivating pearls. It is a far cry from the Ma' ohi land tenure system 
described by Ottino in Rangiroa in the mid-1960s. 
Despite this, there are still some isolated atolls where traditional modes 
of appropriation and exploitation of the land persist, even when there is 
an airstrip present, and even though these lands are supposed to belong 
to the public domain. Such cases, which used to be the rule, have now 
become the exception in French Polynesia as a whole. Even in the Taumotu 
Islands where 90 per cent of the land is undivided, the situation is only 
partially due to respect for traditional values and ways of life. The legal 
complexity of each situation is also responsible. 
As modernisation has become more and more dominant, a traditionalist 
discourse of return to Ma' ohi sources has developed in certain sections of 
the population, particularly amongst intellectuals. The Polynesian situation 
is very close to that in New Caledonia, even if people in Papeete don't 
speak of custom by saying the foreign term. In Tahiti, Punaauia or Rurutu, 
people don't do custom the way they do in Noumea, Canala or Lifou, but 
they speak about it just as much, and ever more so. Put simply, the words 
used in the Ma' ohi language render the phenomena invisible to those who 
do not listen to the Tahitians or who do not understand their language. 
The generalised use of the term Ma' ohi to replace 'Polynesian' is itself 
quite recent, reflecting the appropriation of the term Kanak by Melanesians, 
except for the fact that Ma'ohi, meaning 'aboriginal' or 'indigenous', was 
never a pejorative term amongst Europeans. It was simply absent from 
the Europeans' vocabulary. 
The discourse of Hiro' a tumu Ma' ohi (original Polynesian culture) started 
amongst a handful of intellectuals of the Tahitian Evangelical (Protestant) 
Church. Whilst it used to be a marginal factor in this church, which has 
the highest number of followers in the Territory, it has today become 
dominant and spread throughout the whole of society. It is no longer a 
matter of 'consoling incantations', as Jean-Claude Guillebaud described 
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the cultural assertions of the 1980s.55 It has real consequences in terms of 
land tenure and people's relations with French law and justice. It has lead 
to concrete initiatives aiming to restore the toohitu-customary courts of 
the nineteenth century which were in charge of settling disputes over land. 
This comes at the price of reinterpreting the original nature of the toohitu. 
As far as the contemporary conceptualisation of Tahitian culture as 
custom is concerned (Hiro's Tumu, Iha Tumu or Peu Tumu in Tahitian), we 
can approach the issue in parallel with the situation in New Caledonia. 
The two countries present unexpected similarities which have been 
appropriately analysed in Frederic Rognon' s thesis, Conversion, syncretisme 
et nationalisme: analyse du changement religieux chez les Melanesiens de 
Nouvelle-Caledonie.56 Rognan highlights how much of Kanak culture has 
been influenced by the nineteenth century missionary heritage, even if 
the concepts and reclamations presented today are done so in terms of 
ancestral values, tradition and authenticity.57 In returning to Alain 
Babadzan's analysis of cultural and religious syncretism in Rurutu, we 
are actually confronted with a new tradition. Rather than merely being 
made of elements borrowed from pre-European culture and the missionary 
contribution, it results from the fusion and synthesis of these elements, 
forming an original syncretism.58 
As the issue at stake is the reclamation of Ma' ohi identity, the discourse 
neglects the weight of the missionary heritage. It does this by relativising 
the wide gap between ancestral customs and values and those that were 
introduced by the Bible in religious matters, and by the missionary and 
aristocratic codes in terms of society. Even though it is directed against the 
French colonisers, it neglects the unconscious impact of a century and a 
half of French legal acculturation. This includes one hundred years of the 
exercise of democratic laws (rather than aristocratic) in Tahiti, and fifty in 
certain other islands, which, although they may sometimes have been 
ridiculed, are held as valuable principles. 
The two main apostles of the Ma' ohi cultural revival are Henri Diro 
and Duro Raapoto, both of whom were ex-students of Protestant theology. 
A man of the theatre, a poet, and a militant for independence, Henri Hiro 
came to a premature death in 1990. His lifelong friend, Duro Raapoto, is 
the son of Samuel Raapoto, who was the first president of the Evangelical 
Church of French Polynesia (EEPF) when it gained its autonomy in 1963. 
Duro Raapota is a professor of reo Ma' ohi (Tahitian language) and is also in 
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charge of the Committee of Theological Debate of the EEPF as well as 
having undertaken, since 1988, a theological study comparing certain 
elements of Christianity with Ma' ohi culture. He was at the origin of the 
concept, and subsequent general use, of the terms Hiro' a Tumu, Iha Tumu, 
and Peu Ma' ohi, which can all be translated as Ma' ohi culture, identity and 
custom. But we will let him define these words himself, and their relation 
to land, in an unedited letter, written in French, that he sent to us in 1986. 59 
Hira'a translates as the idea of someone who is in full possession of his 
mental and physical capacities, who can see and understand what is 
happening around him . . .  
Tumu refers to that which is fundamental 
Hira'a tumu therefore refers to this fundamental knowledge. But in order to 
better grasp the term, one needs to know that tumu originally applied to 
plants. 
Tumu is a plant with a trunk, which is therefore at full force. It gets this force 
from the land, a notion to which it is inextricably linked. There are no trunks 
without the land to nourish them. Similarly there is no culture without 
land . . .  The land is called mother by Polynesians. Just as a cord attaches a 
child to its mother, so tradition demands that the child's umbilical cord be 
buried in the ground . . .  To take away the land of a Polynesian is to take away 
his culture, his sensitivity I awareness, or to condemn him to live his culture 
artificially. As long as we have not resolved the problems of land, the 
problems of culture will remain murky. 
Finally, the term Iha Tumu is no different from Hiro' a tumu, as the notion of 
identity is expressed by the idea of essence (Iha). The land is life, it is alive, 
and from this life the Polynesian Iha tumu is born, feeds itself, and grows . . .  To 
take away land is to condemn a Polynesian to being a kind of wandering 
soul, with a vaporising identity, in the image of the spirits who failed their 
passage to the other world and are eternally condemned to wander 
dangerously between two universes . . . .  
There is a lot to discuss on the subject of Dor Raapoto' s passage, in the 
late 1980s, from a simple poetic discourse of cultural revival to an ambitious 
theological synthesis of Christianity and Ma' ohi culture. While this new 
theology does not have unanimous support within the Evangelical church, 
it has been important for the young generation of Ma' ohi pastors. The 
most spectacular innovation it has produced is the replacement of the term 
Jehovah, the name of the god of Israel and of the Christians, with Taaroa 
or Te Tumu Nui (the Big Origin), the creator god of Polynesia. 
This theology is interesting because it is situated in the extension of the 
concept of culture as traditional customs (Hiro'a Tumu), since the Ma'ohi 
term Peu refers more to the totality of customs, habits, and ways of life. It 
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touches on matters of land tenure, as land and culture are seen as the gifts 
of God to the Ma' ohi people, to whom He pays specific attention. Message 
au peuple elu de Dieu (Poro'i i te nuna' a ma'itihia e te Atua) ['A Message to 
God's Chosen People'] is the title of one of Duro Raapoto's works, 
published in over ten thousand copies by the Evangelical Church in 1989. 60 
In the 1980s, a working committee on land tenure, led by Gabriel 
Tetiarahi, was created within the EEPF. It contributed considerably to the 
renaissance of the toohitu in the strongly Protestant island of Tahaa. These 
were the Ma' ohi customary jurisdictions which had appeared in the 
nineteenth century codes and had been suppressed in the Leeward Islands 
in 1945. 
But before exploring this renaissance of toohitu in Rapa, Tahiti, Rurutu 
and Tahaa, we must return to the original missionary and aristocratic codes. 
It is important to see whether the conceptualisation of the 'customary', or 
indigenous (Ma'ohi), courts today has changed in comparison to the 
realities of the toohitu of the nineteenth century.61 
Toohitu can be broken down to too, which is a prefix for any number 
between two and nine, and hitu, which means seven. 
Although most Polynesians are convinced that the institution pre-dates 
the arrival of Europeans, it undoubtedly due to the fact that it deals 
specifically with matters of land, as a result of colonisation (and not prior 
to it). This, coupled with the inseparability of land and Ma'ohi identity, 
gives it a reputation of authenticity or antiquity. 
There are no indigenous or ethnographic texts which mention the 
existence of the toohitu in ancient times. The term does not figure in the 
Pomare Code of 1819, and, if we are to believe William Tagupa, it originally 
appeared as a court of appeal in 1824, when the code was first revised. 62 
William Ellis calls the institution 
[a] supreme court . . .  consisting of seven judges, of which two are residents of 
the island of Eimeo (Moorea). The judges are also high level public servants 
(governors or Tavana) and nearly all of them are chiefs. This double function 
gives them considerable influence and sufficient powers . . .  it even serves as a 
barrier to any intrusions on the sovereign power. The powers of the court 
can even block royal authority. The mode of judgment consists of a jury of 
six people (plus a president) . . .  Everybody has the right to be judged by their 
peers.63 
In fact, the first toohitu played the roles of both a cours d' assise (highest 
level criminal court) and of a jurisdiction of appeal. Its creation can be 
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explained by the desire of chiefs of noble rank not to be judged by inferior 
people. Hence the existence of a royal court which could also be appealed 
to by people of the lower class who were contesting ordinary judgments. 
The power of making final decisions in matters of justice was given to 
chiefs who were not part of the Pomare family (who from then on were 
the only ones to reign on the throne of Tahiti), even in serious cases, which 
gave them regal functions in matters of justice, much like those they had 
each held in their own district in ancient times. Having said this, the toohitu 
of the time did not have wide ranging powers over matters of land, despite 
the fact that, by virtue of their nobility, they were considered to be wisemen 
or elders with substantial knowledge of tradition. 
In practice, the toohitu would become the missionaries' main political 
tool from 1824-31-effectively for the entire duration of the politico­
religious insurrection of the Mamaia. It was the members of the toohitu, the 
chiefs of Tahiti (including Tati of Papara, and Paofai, spokesman of the 
toohitu ), who triumphed militarily over the millenarian Mamaia movement, 
which the young Queen Pomare IV had joined. 
Nevertheless, the power of the toohitu was not due, at that stage, to the 
strength of the legal institutions it represented, but to the political weight 
of the chiefs it was composed of. It went hand in hand with the weakening 
of the power of Pomare III and his sister Pomare IV who, at the time of her 
enthronement, was still young and carefree of her responsibilities. 
Despite the move to the status of French protectorate in 1842, the 
jurisdiction of appeal (tiripuna hororaa) which was formed by the toohitu, 
and was unique to Tahiti and Moorea, was not affected to the same extent 
as the first degree courts by the processes of democratisation instigated by 
France. Although the toohitu was still appointed by the Queen, the district 
judges (thaavamataeinaa) and the district chiefs (avana mataeinaa) were 
elected by the landowners from 1852 (Tahitian electoral law of 22 March) 
onwards. 
In other words, the authority and responsibilities of the toohitu changed 
so that they were eventually transformed into specialists of land tenure. 
This happened in two stages. First, the Tahitian law of 30 November 1855 
installed a court of appeal between the normal district tribunals and the 
toohitu, which was unique to Tahiti and Moorea. At the same time, the 
toohitu ceased to fulfil this function, becoming instead a kind of supreme 
court, the third instance of indigenous jurisdiction, called the Tahitian High 
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Court. It was not really a Cour de Cassation (highest court of civil law), but 
more a second jurisdiction of appeal which would either guarantee (by 
confirming) or invalidate the sanctions of the Court of Appeal. On the 
other hand, appeals for cases concerning the death penalty would be 
brought directly to the toohitu. They were therefore cloaked in a reputation 
of wisdom, of being the men to whom one turns in serious cases or when 
all else has failed, much like the aari of ancient times. Yet we have also 
seen that the Tahitian law of 28 March 1866 gave the monopoly over matters 
of Tahitian jurisdiction to the French legal powers, except for land disputes 
between Polynesians. These disputes were the responsibility of the district 
councils, with appeals being sent directly to the toohitu, who were also 
responsible for ratifying the decisions of the council which were not 
questioned in an appeal. With the law of 1866, the toohitu ceased to rule on 
appeals of death penalties, because all crimes and misdemeanours relating 
to problems other than those of land were to be brought to the French 
courts. From this point on, the competence of the toohitu was restricted to 
matters of land. They no longer constituted either a political counterbalance 
to the powers of the Pomare family, which had been severely curtailed by 
France, nor the pillar of social and moral order intended by the English 
missionaries, who started leaving Tahiti from 1852 onwards. 
The toohitu continued to exist until the beginning of the twentieth 
century. The treaty of annexation of 29 June 1880, contained the following 
clauses. 
Our States, wrote Pomare V, are thus reunited under France, but we ask this 
big country to continue to govern our people with Tahitian laws and 
customs in mind . . .  We also ask that all minor matters be judged by our 
district councils, so as to avoid large costs and long voyages for the 
inhabitants. We also wish that affairs relating to land be left in the hands of 
the indigenous courts. 64 
Yet, through a convention dated 29 December 1887 (and ratified by a 
law of March 10, 1891), Pomare V decided that these courts would be 
suppressed when 
. . .  the operations relating to the delineation of ownership are finalised and 
when the disputes that they have given rise to are settled.65 
In practice the Tahitian High Court sat until 1934, and then extinguished 
itself. 
In the Leeward Islands, and in Rurutu and Rimatara, which were not 
part of the states of Pomare V and were annexed between 1888 and 1900, 
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the Ma' ohi courts of first instance and of appeal (the toohitu) continued to 
function regularly until 1945. Their authority was not limited to land tenure, 
even though it had been reduced over time by the decisions of the governor, 
who had the right to modify the indigenous codes applied in these islands. 
The consequence of extending French nationality to all of the old subjects 
of the EFO, brought about by the decree 45/ 482 of 24 March 1945, was the 
ratification of the decree of 5 April 1945, which repealed the indigenous 
jurisdictions of the Leeward Islands, Rurutu, and Rimatara. It seemed that 
the toohitu had lived out their lives. 
Yet in the 1980s and 1990s the toohitu were reintroduced in certain 
islands, whether or not they were recognised by French law. 
The first initiative came from a woman of Rurutu, Martha Pascault. On 
6 August 1977 she created an association called Teva Nui, 'Polynesian 
movement for the information and defence of the owners of undivided 
land', which sought to encourage owners to settle through amicable 
sharing.66 Teva Nui, which had 370 members at the end of 1979, would 
soon set up a committee of genealogists and land tenure specialists in Tahiti, 
Rurutu and the Leeward Islands. These structures, although they only 
worked with a section of the population, nevertheless brought concrete 
help to some of them. Martha Pascault would soon christen them 
'committees of elders' or the toohitu of Teva Nui.  
Her association was reborn in 1988 under the name of ' Association 0 
Teva Nui, Pu ma'itihia e to tatou Fatu e Iesu' (Teva Nui, group chosen by 
our Lord Jesus), now presenting an explicitly recognised political and 
prophetic character. Ironically, its statute appears in the Journal Officiel of 
the Territory (14 July 1988), but the Administrative Court of Papeete 
declared it illegal on 4 January 1989. We will only quote short extracts of 
its statutes, which have been reproduced elsewhere.67 
(the members of Teva Nui) choose . . .  to participate in political life by 
presenting candidature lists to the municipal and territorial elections. This is 
to maintain the sacred union which should allow for the reinstallation of the 
three Tahitian jurisdictions: the jurisdiction of the district council, the 
jurisdiction of the Tahitian High Court, and the jurisdiction of the Tahitian 
Court of Cacassation . . .  
(They wish for) the fulfilment o f  the power o f  God, on this day, April 1 6  
1988, and according to the prophecy of the Prophet Isaiah, Chapter 1,  verses 
26 to 28: 'I will restore your judges as in days of old, your counsellors as at 
the beginning, afterwards you will be called the City of Righteousness, the 
Faithful City . . .  and those who forsake the Lord will p erish. 
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Finally, Teva Nui declared that all judgments made by the French courts 
and judges would be nullified 
. . .  because France owes an enormous debt to the Tahitian people. All acts 
relating to land tenure will now have to be established by the committee of 
elders known as tomite toohitu de 0 Teva Nui of the commune in which the 
land is situated, and written in Tahitian . . . .  
That the work of the toohitu is inscribed in such a prophetic perspective 
would not surprise anyone who is familiar with the inextricable links 
between the political and the religious in Polynesia. The aims of the 
association follow those of the Protestant missionaries, who.protected the 
land and solidified the language by writing it down. The trust in a God 
who is both a saviour and vengeful, opposition to the French profanitising 
of Ma' ohi land, as well as the elected nature of the group, echoes the 
theological discourse that was being elaborated at the same time by Duro 
Raapoto. The group can be situated in a cultural pattern of prophetic, 
millenarian, and messianic movements in Oceania, which are usually the 
product of Christian acculturation and colonisation. Yet Martha Pascault' s 
association is not a religious movement, even if it is occasionally supported 
by certain specific 'elders' called the tahu'a. Her discourse is borrowed 
from the prophetic complex of liberation, but her actions are situated in 
this world and in front of the French courts, which she assiduously attends 
while still contesting their fundamental legitimacy. In certain elections, 
she has also presented candidate lists composed entirely of women, without 
much success. 
The work of Martha Pascault and the undertakings of Gabriel Tetiarahi 
in the Evangelical Church have contributed to a political awareness among 
the inhabitants of the Leeward Islands and influenced the restoration of 
the toohitu on the island of Tahaa (4,005 inhabitants in 1988) which was 
initiated by the mayor of the commune, Monil Tetuanui. In 1990, with the 
help of designated parish members, he installed toohitu, or councils of 
elders, in each of the eight commune sections (or associated communes) 
of the island of Tahaa. Twelve members, five of whom are deputies, are 
elected by the populations of each neighbourhood. 68 
Their sphere of authority is mainly concerned with the allocation of 
maritime concessions in the lagoon for the establishment of pearl farming 
and breeding activities, which at that time was just starting in the Leeward 
Islands. Nevertheless, the toohitu are infringing upon the authority of the 
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Territory, even though the nature of the public area of the lagoon is currently 
in dispute. Not recognised by the state, or the Territory, the toohitu of Tahaa 
in fact work with the municipality as a council of elders anxious to prevent 
the serious deterioration of human relationships that occurred in the 
Taumotu islands with the advent of pearl cultivation. 
Finally, there is an island, Rapa, where the toohitu. were officially 
reinstalled by the state. Although their powers no longer reflect those of 
the original nineteenth century toohitu., the initiative proves that the name 
and memories of them are still being perpetuated. 
Rapa (514 inhabitants in 1988), the most southern and inaccessible of 
the islands of French Polynesia, was never surveyed, nor has it ever seen 
a declaration of property lodged with a tomite. It belongs to the 
administrative subdivision of the State of the Austral Islands, which was 
lead by a Tahitian, Jacques-Denis Drollet, for the first time in the mid 1980s. 
This refined and cultured man had to implement mayor Lionel 
Watanabe's idea of giving legal form to a practice that was still alive-the 
meetings of the Council of Elders to resolve problems of land. Thus, on 7 
July 1984, the municipal council of Rapa agreed 'to the creation of a council 
of elders called Too Hitu in Rapa and to the proposed methods of choosing 
its members'. Article 1 of this text, written in French, specifies that 
[t]his council will gather the most respected people who live in Rapa, 
choosing them amongst those who are the oldest and most informed as to 
'questions of land'. It will effectively contribute to the Continuity of a Link 
that has always been upheld on the Island, that between Polynesian cultural 
Life and Ancestral Land. And this, so as not to disturb this Customary Land 
Tenure which remains a model of Tradition harmoniously embedded within 
Families, and throughout Time. Due to the absence of registered surveys and 
hence of official demarcations on Rapa, it will be invested with a Guarantee, 
given by the consensus of the entire Population, over the Descendence and 
Hereditary Links which regulate and determine the places of each of the 
island's inhabitants, as either Ancestral or Adopted Land. Following this, an 
adviser will be attached to the council of elders which it will send as an 
emissary to the mayor of Rapa, accomplishing a kind of expression of 
Certification on behalf of the Loyal Memory of the Truth of the Acts which 
consist of construction permits, and of the subsequent implantation and 
modification of the environment. 
The designation of the seven members of the toohitu. is intended to be 
by secret ballot vote of and by all the residents 'who make up the population 
of people over the age of forty years'. 
Finally, mention is made about the land management systems carried 
out by the Tiaau. (steward). The toohitu are responsible for appointing Tiaau, 
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who are supposed to be 'trustworthy individuals, representative of the 
patrimonial and usufructuary interests of the inhabitants and the families 
of Rapa' (Article 3). 
This resolution, which had been approved for the High Commissioner 
by the State Administrator on 31 August 1984, evolved with the adoption 
of a new resolution on 25 July 1986 that would ultimately lead to the 
creation of a council of elders under the guise of a municipal commission. 
That same day, the mayor, who was the honorary president of the toohitu, 
issued a decree naming the seven members, 'each representing one of the 
large families of Rapanese origin', and 'among those residents of Rapa 
who are knowledgeable about matters of land'.  They were inevitably 
chosen from the Municipal Council and were responsible, for example, 
for authorising the distribution of building permits but also, on a more 
general level, for managing land disputes on the island. The toohitu 
... deals with contemporary actions without exceeding its legal authority: this 
means giving advice which satisfies the general Consensus or accrediting 
well known facts (Article 3 of the resolution of 09 /86). 69 
The transformation of the 1984 toohitu into a municipal commission 
two years later, testifies to a certain political realism-the advice of 
councillors who are part of the mayor's majority can be easier to obtain 
than that of a toohitu, which would be opposed to him. The people of this 
municipal commission, however, are not necessarily the island's most 
respected and knowledgeable men in matters of land tenure, and in practice 
they often work informally with other ' elders' who are members of the big 
families. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to see that an institution which 
was originally legal, Tahitian, and aristocratic, and appeared at the time 
of the missionaries, continues today to exist and evolve-that is, continues 
to live-in the entirely Protestant island of Rapa. 
A final word needs to be said in relation to the Polynesian government's 
management of the land problem. If the idea of reviving indigenous courts 
usually emanates from opponents of the pro-French, liberal, and pro­
development politics of the people in power in Tahiti since 1982, it has 
nevertheless had the effect of bringing to their attention the necessity of 
maintaining a reserved and balanced approach to the subject and 
conforming at least to the spirit, if not the word, of the toohitu. 
In 1987 Ministry of Land, the Public Domain and the Development of 
the Archipelagos, was created within the government of Alexandre 
Custom and the la w 
Leontieff. To date, however, it has not instigated any fundamental reforms 
because of the political risk involved. 
The review of the statute of the Territory in 1990 resulted in the entry 
of Article 90bis within the chapter on cultural identity in French Polynesia, 
which states that 
[a] body of experts, composed of people who have acquired notable 
competence in matters of land tenure, has been installed. Its composition, 
organisation and functions are set by the resolutions of the Territorial 
Assembly which also appoints its members. This body can be consulted by 
the president of the government, the president of the Territorial Assembly or 
the high commissioner, on any questions relating to land tenure in French 
Polynesia. It presents the assembly of court of appeal magistrates with 
qualified people . . .  to be registered as legal experts. 
For the moment, this dispensation has not been applied, and in 1994 there 
were only two land tenure experts working with the court of Papeete. 
Finally, Article 3, Paragraph 7 of the law for the direction of economic, 
social, and cultural development in the Territory, which was passed in 
February 1994, made provisions for the installation of a 'commission of 
obligatory reconciliation and arbitration in Land matters', whose 
composition and work methods have yet to be defined. 
These measures, which are still only theoretical, testify to the growing 
awareness of the seriousness of the question of land tenure in Polynesia. 
The problem is linked to economic stakes as much as it is shaped by the 
emotional forces that it engenders. 
Furthermore, it is necessary that they actually have an effect, because 
the discontent and resentment of many Polynesians is growing, even 
though one would wager that any decisions made by a court would only 
satisfy a small number of people. Two days prior to the beginning of this 
symposium, a general assembly of the latest of the Polynesian landowners 
associations was held at the Papeete town hall in the presence of several 
hundred participants. It is called Mata ara (open eyes, or vigilance), and 
also presents itself as a committee for the defence and protection of 
indigenous land rights. Its president is none other than Joinville Pomare, 
the driving force of the royalist and pro-independence Pomare party, who 
has long struggled against exploitation of land in violation of the treaties 
signed by his ancestors in 1842 and 1880. This has been his political 
warhorse for more than twenty years. Mata ara's program encompasses 
updating Polynesian genealogies, condemnation of registered surveys 
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carried out by French surveyors for private companies, the demand for 
Ma'ohi surveyors to replace them, categorical rejection of the civil code 
and especially the thirtieth prescription of acquisition, and, finally, the 
reinstallation of Ma'ohi land courts. This association is far from being 
composed only of pro-independence militants or sympathisers. Having 
said this, it is true that in Polynesia, resentment towards France is usually 
fuelled by private land litigation which is very costly for both the French 
laws and for the courts of the Republic, which hold very few people­
Polynesian or French-knowledgeable in questions of local land tenure. 
In this study we have measured the legal and cultural changes that 
have come about in Polynesia since it was opened to the West. 
In pre-European times there was a whole set of restrictions, rights, and 
obligations, of which only some are to be found within the realm of French 
law. Disrespect for the golden rules of hospitality, place, and even sacred 
words, could lead to serious human or supernatural punishments. These 
rules have lost their effect, or even their meaning, today. 
There were also practices, some of which are maintained today, of 
adoption or of collective (family based) appropriation of land. Yet, in many 
other cases, traditional rules have been substantially remodelled by two 
hundred years of Christian acculturation and one hundred and fifty years 
of colonial occupation. 
What popular discourse these days calls Ture Ma'ohi (the law, or 
Polynesian law) generally refers to two things-the aristocratic and 
missionary laws of the nineteenth century and the jurisdictions to which 
they were linked. These have become indigenous or aboriginal in so far as 
they have protected Ma' ohi from land dispossession and have given them 
the possibility of settling their own land disputes-the so called 'Affaires 
Polynesiennes'. 
On a more subjective level, the Ma' ohi expression Ture refers to an order, 
a vision of the world, and the way Ma'ohi people organise their lives, 
invoking a cultural and often religious meaning which goes far beyond 
the strict confines of law. To speak of Ma' ohi Ture (in the sense of Ma' ohi 
Ture no te orara' a, Ma' ohi rules of life), is to refer to that which is good (au), 
but also suitable (Tana) and just or worthy (ti'a) for Polynesians, in 
opposition to French values and criteria. We are therefore dealing less with 
a conflict of legal systems (because the Tahitian legal system had to 
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incorporate the outlines of the colonising one, and there are now no Ma' ohi 
jurisdictions outside the French system) than with a conflict of values and 
legitimacies. 
The Polynesian example therefore demonstrates the advantages for the 
anthropology of law to explore not only the legal practices of indigenous 
people, but also the circumstances of acculturation and contemporary 
representations of the law. By accounting for all of these preoccupations, 
we can overcome the barrier that exists between comparative law and 
legal anthropology, two disciplines which are as distinct from each other 
as are theology and religious anthropology. 
An anthropology of the law built on this basis would be close to 
inscribing itself into a vast political science which could claim to be an 
anthropology of power. The prospects for research are enormous, without 
taking into account the fact that current social and cultural processes of 
change-in the case of Polynesia, for example-will probably lead to new 
political and legal orders and disorders. 
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This chapter unfolds in three parts. The first is a brief reminder of customary 
institutions and we outline certain particularities of the territory of Wallis 
and Futuna which differentiate us from our Caledonian and Tahitian 
neighbours. The second part is devoted to what we could call external 
influences on customary rules. In Wallis and Futuna, as in Tahiti, there are 
two essential external influences-the arrival of the early missionaries and 
the adoption of the status of overseas territory (TOM) in 1961. In the third 
part we ask questions about, and provide answers to, the future of this 
custom and raise the issue of a certain adaptation of customary rules in 
Wallis and Futuna to the transformations we are currently experiencing. 
Customary i n stitut ions 
We can not begin to  understand customary rules without having an 
understanding of what the customary institution is in itself. To do this, we 
will outline the specificities of the Territory in relation to New Caledonia 
and French Polynesia, but first we will begin by exploring the customary 
institutions themselves. 
These customary institutions were not created by the law which made 
the islands of Wallis and Futuna into French Overseas Territories. The law 
of 29 July 1961 allowed all traditional organisations to continue side by 
side with the authorities of the Republic, and these two authorities coexist 
perfectly. It is a peaceful coexistence which, despite certain small clashes 
from time to time, has lasted for 33 years. 
Wallis and Futuna 
Despite the small size of the two islands (Wallis has a surface area of 96 
km2 for 8,973 inhabitants, and Futuna has a surface area of 115 km2 for 
roughly 5,000 inhabitants) there are three kingdoms, one in Wallis and 
two in Futuna. These kingdoms are organised identically into two levels 
-the upper level consisting of the king and his ministers and the lower 
level of the district and village chiefs. 
In the kingdom of Uvea, the king who currently holds the title of Lavelua 
is the highest authority and the supreme judge. He is aided by a council of 
five customary ministers, led by the prime minister who holds the title of 
Kalae-Kivalu. In Futuna you find exactly the same traditional organisation: 
the king of Alo carries the customary title of Tui Aigaifo, and the king of 
Sigave currently holds the title Tui Sigave. Thus, the king in Wallis and 
each of the kings on Futuna is the highest authority and, of course, the 
supreme judge. 
As regards as the chiefs, the district chiefs are appointed by the king on 
proposal from the people. They are the representatives of the Lavelua in a 
particular district. These district chiefs also have authority over the village 
chiefs, who constitute the lower level of customary traditional organisation, 
which is in no way pejorative. The village chiefs are elected by the 
population of the village, except in the period from 1964-78, when a decree 
from the High Administration provided for elections based on universal 
suffrage (or franchise). In the old days these village chiefs had a relatively 
limited role, being responsible only for organising work to be done within 
the respective villages. Today, however, they have gained importance, 
because they organise the work to be done with the credits allocated in the 
budgets of every constituency. Let us not forget that, if there is a relaxation 
and rejuvenation of custom, it is because the chiefs themselves are younger, 
speak French, and have stronger relations with the administrative 
authorities. 
There are 20 village chiefs in Wallis and 15 in Futuna, and today the 
role of the administration, as in New Caledonia, is simply to ratify those 
who are designated by the population. 
Particu l a rit ies 
A particularity that requires mention is Article 2 of the statutory law, 
relating to the status of particular law, which stipulates that the indigenous 
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population of the island who do not have a common law status maintain 
their personal status as long as they have not specifically rejected it, as is 
the case in New Caledonia. What is worth noting, in comparison with the 
situation in New Caledonia, is that 'the quasi-totality of the Wallisian and 
Futunese population has maintained a personal legal status', with the 
exception of a handful of Wallisian and Futunese, numbering about 60-
65, and some expatriates who have lived in New Caledonia or in 
Metropolitan France. 
The second point which also constitutes a particularity of the territory 
is that in Wallis and Futuna 'there has been no massive influx of an external 
population to the territory'. Actually, the 1990 census for Wallis and Futuna 
counted a total population of 13,705 inhabitants, of which 98 per cent were 
Polynesian and only 2 per cent of European origin. For the moment, this 
European population is marginal in the Territory and is mainly composed 
of civil servants and their children. 
The third point is the 'absence of a communal regime'. In fact the 
Territory is divided into three districts each corresponding to a kingdom­
the district of Uvea, the district of Alo and the district of Sigave. Each 
district has a council, which could be regarded as a municipal council. 
This council of members is elected according to customary provisions and 
is presided over by the king. Village chiefs, who resemble mayors in their 
administration of their respective communities, do not belong to this 
District Council, but can nevertheless work in collaboration with the head 
of the district. In Wallis this head is, according to the law, the superior 
administrator, but in practice he delegates his powers to a civil servant. In 
Futuna, on the other hand, the superior administrator has the two titles­
head of the district of Alo and head of the district of Sigave. 
Finally, the last of these points relates to the land tenure system which 
exists in Wallis and Futuna, to which we wish only to draw your attention. 
Paragraph 4 of Article 4 of the statutory law used to stipulate that the real 
estate and land tenure regime to be applied to the territories of Wallis and 
Futuna would have to be determined by decree. This article could in fact 
never be applied and Paragraph 4 of Article 4 was finally repealed. Today, 
it is essentially the customary authorities who manage the land tenure 
system. The situation is of course motivated by the customary authorities' 
long held mistrust of any approaches on the land tenure system. This is 
reinforced by the fact that most Wallisians and Futunese belong to a 
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particular law status and especially by the lack of any registered surveys. 
Yet it can also be explained by a desire not to upset things as they are, 
which is endorsed by the customary authorities today. It seems, however, 
that customary rules, far from being fixed, have been subjected to many 
influences. 
Externa l  i nf luences 
The Cathol ic  m issionaries 
We will try to present you with these external influences which remind us 
of those encountered in French Polynesia. First, there was the role of the 
Catholic missionaries, who arrived around the 1830s, and converted the 
entire population within about 30 years. The man in charge of this mission, 
Mgr Bataillon, quickly became an adviser to the then queen, Queen Amole, 
to whom he proposed the Code of Law of the island of Uvea in 1870. This 
document, which contained the rules of conduct and organisation of the 
kingdom, remains the only written reference for which certain principles 
continue to be applied in the kingdom of Wallis. 
The code outlines the rules of organisation of the kingdom, the 
designation of customary authorities and especially of their respective 
powers, the rules of the district assemblies of the kingdom and of the 
villages, which are the instruments for decisions by the customary 
authorities. The code also makes provision for customary courts, which I 
believe to be an idea of the missionaries as these courts did not exist 
traditionally, and which continue to rule over litigation between specific 
citizens today. 
Next to these rules, which we can call the rules of organisation of the 
kingdom, stands the second part of the code, which we could call the rules 
of good conduct. In fact, these annihilated many of the principles of 
traditional customary law. Any traditional principle which contradicted 
Catholic morality was simply put aside so as to give the principles of 
evangelism full reign. The code also had various provisions to protect the 
island at a time when there were many merchants, sailors and adventurers 
who came by sea and represented a certain threat to the integrity of the 
Territory. 
The first point, as in French Polynesia, was a restriction on selling land 
to any foreigner who had come by sea. This principle still applies because, 
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except for a few very exceptional cases, it is extremely difficult to acquire 
land in Wallis without the backing of the customary owners. 
Another principle which was written in the code is that there would be 
only one religion in Wallis and Futuna. Neither the king nor the chiefs 
were allowed to set up another kind of worship, which would bring 
despondency to the country. Furthermore the legislator of 1961, when the 
status of TOM was adopted, wrote, 'the Republic guarantees the population 
that it will respect their religion', while making sure to put the term religion 
in the singular. We can reasonably assume that, at the time of the writing 
of this text, the missionaries had a certain amount of influence over this 
legal project. 
Another point is that the customary authority is responsible for 
maintaining the clergy. This principle is still applied as villagers continue 
to participate in both the maintenance of the mission plantations and the 
annual retreats of the mission representatives. 
It is forbidden for any married person to separate from their partner 
and there are no provisions in the code for people married in custom to 
divorce. 
As regards customary marriage, it simply consists of a church marriage 
followed by a customary ceremony which confirms it. There are no 
ministers of customary worship to sanctify the customary marriage, it is 
purely a matter of confirming the ceremony. 
In regard to customary festivals, which are casually called either 
customary or religious in Wallis and Futuna, each district and each village 
has its own festival which inevitably commences with a mass, followed 
by a customary ceremony. The invitations to the festival are sent out by 
the customary authorities, and the invitation is made for the recipient to 
participate in both the mass and the customary festivities which follow. 
This selection of examples should illustrate the prevalence of the role 
of the Catholic mission in the customary system, which was to play another 
role in 1961 when the territory was declared a TOM. The legislator in the 
law of 1961 established a framework which was quite flexible, if not vague, 
because nothing precise was said on the role of the customary authorities. 
It must be said, however, that it was not easy to set a solid framework 
from the outset with an exact definition of the role of the customary 
authorities in relation to the new principles of the Republic. 
Wallis and Futuna 
The adoption of the status of an Overseas Territory in 1 961  
In thinking about this subject we could say that the customary authorities 
have at times been implicated or associated with the status of TOM, as 
well as being set apart from, or concurrent with, or even overtaken by, the 
arrival of new institutions. 
Implicated or associated custom. The first point is to retain the particular 
law status. Currently, 98-99 per cent of Wallisians and Futunese belong to 
this status. 
Second, the statutory law has set up a court of local law which presides 
over litigation between citizens of local legal status in disputes relating to 
goods held according to custom and especially for the application of local 
law status. 
Third, in terms of implicated or associated custom, is the participation 
of the three kings in the Territorial Council as vice-presidents, and as 
members by law. 
The fourth point is the role of customary authorities in the territorial 
circumscriptions. 
The final point concerns the settling of land disputes because, as long 
as there are no applicable texts, it must be said that all litigation is judged 
by customary authorities; yet it is nevertheless necessary to think about 
another way of settling them. 
Custom that has been put aside. This occurs mainly through the exclusive 
authority of common law in matters of criminal law. This is something 
that the customary authorities find hard to accept because the settling of 
litigation automatically means settling all litigation whether it be civil or 
criminal. There is an ongoing debate between the customary authorities 
and the magistrates of the common law jurisdiction about these spheres 
of authority. 
Putting custom aside is also possible for citizens of particular status 
who wish to claim an agreement under the auspices of a common law 
jurisdiction. 
These are the two areas where custom seems to have been put aside, 
but if customs has lost authority in these areas, there are still many areas 
where it affirms itself and, especially, organises a future for itself. 
Concurrent, or overtaken, custom. This stems from the development of 
new institutions which emerged from the law of 1961, such as the creation 
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of the Territorial Assembly, the Council of the Territory, and the respective 
attachments which were assigned to these new institutions. Prior to this, 
there was no other power, or counter-power, in relation to customary 
authority. 
It is also a consequence of the emergence of elected national 
representatives who have an important role to play and who sometimes 
get into disputes with the customary authorities because important 
decisions are increasingly being made by the territorial and national elected 
representatives in partnership with the state. Consultations with customary 
authorities are becoming less and less frequent. 
Thoug hts o n  the futu re of custom 
It seems useful to think about the subject as a Wallisian of particular status. 
We believe that the statutory laws have made provisions, in terms of this, 
for custom to blossom. This 30-year period of stability should have allowed 
Wallisians and Futunese to think about what they really want to do with 
custom. It is not a question of completely writing down custom, but it 
seems necessary, on certain specific points, especially where they are 
concerned with litigation, to renounce the primacy of oral law and write 
down what we might call the general principles of custom. This would 
serve to clarify the issues and extract the main principles for each kingdom, 
so that we can then think about the details. 
We should take advantage of this period of stability. Just as in the 
laboratory represented by New Caledonia we have had the luck-and we 
insist on the term luck-to have several possibilities tested in succession, 
so our richness and luck in Wallis and Futuna might have been to have 
only known statute which has been flexible enough to allow for several 
possibilities in which custom can express itself. We need to think about 
this unique experience and develop it by creating texts, especially land 
registers. Citizens of particular status who are concerned about the settling 
of litigation by customary authorities need to be given answers. For 
example, in relation to divorce, particular status citizens who have lived 
in New Caledonia are aware that there are solutions for settling a divorce, 
whereas custom in Wallis and Futuna has not made any provisions for 
this matter in terms of any particular law. Furthermore, in New Caledonia 
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the Territorial Assembly has ratified texts brought forward by the 
customary authorities. 
The other point on the future of custom is to try and revive the role of 
the Council of the Territory in the current institutions. The council includes 
the three kings and certain ministers who are members by law. It must be 
revived because, it is currently only consulted two or three times a year 
(and even then, as if by chance), whereas it is supposed to assist the higher 
administration and especially to give its opinions on any deliberations 
before the Territorial Assembly. We would also need to reconsider the 
District Council, which should be reconfigured to give a prominent role to 
the village chiefs, in consideration of their current responsibilities. It is 
through such measures that, in our opinion, our society can go forward 
whilst still maintaining the rules of custom. 
In concluding, we would like to evoke an image. Polynesians have 
always been a travelling people, people who went from island to island 
and who would leave an island if it no longer suited their needs. Today 
we are condemned to remain physically in a territory which assimilates 
external contributions. It is essential, therefore, to adapt our situation and 
our style of life to what really exists and especially to the framework that 
certain followers of custom sometimes call the rigid framework of the rules 
of the Republic. 

Part 
Indigenous custom and the 
jurisprudence of t he French 
Overseas Territories 
u t m nd 
approach and  pract ice i n  New Ca ledon ia 
Fote Trol ue 
H istor ica l overview 
When the French administration arrived in New Caledonia towards the 
second half of the nineteenth century, it discovered a population scattered 
among different indigenous kingdoms, within each of which custom was 
practiced to varying degrees. It seems important to me to highlight this 
unifying aspect of custom to guard against the temptation of stressing the 
existence of several customs and forgetting the common base by dwelling 
on differences of degree. 
At that time, France wished to establish a colonial settlement in New 
Caledonia and nothing was to impede this ambition. As the Kanak 
population threatened this goal, if only by its very presence, the French 
administration decided to take charge of the matter. It started by excluding 
Kanaks from the political and administrative systems by making them 
French subjects and then by quartering them off into restricted areas called 
reservations, which they could only leave if they had official permission. 
Although these reservations were an affront to human rights, they 
nevertheless allowed the Kanak population to continue living according 
to custom and hence preserve a cultural identity. 
It was not until 1946-47 that the indigenous population-subjects of 
France-became citizens and could participate in the political life of the 
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Territory. The French administration not only exiled the Kanak people to 
the reservations, but also actively encouraged colonial settlement and 
organised customary society according to its own criteria. And so the 
districts were born (restoring the pre-existing 'kingdoms' either partially 
or totally), led by the high chiefs, as were the tribes, led by the tribal chiefs 
with the Districts Councils and the Councils of Elders. 
In terms of common law, the administrative organisation of customary 
society turned the 'tribes' into moral persons, making them responsible 
for offences committed by their members. The high chiefs and the tribal 
chiefs were responsible for the maintenance of public order within the 
geographical perimeters of their authority. 
A pa rtia l  cons ideration of custom 
The acquisition of French citizenship by Kanaks did not mean a disavowal 
of their customary values. Both the constitution of 1946, and that of 1958, 
expressly recognised these values in the following terms. 
All citizens of the Republic who do not have a common law status maintain 
their personal status as long as they do not reject it. 
But this recognition of personal status would be limited to 'L'Etat civil 
des personnes' (marriage, divorce, adoption, inheritance) and had no effect 
in other areas of the law. For example, the criminal or social laws of the 
Republic would be uniformly applied in New Caledonia, regardless of 
cultural origin. 
Under the constitution, both the organisation and the application of 
particular civil status would come under the jurisdiction of the Territory 
until 1988, when it passed into the hands of the districts. 
Until quite recently, litigation over matters governed by particular status 
was virtually never brought before the common law courts. They were 
settled directly by the customary authorities. The end of the regime de 
l 'indigenat (which coincided with the Kanak acquisition of French 
citizenship) and the exit of Kanaks from the reservations posed new 
problems whose solutions could not be found in custom alone. As a result, 
the common law model was increasingly used by Kanaks seeking to settle 
litigation. 
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Kan a k  cu ltu ra l  reviva l a n d  the g rowi n g  recog n it ion 
g iven to custom 
Custom is one of the pillars, if not the main one, of Kanak political claims 
and independence. In order to appease this political claim, the French 
administration started organising a better and more real recognition of 
Kanak cultural identity. The customary authorities, the clan, the palaver, 
and other institutions, was no longer confined solely to the districts and 
tribes, but came into the common law courts to assist the professional 
magistrate in his or her encounters with custom. In this regard, an ordinance 
of 1982 established customary assessors who are put forward by the 
customary authorities of the various customary areas to join the common 
law court when it encounters litigation over matters governed by particular 
civil law. Moreover, the legal decentralisation that occurred with the 
creation of sections of the tribunal de premiere instance in Noumea, Kone 
and Lifou, will further aid in taking custom into account. 
Custom ca l l i n g  on the mag i strate 
With the coexistence, in civil matters, of two categories of persons-those 
under the regime of common law and those of particular legal status­
New Caledonia presents a novel dimension to the magistrate who comes 
here to take up his or her functions. Furthermore, the principal of legislative 
specificity means that the laws applied in metropolitan France are not 
automatically applicable in the Territory. This is the case for the Territory's 
and the Provinces' own legislative and regulatory authorities, which also 
call on magistrates, particularly to confirm the legal foundations of their 
decisions. 
It is important to highlight the fact that Kanak political and cultural 
claims will also have certain consequences for a magistrate's approach to 
custom. Until recently, when a common law judge was called to deliberate 
on a matter pertaining to particular law by a citizen of particular status, 
he or she would immediately declare him or herself incompetent, based 
on Decree 424 of 3 April 1967, on the application of particular status, making 
it applicable to all to custom. While declaring himself incompetent, 
however, the judge would mention that the only way for the matter to be 
brought into his or her sphere of competence would be for the claimant to 
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renounce their particular status. Often enough, Kanak claimants who were 
unhappy with the customary process, especially a perceived laxity, would 
end up changing status, against their desire so that a problem could be 
settled by a magistrate in a common law court. In fact, neither the claimant, 
nor the magistrate, was satisfied with this way of settling litigation. 
Moreover, as soon as a solution to the litigation was found the claimant 
would hastily ask how to get their old status back, only to be bewildered 
that the change of status is irrevocable. Another worry is likely to plague 
them: will the renunciation of personal status undermine their social 
situation in the reservation? 
As for the magistrate, the situation may be satisfactory on a human 
level, but is dubious on a legal level-how can a magistrate dissolve a 
marriage that was celebrated under a particular status regime for a citizen 
whose only justification for this is an earlier renunciation of his or her 
particular civil status? 
Is this a way of skirting proper procedure by allowing a particular status 
citizen to escape custom for a case that should come under that statute? 
Should the magistrate apply customary notions of time for customary 
settlement procedures between particular status citizens? 
For example, in a decision in 1989, the magistrate ruled, based on a 
legal fiction-that common law prevails over particular law-that it was 
legally impossible for a common law child to be adopted by a particular 
law citizen. This position was reinforced by the idea that a renunciation of 
status could only be made by particular status citizens. Moreover, a 
magistrate is called upon to rule not only on civil matters but on criminal 
law as well, although particular status has no effect in that domain. To 
understand this situation we can use the example of a particular status 
citizen who occupied land on a reservation without appropriate customary 
title. The concerned individual ignored several notices to leave by the 
proper owner, who was supported by the council of elders of the tribe 
involved, until the day he was chased from the land and his crops were 
destroyed. When the case was brought to the customary authorities they 
ordered the man to return to his own clan land, but told the true landowner 
and the Council of Elders to rectify the material damage done (supply 
yams, potatoes and vegetables and rebuild the hut). Unhappy with the 
customary decision, the man lodged a complaint to the highest-ranking 
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judge, and criminal law procedures were set in motion. From this point 
on, the guilty party from the customary perspective became the victim in 
front of the magistrate, and the victims according to custom became the 
alleged perpetrators of a crime in the common law courts. In terms of the 
criminal law procedure, the true customary landowner and certain 
members of the Council of Elders were charged with destruction of 
property belonging to someone else, and on a civil level they were ordered 
to pay compensation to the claimant. The criminal law magistrate limited 
himself to the criminal implications of the case and declared himself 
incompetent to resolve the real cause of the lawsuit, which was the issue 
of land tenure. In custom, the litigation forms a whole, from the violation 
of customary rights through to the destruction of the crops and the harvest, 
but, in written law, litigation is dissected into different customary (land 
tenure) and penal (destruction of goods) aspects. While the magistrate 
thought that this was proper legal procedure, the accused saw themselves 
as victims of an injustice, because, on the customary level, they were the 
ones who had sought justice. I mention this case in order to highlight the 
fact that contradictions can exist between customary and written law. The 
magistrate must take this into consideration in the interests of those going 
to court and especially of justice itself. 
Kanak cultural revival, combined with the rise in the number of 
particular status citizens seeking to settle litigation in common law courts 
(which can partially be explained by a certain laxity of the customary 
authorities), will lead to certain innovations by the legislative powers. The 
creation of customary assessors to assist the civil courts with matters 
pertaining to particular civil law is a case in point. The magistrates are 
showing a different attitude towards the adoption of a common law child 
by particular law citizens when they abandon the primacy of common 
law over particular law to work towards the interests of the child and the 
family, and when they explain clearly to the particular status citizen the 
irrevocable nature of a change of status. 
This evolution of practice and of the texts does not, however, mark the 
end of customary recourse to the magistrate. He or she could be called 
upon at any time to rule on a case coming under particular legal status; for 
instance, between a Wallisian wife and Kanak husband. Which status 
would prevail; the Kanak or the Wallisian status? And with the rise in 
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conflicts over land tenure, will the magistrate continue to consider only 
the penal aspects of the cases, and tum a blind eye to the customary 
dimensions? In light of the diversity of customary practices, one can 
wonder whether the customary assessors will provide sufficient aid to the 
magistrate in the search for legal solutions that help to harmonise human 
relations in society. 
Concl us ion 
The transformation of attitudes and morals means that the solutions to 
the new problems confronting custom today are not necessarily found in 
custom alone but also in common law. One of the major difficulties 
confronting a magistrate dealing with a case pertaining to particular status 
law is the diversity of customary practices which, because of their oral 
nature, produce uncertainty. To facilitate the work of magistrates, it would 
be worth considering writing custom down, with all the advantages and 
inconveniences that includes. It is up to the people who can claim 
customary status to make the choice themselves. 
In the beginning of this chapter I spoke of the duality of status. Beyond 
the issue of the relationship between custom and the magistrate, lies a 
more profound and general question, which concerns all the citizens of 
this country-will the co-existence of two statuses undermine the 
emergence of a Caledonian nationalism? 
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q u estions  and  answers on approach and 
pract ice in  New C a ledonia 
B e rnard d e  G o uttes 
A plaque in the house of the Claudels in the ile Saint-Louis displays a 
sentence that Camille Claudel sent Rodin, 'Whenever I think I have 
understood the world, there is always something missing to torment me.' 
This volume, which is about understanding the world, also holds 
something obscure for us judges of the law, when we think about how we 
exercise our legal functions in Kanak circles. 
An inherent lack of understanding of the Kanak world leads us to an 
uncertain approach towards the subjects or objects of law that we act on in 
our legal interventions. We can see this as an outcome of the process that 
Carbonnier called 'the institution of doubt which leads to decisions'. 
There is also an absence of the parameters of time in its acceptable 
duration and progressive evolution. A court judge has to make a decision 
at a given time for a specific act, and the decision is contingent on the case 
at hand. To highlight the relationship of the justice system with custom in 
1994 without considering the persistence of Judeo-Christian concepts of 
man which inspire common law, European conventions, and Onusian law 
would lead to unlikely certitudes. 
So, as judges of the French legal system, we are called on to make a 
decisive choice-either we apply French law by marginalising particular 
local law, or we apply French law by maximising its capability to take 
Kanak customs into account. 
The magistrature and custom 
The legal history of New Caledonia shows the oscillations of the judges 
and of jurisprudence on this dilemma, which arises whenever a legal 
decision has to be made in Kanak circles. 
What I show here are the heavy considerations that weigh on a judge 
who has to rule on a case that involves Kanak customs. 
The first question is based on the fundamental issue of the compatibility 
between the task of the judge, as defined by Article 66 of the Constitution 
of the Fifth Republic, to guarantee individual liberty, and the fact that 
Kanak culture blends the notion of individual responsibility with that of 
the collective responsibility of the tribe. 
Moreover, the question of written law and oral tradition can not be 
avoided. The radically different approaches between a written positive 
law and an oral tradition, which is more flexible and contingent on the 
inclinations of the authorities, give rise to severe complications. These 
complications relate as much to the issue of securing the permanence of a 
legal or customary norm as to the validation of these laws. 
In the same vein, there is an opposition between the transparency of 
written law, which only has legal validity once an act has been publicised, 
and the relative confidentiality of custom, where knowledge is subordinate 
to the elders (and what they say) and where confidentiality can be total to 
ensure the secret and sacred nature of a particular tradition. 
These contradictions, although not exhaustive, were encountered in 
two long periods in the history of New Caledonia. The first of these can be 
summed up as a kind of negative conflict over legal competence. A parallel 
trajectory between the customary Kanak world and the legal world was 
created. The state left all customary litigation in the hands of the customary 
authorities, and essentially intervened only in conflicts that it considered 
a threat to the public order. 
The common law justice system was invoked basically only for conflicts 
in which the litigants were governed by civil law or had a criminal record. 
This kind of application of the proverbial 'rendering unto Caesar what 
belongs to Caesar and to custom what belongs to custom' was transformed 
as a concept of the individual's relation to the tribe developed, to which 
the customary approach did not always respond. 
The emergence of the concept of the individual was largely triggered 
by growing awareness of the individual as a subject and actor of individual 
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and economic rights. The starting point of this second period seems to me 
to lie in the first confrontation between Western and tribal worlds­
evangelisation. 
This was based on the concept of the sacred nature of the human person 
made in the image of God and emphasised the individuality of the human 
person and the sacred nature of his or her dignity. Therefore, it does not 
seem coincidental that the rise in cases brought to the common law court 
by particular law citizens stems from the actions of particular status citizens 
acting as victims. 
The victims of infractions increasingly feel that the customary 
settlements do not provide just compensation for the damage or 
aggressions they claim to have endured. This slippage between customary 
compensation and what the victim considers to be proper compensation 
stems from several causes: an uneven distribution of authority in each of 
the regions, customary institutions, an evaluation by the customary 
authorities which does not reflect the current attitudes of particular status 
citizens, and, finally, customary sanctions which are no longer accepted, 
particularly corporal punishment. Hence, the usual area for the collision 
of particular law and common law justice has often been criminal law. 
The most characteristic illustration of the development of these ideas 
are the victims of sexual aggression who no longer consider the customary 
sanctions--compensation from clan to clan-to be an adequate coercive 
measure for the offence that was endured. It is significant that the 
psychological or psychiatric reports established for the hearings show 
analogous reactions between women who were raped in the bush and 
those who where raped in large metropolitan cities. 
Beyond the divergence of cultures, the denial of one's own dignity 
provokes the victims to an irreducible reaction of revolt and an appeal to 
common law justice, which seems to them to be better geared towards the 
protection of victims than the customary settlements. 
It is also important to note that the Kanak associative or political milieu 
brings its own concerns to this change of attitudes and contributes to the 
reliance on common law, because it considers that customary reparation 
does not exclude criminal law. 
Parallel to the rising awareness of the rights of the human person in his 
or her physical and moral integrity, the economic, social and cultural 
evolution of New Caledonia has also brought particular law parties to the 
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common law courts for litigation on patrimonial, economic and social 
issues. The consecration of this approach towards common law was realised 
in 1982 when a decree created customary assessors for particular law 
litigation. 
This decree mentions the conciliatory role played by the customary 
authorities in Melanesian communities under local law, but also makes 
provisions for cases where litigation is brought to a common law court by 
a particular status party. In such cases the court is supplied with an even 
number of particular law assessors who have a deliberative voice. If the 
judgment is appealed, the Court of Appeal is also supplied with customary 
assessors. 
The decree attempts to strike a balance between the maintenance of 
customary settlement, by stressing the customary authorities' preliminary 
role of conciliation, and the requirement for a judge to render justice, a 
constitutional obligation without which any use of the justice system would 
be a denial of justice itself. 
Experience shows that the call on customary assessors to complement 
the courts in particular law litigation is limited. Yet there has been a slight 
progression, particularly since the creation of sections separate from the 
Noumea Court in the Northern and Island provinces. 
It is true that there is at least an apparent contradiction in having 
professional judges, bound by common law, ruling on cases pertaining to 
particular law, even if they are aided by customary assessors. Furthermore, 
these kinds of cases have been of limited scope, dealing mainly with the 
separation of spouses (as divorce is not recognised in Kanak society), child 
maintenance, division of property and goods, or child care. More often 
than not, when a case has not been settled by customary avenues, the 
claimant tends to opt for a common law solution, renouncing his or her 
particular status. 
On the other hand, the customary authorities are seeking more formal 
and concrete recognition of their role, because they fear seeing custom 
reduced to 'a culture' when it is politically responsible for social 
organisation. This was expressed in the Matignon Accords, which set up a 
working group to reflect on the future of particular law and its adaptation 
to the modern world. 
Although I do not wish to pass premature judgment on the tangible 
developments that will emerge out of the conclusions of the working group, 
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several variables need to be taken into consideration. First, general 
principles of particular law must be elaborated in a written form. Then, a 
procedure must be devised for settling conflicts between particular law 
and common law, and particular law conflicts between different customary 
areas. Finally, customary law must adapt to new social situations like 
divorce, family breakup, or the creation of private enterprises. 
The Territorial Assembly of New Caledonia has already supported a 
kind of external organisation of customary law in the 1967 ruling on the 
civil status of particular law citizens. In 1962 and 1965, it passed a resolution 
on the establishment of certificates of inheritance and, in 1958, it passed a 
decree on the attribution of land in the spirit of land tenure reforms. 
The Noumea Court of Appeal has also taken particular law into 
consideration within its jurisprudence. It has done so in diverse areas of 
the civil code, like divorce, personal status or child care. 
Throughout these regulatory and jurisprudential progressions, two 
fundamental, but veiled, questions remain unanswered. Does common 
law have primacy over particular law, and is there any possibility of 
divisibility for these statutes? 
The State Council was asked to explore the problem of irreversibility 
for a particular law citizen who opts for common law. 
The High Assembly considered that common law status was an 
achievement of the Republic in terms of individual liberty, the legal 
consequences of the Declaration of Human Rights, and the rights of the 
citizen. It did not consider this to be irreversible, because Article 75 of the 
Constitution was, in a way, only a conservatorial law. In other words, the 
State Council touched on a legal incertitude which would jump at the 
opportunity of putting forward the possibility of a change of status, as 
well as the impossibility of setting objective criteria to determine who 
would in fact be eligible to change status-how many generations would 
we need to go back for this? 
On the other hand, the Noumea Court of Appeal has denied the primacy 
of one status over the other in several decisions. Furthermore, as protector 
of the rights of the individual, it puts forward the principle that opting for 
common law status is not irreversible for children of a mixed marriage or 
of particular status parents. The decisive factor for the judge is the legal 
capacity for choice-the coming of legal age, when the child can choose 
his or her status in a way that guarantees their 'free choice' .  
The magistrature and custom 
On top of this first attack on the irreversibility of a change in status, the 
fact of the divisibility of status is being progressively recognised, although 
not fully established. According to the activities a particular status citizen is 
engaged in, he or she can come under either common law or particular law. 
That is what the debates of the Territorial Assembly, which I mentioned 
earlier, brought about. This was done by allowing particular status citizens, 
for example, to partially renounce their status when acquiring real estate 
so as to give them the benefits of common law status. 
We can see the vague outline emerging of a person being of particular 
status in the 'tribe' and common law status 'in town'. 
Is this the beginning of an answer to the contradictions of particular 
law and common law that might allow for a particular status citizen to 
maintain customary identity, whilst still participating in the human and 
economic activities of a Westernised society? It is difficult to tell. This 
approach, however, has not yet been critically examined either by the 
Council of State or the Cour de Cassation, the two supreme bodies of public 
and private law. 
Court judges, who are under the obligation to apply justice to whoever 
asks for it and act as guarantors of individual freedoms, can only apply 
the laws over which they have the authority to do so. Of course with the 
combined effects of Articles 74 and 75 of the Constitution, the law of the 
Republic in New Caledonia has developed a unique 'expression'. 
Article 74 gives the Territorial C ongress a large p art  of the 
responsibilities that come from the Parliament of the Republic, and this is 
growing in scope. This allows a specific legal situation for the Territory. 
Article 75 establishes the recognition of particular local legal status, 
providing much more autonomy to the customary authorities. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the legal state in New Caledonia 
draws on a Western legal model, which is that of the main industrialised 
societies of the world, and which is based on a different conception of the 
world than the traditional approach of Kanak culture. 
But the Kanak approach is not fixed either. It is under siege from the 
modern world-namely, the rise of the notion of the individual within the 
tribe, and the requirement of legal security, which is a necessary condition 
for development. 
It is said that 'facts are stubborn', and it is up to us-judges of the law 
and the customary authorities-to acknowledge this. It is up to us to be 
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attentive to the evolution of society and to be determined that there can be 
no true state of law without cohesiveness. 
Only through an empirical, flexible, and forward looking approach will 
judges find an ongoing balance in conflicts between particular and common 
law. This will have to be on a case by case basis and will have to take into 
account the evolving nature of custom, which is itself influenced by the 
evolution of society. 
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To discuss land tenure and custom in jurisprudence, it  seems necessary to 
begin with some definitions. Jurisprudence is the result of the pragmatic 
application, interpretation and comparison of legislative texts by judges. 
It is the resolution of multiple concrete cases which gradually produces a 
whole legal system which is more or less coherent. 
Land tenure, stricto sensu, concerns human relations with land, or to be 
more precise, the relations between humans with regard to the subject of 
land. Yet it goes beyond this. When legal reforms for land tenure were 
undertaken in Polynesia, there was an attempt to define what a chambre 
foncier1 could be, but nobody could pin it down with any real precision. In 
the greater sense, land tenure encompasses questions of property, 
inheritance, sale, gifts, sharing and dividing, delineation, leases and 
possession. Furthermore, the problems of urbanisation cannot be separated 
from those of kinship relations. 
Custom, in a legal rather than ethnological sense, is also a set of norms 
with communal values. Its particularity is its traditional foundation and 
essentially oral nature, occasionally marked with concrete objects. The 
delineation of property in Polynesia was marked by a tree or stone which, 
by virtue of this, became sacred or tapu. In the beginning, custom created 
the law, which then either became fixed through codification or evolved 
along its own lines. 
Custom and the law 
In expressing these ideas it should be pointed out that according to 
French concepts, the law, by its very nature, is written. French law is thus 
opposed, in principle, to custom and tends to leave little or no room for it. 
Yet for those of us in French Polynesia, the problem of the law I custom 
relationship is more apparent, more urgent, and larger in terms of land 
tenure. This is because problems and questions over land tenure generally 
tend to last a long time. For example, when one is confronted with a 
problem of child care, or a work contract, the current laws suffice, but 
when a judge is presented with an inheritance settlement based on a deed 
of 1852, he or she has to consider the legal situation at the time, which was 
not homogenous, as well as issues of kinship and filiation. This is why 
genealogists sometimes appear as miracle makers, because, while property 
titles are limited to certain documents, the frequent changes of civil status 
pose enormous difficulties for claimants trying to establish their part of 
an inheritance. 
It is interesting to note that Polynesia, unlike several other French 
territories, does not have two coexisting types of jurisdiction. Custom and 
laws are subject to a single more or less homogenous system. 
It is worth sketching an outline of the evolution of the legal state in 
French Polynesia here. In doing so, we can distinguish three main periods. 
The first was the era prior to European implementation of written law. 
Culture was not written, but that obviously does not mean that there were 
no social rules. On the contrary, the rules regulated behaviour in relation 
to universal issues such as the relationships of couples, descent (kinship), 
and land appropriation, which are all categorised as 'legal' issues. We can 
therefore legitimately speak of customary law (or more precisely of 
'traditional law'). 
The following period, which we call the 'transitory law' period, started 
with the first local codification-the Pomare Code of 1819-and continued 
until the promulgation of the Civil Code in 1874 for most of the Territory, 
and 1945 for the Leeward Islands and part of the Austral Islands. Initially, 
the written laws did not cover land tenure. The issue of land, however, 
became more and more developed in the codes, although custom retained 
an important place. 
Finally, the contemporary era is that of a Western-type written law. 
Internal evolution is characterised by a considerable increase in regulations 
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and an increasing alignment with the metropolitan system. Custom is only 
a residual survivor. 
A certain amount of leeway is left to the judges to either elucidate 
custom or absorb it into their legal determinations. As early as 1896, the 
Cour de Cassation advanced the principle by which the Papeete jurisdiction 
of appeal 
. . .  has the sovereign power to determine the essence of the law, the 
competence and form of jurisdiction for all that concerns local customs prior 
to French annexation.2 
This generally concerns the first two periods that we outlined, but since 
our legal system considers anything not drawn from French law3 to be a 
matter of pure fact, we might think that this position would still be valid 
for contemporary customs in as much as the interstices of written law can 
allow them some space. 
This creates two problems. The first is to determine which custom is at 
issue, because, as long as custom is alive, it will change. It changed before 
with the development of new technologies and morals-access to land was 
not practiced in the same way in pre-European times, with cultivation of 
taro and other staple crops, then on the large coconut plantations, and it is 
different again today. Undoubtedly, the possibilities for construction on 
undivided land were not the same during the era of bamboo huts as during 
the time of cement buildings. Custom varied (and is still changing today) 
between archipelagos. Property titles in the Society Islands were established 
by a genealogical link to the ancestral marae and, in the Taumotu Islands, by 
belonging to a clan-like organisation called the ati. Today, the legal situation 
and the problems encountered in urban areas are not identical to those in 
the rural sectors. Custom also varied according to social class-while ' small' 
landowners were limited to the family land of their place of birth, the Tahitian 
aristocrats could claim several distinct marae as their own. This is just an 
outline to give an idea of the complexity of the phenomenon. 
Once the sphere of custom has been defined, the second problem 
remains-determining what it comprises. In practice, the methods and 
answers change according to whether one is trying to specify and apply 
customary law as it was at the time when it had a legal existence, or whether 
one is trying to do so in terms of the contemporary continuation of 
customary practice. 
Custom and the law 
In the first case, the work of the judge involves the interpretation of the 
few texts that were written during the 'transition period' (mainly the 
Pomare Code with its successive revisions, the Tahitian law of 1852 on the 
registration of land, and the codified laws of several other islands). The 
judge must interpret these in terms of what we know of the social conditions 
of the time, and for this we have several ethnographic documents of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century. There are about 20 or 30 decisions of 
this type from 1886 to 1994 classified relating to capacity-entitlement, 
parental authority, the effects of gifts, descent, adoption, property, marriage 
system, inheritance and usufructure . Furthermore, one of us was 
commissioned to go to Rapa to specify the rules of inheritance that applied 
prior to 1945 and to verify that, in accordance with the Polynesian 
customary system, children were treated equally, whether they were born 
in or out of wedlock. 4 This could lead to a more detailed study of customary 
law, but we will not go into specifics here. 
In the second case, which contemporary land tenure customs can we 
recognise as carrying legal efficacy? The first notion that comes to mind is 
that of uncertainty. In our system (which we call an Etat de Droit ['legal 
state']), non-codified custom is a question of fact. Consequently, it is up to 
the party claiming custom to put forward the proof of its existence and 
substance. It is quite rare for this to be done with any real relevance, 
however, as confusion reigns in the minds of people. The population is 
committed to its traditions, but more often this takes the form of a 'spirit 
of tradition' and a cultural community rather than precise, clear, and 
uncontested practices. Today, custom is a kind of mythical nebula. It is 
often referred to because it is vaguely associated with ancestry, but without 
really knowing what it is and mixing it with biblical citations and in relation 
to immediate personal interests. The same claimant, in the same case, may 
call on custom to block a sale or a testament which bothers him, and then 
invoke the civil code to eliminate his cousin under the quite anti-traditional 
p retext that there is no formal recognition of that cousin. Legal stability 
and equity both lose out in this game. 
Yet the judges, at their own discretion, can draw on local custom when 
it seems to serve a useful purpose for the case at hand. We will explore 
some practical applications of this, but first we should come back to what 
we have just said, highlighting two essential characteristics of the French 
Polynesian situation compared to that of New Caledonia. 
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The first one, and this is what differentiates French Polynesia from New 
Caledonia, is the unity of legal status. This unity stems, in most of the 
Territory (the ex-Pomare kingdom and its dependencies), from the 
implementation of the civil code in the period 1866-74, as well as the 
annexation documents of 1880 and the joint declaration of 1887. Later, the 
ordinance of 24 March 1945, which extended full citizenship to ex-' subjects', 
and its complementary decree of 5 April 1945, suppressed the last of the 
indigenous jurisdictions. Although there is an etat du droit local (state of 
local law) which is hardly different to the metropolitan state (etat 
metropolitain), it applies to all residents of the Territory, regardless of origin 
or ethnic group. 
The other characteristic, which makes us similar to New Caledonia, is 
that here as well, land-the relationship of people to land-is an important 
element of identity. We would like to quote feue Aurora Natua, a Tahitian 
personality who was knowledgeable, but discreet, about her traditions. 
When somebody from her island approached her to say 'we are Fetii' 
(cousins), she would answer by asking 'oh yes, on which Fenua?' (which 
land?). From her perspective, that was everything.5 
So, in turning to some of the findings drawn from actual jurisprudence, 
we will not speak of the many cases where custom seems to more or less 
correspond to French law. For example, adoption existed in traditional 
society-the problem today is whether or not the legal formalities are 
followed. 
The civil code allows for subsidiary recourse to local usage in a limited 
number of situations, for example, for the distance required between 
plantations and the boundaries of properties; for the delays awarded to 
the taker, when the lease is not under some special rule or convention; or 
for the division of produce between the landowner and the tenant. In the 
latter case, the courts have determined-based on known contractual 
examples, reports from agronomists and geographers, and statements 
collected during legal enquiries-that the division of the produce of a 
coconut plantation is usually one-half for those who work the land, one­
quarter for those who own it, and one-quarter for those who planted the 
trees.6 
Since the 1960s, the courts have had to deal with a new kind of lease 
which relates to the suburban zones-when a small plot of land is rented 
for construction by a tenant of a temporary dwelling. This is what sustains 
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the shanty towns, where this type of convention escapes the regulations 
for residen tial leases and rural leases.  There was a need to set 
commencement and completion dates and determine how long it would 
last for. The judge confirmed that the usual practice was to allow 3-12 
months for notification, according to the particular circumstances. In fact, 
however, he invented this-a preatorian creation which is now set in 
writing. 
These two examples may show a positive approach to custom by 
jurisprudence, sometimes studying custom objectively and sometimes 
seeking to contribute to its production, through analogy and a desire for 
equity. They are nevertheless somewhat marginal, and it is more interesting 
to see how fundamental characteristics of traditional land ownership 
survive in contemporary legal practice. 
One of these characteristics was that property, which was transmitted 
through a line of inheritance going back to a founding ancestor, was 
inalienable. The sale of land, however, was legalised in Tahiti by the texts 
of 1844-47. The concept of prescriptive acquisition was introduced at the 
same time, when the term aitau ('eaten by time') appeared, and was 
legalised as a consequence of the implementation of the civil code. Today, 
claimants who seek to sidestep these modes of acquisition in the name of 
a tradition that has been abolished for 120 years are tackling a legal 
condition which cannot be avoided. On this point, the conflict between 
custom and written law is insurmountable. 
Another essential characteristic is that property was family owned. Land 
belonged to a family, not an individual, and this notion has persisted to 
the presenf'-it explains the undivided nature of most land today. Different 
regulations have tried to suppress it, all unsuccessfully. In legal practice, 
none of the co-holders are forbidden from making a claim to and obtaining, 
a division of the land. Yet the idea of the family entity still maintains efficacy, 
particularly in relation to the notion of souches (ancestry, origin, lineage, 
'stock') and hence the problems of prescription. 
In legal terms, the souches correspond roughly to Tahitian term opu and 
are the sub-groupings which delineate the inheritors. They have a 
recognised role in both the provisional management of co-ownership (the 
heads of lineage are responsible for the allotment of rent and for organising 
the harvesting rosters8) and at the level of distribution (most of this is done 
by the lineages, not the 'heads'9). 
Customary law and custom in Polvnesian iurisprudence 
These incidents are also seen in the realm of prescriptive acquisition, 
and the law has changed on this matter. Originally stemming from a 
political and colonial administration which was hostile to co-ownership, 
there was a tendency to systematically favour 'usucapion'. In the mid-
1 990s a Land Commission incorporating members of the Territorial 
Assembly and a magistrate, did research in all the districts of Polynesia 
and found that the population held strong reservations about the institution 
of usucapion. As a result, jurisprudence changed several years later and 
became hostile to prescription, perhaps overly so, as a reaction to the 
p revious position. Today, the position of the courts is more subtle and 
pragmatic. In terms of the family ideology in question, the principles that 
have been extracted are, on the one hand, a strong insistence on the actual 
nature of possession when a case involves an co-owner who is said to 
have 'usucape' against the rights of other co-owners;10 and, on the other 
hand, the possibility of acquiring land by prescription, not of a delineated 
plot but of an undivided area, 11 or of acquiring land on behalf of the family 
branch rather than on one's own.12 
A third fundamental characteristic is the clear distinction traditionally 
made between rights of ownership of the land and the right to exploit the 
land. 
Following the research mentioned above, the Commission developed 
rules to specify and protect the 'rights of the plantation owners', but these 
never actually came into existence. The effects of this custom are quite 
clearly manifested in the law. 
The law has recognised, under certain conditions, a specific right called 
'rights of superficie'. This is analogous to French metropolitan customary 
land tenure-and allows the developer to be the sole owner and have free 
use of the plantations and constructions he or she has created, regardless 
of whether he or she is the actual owner of the land.13 
Furthermore, the rules of the civil code, which are supposed to restore 
the produce of individual plantations on undivided land to all of the 
inheritors, are never invoked in court, or only in cases of clear abuse.14 For 
the same reason, they are often followed by a preferential attribution of 
the shared plots which operates outside the strict conditions set by the 
law.15 
The last of the characteristics is the importance of the marine 
environment. This mainly means the coast and the lagoons, which are a 
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source of food and a means of communication. Here are two examples of 
how they have been taken into account by the law. 
First is the recognition, in specific cases, of the private appropriation of 
parts of a lagoon. The law in this regard became widely-known through 
two cases in 1979-80 and 1991, but actually draws on several judgrnents 
between 1864-1953 and is based both on metropolitan models and on the 
study of the Pomare Code and ancient customs. 
Second is the fact that in dividing marine tenure, access to the riverbank 
is often granted to co-owners whose lots do not touch it. There is no article 
of law to enforce this-the parties ask for it, the experts make provisions 
for it in their reports, and the courts ratify it. We could say that a textual 
vacuum is filled here by the imposition of custom. 
This quick overview shows how local jurisprudence can adapt to the 
land tenure situation of the Territory by giving the texts a meaning that 
flows from custom, and by inserting custom into them, even if it sometimes 
means overlooking an article of the Code. 
All this, however, depends, in p art, on the judge making a decision. 
This is because there are two schools of thought among the magistrates. 
Some apply the law in Papeete as they would in Dunkerque, without 
having to worry about particularities and consequences. Others believe 
that their role is to adjust the law to the needs of the people. Some manage 
records, and others deal with concrete situations. It does seem that there 
may be a problem of equity for claimants, depend on which school of 
thought they encounter in the court. 
On the other hand, it is clear that abandoning customary information 
produces harmful social and economic effects, and the development of a 
mentality of individual ownership feeds into the destabilisation of the 
population. This set of phenomena is irreversible, and it is no longer 
possible to simply let people go back to disintegrated or altered ancestral 
practices. We need to make do with modem technical and legal constraints. 
Polynesians are aware of the advantages of a legal decision which 
solidifies co-ownership over custom, where all is oral. So, in order to solve 
the problem of land tenure in Polynesia we need to research the past. 
The answer involves a number of reforms that should encompass the 
entire land tenure system, but what we are interested in here are the 
procedures. By that we mean the proposals of the College d' experts fanciers 
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(College of Land Tenure Experts) and of the Territorial Commission for 
Reconciliation. These projects have passed into the institutional texts but 
have not b een applied effectively. They should recall one of their 
inspirations-to help the law in its treatment of land tenure by using those 
who know what survives of custom. Let's hope that the way they are 
implemented lives up to these expectations. 
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1 Translators note: I have left this technical term in French: it translates roughly as 
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4 Rapport du juge forain sur I' application du code civil ii Rapa, R. Calinaud, 16 
September 1981. 
5 Bull. Soc. Etudes Oceaniennes, 1991, No. 5:254-5. 
6 Bull. d'information du Tri. Sup. Appel, Papeete, 1980, No. 2:16-18. 
7 It was maintained in practice by the users when land titles were created. 
8 For example T.5.A 59 of 24 September 1953. 
9 T.S.A 122 of 28 July 1955; 93 of 17 May 1956; 2 of 27 January 1966. 
10 T.S.A 3 of 6 January 1977; and Cass. 29 October 1979; Cour d'appel 116 of 9 
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1979. 
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15 T.S.A 20 of 17 April 1969; C.A. 171 of 1 December 1983; several decisions by the 
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Custom and the law 
An nex I 
The opin ion of the Tah it ian l e g is l ator of 1 852 on 
the need to reform customs 
Extract from the proceedings of the Tahitian Legislative Assembly's session 
of 5 March 1852. The debates preceded the vote on the Tahitian law on 
'L'Etat civil' of 5 March 1852. 
The order of the day calls for the discussion of the proposed law on the 
acts of the civil state (etat civil) 
The president: The spokesperson, Ote, has the floor. 
Ote asks for the Assembley's tolerance: He feels somewhat underqualified, 
but is anxious to fulfil his obligations, and does not want to miss out on 
the discussion of a law which will fill a large gap in the Tahitian Code. For 
a long time now, he says, we have been dissatisfied with the uncertainty, 
or rather the obscurity, of family genealogies. They are an ongoing source 
of litigation over land tenure. The absence of titles and the impossibility of 
establishing the exact links between the various parties, always leaves some 
uncertainty in property law. Land is passed on from hand to hand. As 
soon as a case is closed, others step forward to make claims. Despite all 
our efforts, our judgments are precarious; we lack any solid foundation 
on which to base our decisions. And this state of affairs has unfortunate 
consequences: apart from the confusion, and the enmities sparked by the 
litigation fever that has grasped the country, agricultural activity is 
languishing. A landowner today is never sure that his rights will not be 
contested tomorrow. And this causes a pernicious disincentive: people do 
not want to work land that is under continual dispute. So despite all the 
ongoing efforts of the G overnor, his p lanning and urging, his 
encouragement and freedoms, he cannot make agriculture flourish. Our 
lands remain fallow. It is security that is missing. A father of a family would 
work hard if he could be assured that the fruits of his labour would not go 
to someone else who, through litigation, would take them from him and 
his family just when they were about to reap the benefits. But that is not 
all: not only are people not working, but when a foreigner wishes to rent 
land in order to render it productive, they are refused access because of 
the uncertainties that hang over land tenure. No one knows whom they 
should be dealing with, or the land remains undivided between several 
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people . . .  some desire to rent it out, and others do not; or the conditions 
acceptable to some are unacceptable to others. This is the lamentable chaos 
we have been struggling with for so long. We must get out of it (entirely: 
hear, hear!). 
'Well! The law that is put forward offers you this. Under this law, it is 
true that our old customs will be violated, but the flames of litigation will 
die down, and security will breed work. Once the law comes into effect, 
nobody will be hindered and confused by trying to trace our ancestors; 
this epidemic of discord, of court cases, of laziness and misery, will cease 
to inflict our country. Every session of the toohitu leads to a multiplicity of 
litigation where the judges are forced to make decisions based on the 
uncertain memories of elderly people who are questioned on the ancestry 
of the parties involved. Once this information is set into public registers it 
will be an enormous advantage! The memories of men weaken, even if 
their declarations are guided by the best of intentions; but that which has 
been put down in books remains always clear . . . In short, the new law will 
replace obscurity with light . . .  
The speaker, who spoke with vigour, appears tired. 'There is much more to 
say, he adds, and I have only partially demonstrated the advantages of 
our law: but the audience is perceptive enough to realise that fatigue, and 
my relative lack of qualification, do not allow me to fully develop the 
issue.' Ote returns to his place. 
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Annex I I  
The l aw of 1 0  March 1 89 1 ,  ratifying the statements s igned by 
King Pomare V and the Governor of the French Esta b l ishments 
of Ocean i a  
Article 1 .  The statements signed on 29 December 1887, b y  King Pomare V 
and the Governor of the French Establishments of Oceania have been 
ratified. They suppress the articles of indigenous jurisdiction (whose 
maintenance is) stipulated in the act of annexation of Tahiti by France. 
Annex to the law of 1 0  March 1 89 1  
Decla rations s igned o n  29 December 1 887 by the Governor of 
the French Establishments of Ocean ia and King Pomare V 
His Majesty, King Pomare V and M. Lacascade, Governor of the French 
Establishments of Oceania, representing as such the President of the French 
Republic, and acting in accordance with the powers conferred on him, 
Consider that the reservations contained in this Royal declaration of June 
19, 1880, giving full and entire cession to France of the sovereignty of His 
Majesty Pomare V over the Society Islands and its dependencies, provide 
an obstacle to the harmonious union of Tahitians with their new co-citizens; 
His Majesty Pomare V would like to give his ex-subjects a renewed 
proof of his affection, and to the French Government a renewed expression 
of his confidence, 
The (high) contracting parties have agreed upon and declared the 
following, subject to ratification by the French government: 
The indigenous jurisdictions which are maintained by a stipulation in 
the act of annexation of Tahiti by France, will be suppressed as soon as the 
processes relating to the delineation of property have been accomplished 
and the disputes arising from them have been settled. The acts of l' etat 
civil indigene (indigenous civil state) will be regularised free of charge, as 
the ex-subjects of his Majesty request it. 
From now on, the translation of the acts into Tahitian and vice-versa in 
the courts, will be done free of charge. 
Done in Papeete on the twenty-ninth of December, eighteen hundred 
and eighty seven, in the presence of all the chiefs of Tahiti and Moorea. 
signed: Lacascade 
signed: Pomare V 
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Annex I l l  
The op i n ion of the com mission for the i m provem e nt of the 
l a n d  tenu re system on prescriptive a cquis it ion 
(extract from the minutes of the meeting of 7 December 1956) 
The president: ( . . .  ) This is an important question as nearly all litigation 
revolves around prescriptive acquisition. 
A member: Do we find a notion of prescription in Tahitian customary 
law? 
The president: I have found the expression Aitau in the Tahitian law of 
November 30, 1855. The term Aitau means 'eaten by time'. 
I will read Article 70 of this law for you 
When the dispute to be settled is based on tapuna descent on both sides, then 
the judges will carefully seek the true genealogies of the parties, and allot the 
land to the most direct inheritor. If one side claims rights of descent, and the 
other bases their claim on the rights of aitau possession, the judges will 
follow the decree of Governor Bruat, made on May 3, 1847, on the request of 
the toohitu (high judges). At least three witnesses, who must be ex-huiraatira 
(land owners) of the same district, are required to prove this kind of agreed 
possession of land. 
This decree of May 3, 1847, is written as follows 
We, President and Toohitu, after considering the difficulties and uncertainties 
which exist in disputes over land possessed in ancient times during the 
pagan era. 
And also in light of the decision taken by the assembly of iriti ture 
(legislators), according to which anyone who owns a plot of land is the 
true title holder of it, if he has benefited from it since the abolition of the 
pagan government; 
Consequently, we appeal to our Queen to order that disputes dating 
back to that time, before the establishment of the laws and the gospel, no 
longer be brought for judgment before the toohitu, nor the district judges 
and the hui raatira. 
We also appeal to the Gouverneur Commissaire of the King of France to 
acknowledge our request. 
Court of the Toohitu, May 3, 1847. 
signed: Taama-Tairapa-Nuutere-Ote-Fareahu-Utami, President 
(The commission then goes on to the perusal of the surveys addressed 
to all the District Councils of the Territory.) 
Custom and the law 
The President: These answers all demonstrate the quasi-unanimous 
opposition to prescription; the districts may agree to a thirty year 
prescription, but the generalisation of a 10 year prescription, which 
Councillor C. . .  and I recommended at our last meeting, seems to be 
impossible; it would create too large a gap between the law and usual 
practice, which would only be a source of violent conflict. 
I think that, in light of the answers we received, we must therefore 
come back to the thirty year prescription, for important reasons of social 
stability. ( . . .  ) This is a matter for the courts, which must show prudence in 
applying prescription; moreover, prescription cannot be automatically 
applied, it must be requested by one of the parties. 
Is the commission, in brief, being asked to recommend a 30 year 
prescription while the provisions of the Civil Code concerning the 
shortened prescription after 10 years of alienation of land remains in force? 
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Annex IV 
Notes on the issue of Moruroa 
The precise name for this atoll is Moruroa and apparently means ' large 
hoop net', it is shaped like a fish-trap. 
In Tahiti aux temps anciens, Teuira Henry does not even mention it, 
writing only that 'the uninhabited islands (of the Taumotu Islands), 
scattered to the East and the South had no importance and, being rarely 
visited, did not belong to the domain of the chiefs.' 
Chronology 
1767-discovery attributed to Carteret who called it Osnabruck 
1792-wreck of the whaling ship Matilda 
1723-Duperrey's passage, mapping of the atoll 
1825-Beechey's passage: no trace of inhabitants or cultures, but leftovers 
of shipwreck(s) 
1832-passage of a ship that sees some huts, but no dwellings 
1834-passage of another ship and a conflict with the eight inhabitants 
1834 or soon after-Moerenhout's passage, no human traces 
(After 1852) apparently-considered vacant by the Tahitian Administration 
1878-concession given by the Administration to the Societe Oceanienne. 
1910, concession to the Societe Fran9aise de Cocotiers des Taumotu. 
1918-19-at least five or six persons 
1928-lease to the Cie. Immobiliere et Agricole d'Oceanie 
1931-32-at least 4 people and 2 children 
1930, 1934-36, passage of K. Emory of the Bishop Museum, and Mgr. Maze, 
nobody on the island 
1936-Transfer of the concession to the Ste. Tahitia 
1939-passage of Noel Ilari, 3 adults and some children 
1950-52-2 couples 
1964-transfer by the State territory, responsible for indemnities towards 
the tenant Ste Tahitia. 
Sources: Bull. Soc. Etudes. Oceaniennes, n. 162, 1968, and n.232, 1985. 
Ol ivier Ai m ot 
On 19 November 1986, Queen Amelia of Wallis submitted a treaty for 
ratification by the French authorities. The treaty for the protectorate was 
founded on the following principles. The Queen of Wallis wishes to 
strengthen the links that have, for many years already, united her with 
France, and thus accepts to place herself under the protectorate of France. 
As a sign of this mutual engagement she will remove her flag from the 
French flag. 
A resident commissioner will be responsible for foreign affairs and for all 
affairs concerning Europeans. 
The Queen wishes to maintain her independence and also to retain her 
authority over the indigenous inhabitants. 
This text was inspired by the request for a free and independent state under 
French protection (4 November 1842), which was ratified on 5 April 1887. 
On 15 May 1910, a new text, which reinforced the powers of the resident 
commissioners was nevertheless accepted by the King of Wallis and was 
valid in Wallis, but not Futuna, until the change of statute of 1961. 
The kingdoms of Uvea, Alo and Sigave, which on 29 September 1887, 
submitted a request to enjoy the benefits of the treaty of 1886, were still 
applying the provisions set out in the Bataillon code established by Mgr 
Bataillon in 1870. He was the first missionary in Wallis and his influence 
was particularly strong in restricting 'the sale of land in Uvea to whites'. 
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While this text is primarily a collection of restrictions, it does include 
the following 'rules for the law'. 
If a chief establishes a law in his village, that law is not valid. If  he first asks 
the government, and it accepts, then that law is valid. 
It is forbidden for a judge to make a ruling concerning his son, daughter, 
wife, brother or sister-in-law or any of his parents. If one of them does this, 
they will be punished by the law of the government. 
And the law of the Uvean government is that it applies to all the people who 
live in Uvea: the whites, the Chinese, and all the residents of Uvea regardless 
of nationality. They are all equally subject to Uvean law. 
This sketch of a code of procedure made all residents subject to the 
laws of Uvea, regardless of origin. And contemporary settlements of 
customary litigation have a certain regard for this rule, which is explored 
in more detail below. 
On 8 August 1933, a decree on the organisation of French justice in the 
islands of Wallis and Futuna created a Court of First Instance with extensive 
jurisdiction. For the first time, Wallisians and Futunese were subjected, in 
certain cases, to the French legal system. 
Article 4-The Court of First Instance of the islands of Wallis and Futuna is 
responsible for civil and commercial matters concerning French citizens, 
French subjects, French subjects and proteges of other countries and 
foreigners of all nationalities and their co-authors or accomplices. 
The same applies, even if the parties are indigenous, when one of the 
persons concerned belongs to one the categories of the previous paragraph. 
Article 5-In matters of simple policing and correctional justice, the Court of 
First Instance has jurisdiction over French citizens, French subjects, French 
subjects and proteges of other countries and foreigners of all nationalities and 
their co-authors or accomplices. 
The Court of First Instance is equally entitled to know about offences 
committed by indigenous people against French citizens, French subjects, 
non-indigenous French proteges or foreigners of all nationalities, and even for 
indigenous people if one of the above persons is concerned. 
Article 6---Crimes committed by French citizens and subjects, by non­
indigenous French subjects and proteges, by foreigners of all nationalities or 
by indigenous persons, even against indigenous persons, will be judged by 
the Noumea Court if a person belonging to any of the categories enumerated 
prior to the present article is concerned, either as accused or plaintiff. 
Article 7-Disputes between indigenous persons, as well as offences and 
crimes committed exclusively by indigenous people towards indigenous 
people remain subject to indigenous jurisdictions, apart from the exceptions 
mentioned in Articles 4, 5, and 6, above. 
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In other words, offenders of the rules set out by orders of the police of the 
commissaire generale are to be judged by the court of first instance. 
Article 8-In any case where one of the parties is an indigenous person, the 
judge will be assisted by an indigenous assessor who serves in a consulting 
capacity. This assessor is appointed by the King of the island where the court 
is seated. He must be accepted by the French resident commissioner or his 
usual substitute. 
This system, which was largely dominated by local law because of the 
small number of French and foreign persons residing in Wallis and Futuna, 
was to continue in a strict legal sense until the law of 29 July 1961. It 
continued as a non-written law well beyond that date. This fundamental 
law of 1961, specified that 
People who originate from Wallis and Futuna have French nationality. They 
enjoy the rights, prerogatives, and freedoms, attached to the designation of 
French citizen, and they are also under all of the obligations it entails. Those 
who do not have a common law status retain their personal status unless 
they explicitly renounce it (Article 2). 
The Republic guarantees the populations of Wallis and Futuna the right of 
freedom of religious worship, and the respect of their beliefs and their 
customs as long as they are not in contradiction with the general principles 
of law, and the provisions of the present law . . .  (Article 3}. 
And, in particular 
[a] jurisdiction of common Jaw attached to the Noumea court of appeal, as 
well as a jurisdiction of local law, have been instigated in the islands of 
Wallis and Futuna. 
The common law jurisdiction is the only one responsible for, and competent 
in, criminal matters. It enforces the current communal criminal laws without 
discrimination. It is equally responsible for commercial and civil matters, 
subject to the authority devolved to the jurisdiction of local law. 
In all matters, appeals against judgments passed by the jurisdiction of 
common law are to be brought to the Noumea court of appeal. Crimes are 
judged by the cours d'assise of Noumea [today of Mata-Utu]. 
For all appeals, the local law jurisdiction is competent in the first degree 
1) For disputes between citizens governed by local law status, and for 
matters having to do with the application of this status. 
2) For disputes about goods held according to customary practice. 
In any case, parties who come under local law jurisdiction can, based on 
mutual agreement, claim to benefit from the common law jurisdiction; in 
that case, the customs and practices governing them will be applied. 
Judgments rendered as a final resort by the local law jurisdiction can be 
challenged before a chambre d'annulation attached to the Noumea court of 
appeal, for incompetence, abuse of power, or violation of the law. 
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A decree in the Conseil d'Etat regulates the organisation of the common law 
jurisdiction. Dating from the implementation of this decree in the Territory; 
the provisions of articles 1 to 16 of the decree of August 8, 1933, are 
repealed. 
A decree from the High-Commissioner of the Republic in the Pacific Ocean 
organises the jurisdiction of local law (Article 5). 
A decree of 19 February 1962, modified by the decree of 26 December 
1983, concerned the organisation of the common law jurisdiction which 
managed the entire criminal domain. This made it theoretically possible­
for the first time ever since the arrival of Europeans in Uvea-for the 
common law of the Republic to have influence over local civil law in matters 
where both parties were of local origin. 
Finally, a decree of the High-Commissioner of the Republic in the Pacific 
Ocean organised a jurisdiction of local law in the Territory of the islands 
of Wallis and Futuna. 
To sum up, customary authority was almost in the legal domain until 
1933, then it was separated but remained largely dominant from 1933-61, 
when it became limited, at least in the texts if not in fact, to a section of the 
civil domain. Since then, the ways it is implemented have been contested 
increasingly often by those to whom it applies. 
This long confrontation between slowly weakening customary authority 
and the authority of the Republic, would lead us to conclude that common 
law is gradually replacing local law. Paradoxically, this is taking place at a 
time when the rights of peoples to their own cultural identity is increasingly 
being recognised. 
This rapid overview of the textual evolution of legal organisation 
obviously can not account for the much more complex reality, in which 
Wallisians and Futunese have demonstrated, until very recently, their 
extraordinary capacity to adapt. 
I am therefore compelled to set out my examination of the customary 
institutions which are still used and to comment on the jurisdiction which 
was created, but never enforced, in 1978, based on the search for solutions 
to the difficulties and questions we face today. 
Confl ict sett lements i n  p a rticu l a r  l aw 
As demonstrated by the texts on the legal organisation of the islands of 
Wallis and Futuna, customary legal proceedings should not only concern 
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the civil domain in the broad sense. If this seems to be the case, we must 
note the frequent exceptions of fact in many criminal cases and the problems 
for the Noumea Court of Appeal caused by the difficult relations between 
customary authorities-in a situation where their power is largely 
contested-and the legal institutions of the common law. 
The administration of Wallis is based on the notion of villages belonging 
to one of the three districts-Mua, Hahake and Hihifo of the Kingdom of 
Uvea. In Futuna, villages are grouped together within the two kingdoms 
of Alo and Sigave. 
The customary legal procedures I will present to you are those of Uvea, 
which are identical to those of Futuna with the exception that no 
intermediary structure exists between the village and the King's Council. 
The procedures i n  theory 
The entire procedure of first instance is based on the search for a settlement, 
whether the litigation was instigated between inhabitants of the same village 
or not. This requirement sometimes necessitates many meetings and long 
delays, but it is still widely used because it is discrete and costs little. 
The procedure within a village. The customary authority responsible for 
litigation originating within the same village is the pule kolo, village chief, 
who may or may not be surrounded by assistants c alled the lagiaki. 
Sometimes the presence of a customary minister or district chief may 
automatically confer responsibility on that person because of his rank in 
the customary hierarchy. 
When two persons have a dispute to settle, one or both of them will 
first go to the village chief. The village chief tries to get the parties to agree, 
calling on the elders of both families if it is a land dispute, and attempts to 
settle the problem without calling on any other intervention than that, 
perhaps, of the lagiaki. The settlement is usually held in the village chief's 
home and at night so as to avoid unnecessary publicity. 
The meetings end either with agreement, which may include acceptance 
of a punishment by one of the parties for their attitude, or without any 
agreement, in which case an appeal is set in motion. 
The first option is an appeal before one of the King's ministers unless a 
King's minister has been summoned already. The King's minister would 
then attempt again to get an agreement by eliciting further information. 
Customarv legal proceedings in Wallis and Futuna 
The second option, specific to land disputes, is to bring the conflict 
before the district Jona, which is held every Sunday after mass. The Jona is 
attended by the district chief, the two Lavelua ministers who come from 
that district, and the village chiefs of the district. 
Although theoretically not compulsory, it is strongly recommended that 
the parties prepare an umu (traditional meal, consisting of taro or yam, 
kape, and cooked pork), accompanied either by a kava root or a wrapped 
bottle. To present the gifts, they are expected to wear traditional attire. 
The members of the fono hear the parties and, if it is likely to facilitate a 
solution, they will go to the places concerned. They can reconvene a later 
meeting if the various materials they have at their disposal are insufficient 
for a quick settlement of the problem. 
If an agreement is not reached, or if one or both of the parties are not 
satisfied, then the high chiefs are summoned. In principle, this is meant to 
be the last resort for a settlement. 
The Council meets under the presidency of the Lavelua, even though 
his presence is neither systematic nor compulsory. It thus consists of the 
King, the six ministers and the Puluiuvea as well as the three district chiefs, 
Jaipule, and the chief of the village in question. The parties are then expected 
to make the same presentations as for the district Jona. 
At hearings, the verdict is finalised when the parties have been heard 
under the direction of one of the ministers, usually the Kulitea, and the 
ministers and district chiefs have intervened to elicit more information, 
make a comment, or if they asked for their opinion. The King then settles 
the matter and the hearing is closed once his decision has been made. This 
decision is not meant to be reversible or debated, although this principle 
has occasionally been contravened in the last few years when the Lavelua 
has used his sovereign powers to re-open the debates. 
The procedure between two villages or two districts. The procedure for 
litigation between two inhabitants of different villages is identical to that 
followed for parties of the same village. On the other hand, when the case 
concerns residents of different districts, it is brought to the Puluiuvea with 
the usual aim of reaching an agreement. Otherwise, it is brought directly 
to the King's Council, which would be summoned in any case w�re the 
initial attempt to secure an agreement to fail. 
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Contem porary practice 
While the general outline of legal procedure I have described remains valid 
today, we do need to add certain details and corrections which are 
important for the questions now being asked about the juxtaposition of 
the common law justice system and that of local law. 
First, we must not lose sight of the fact that people usually choose the 
customary legal process whether it be for civil suits or criminal offences, 
despite the fact that common law judges are the only ones with the 
authority to settle criminal matters since the law of 29 July 1961. 
I have personally noticed on many occasions, however, that, while 
Wallisians continue to accept the settlement of certain criminal 
transgressions by the traditional customary authorities, they were quick 
to realise that the common law judge could, in such matters, become a 
supreme authority and an ultimate venue in such matters, when they found 
the decisions rendered by the customary justice system unsatisfactory. As 
a result, the magistrate needs to listen carefully to the parties and take 
equally into account the legal rules imposed on him and the customary 
punishments which may have, as is often the case, already been enforced 
prior to the matter being brought to the court. 
It also means that continual explanation is required so as to clarify the 
situation and avoid an open conflict with the customary authorities. 
In terms of civil issues, the recent increase in meetings held by chiefs 
whose authority is often contested entails an increase in the cost of 
investigations. This is even more so for issues of land tenure, as no decision 
is ever definitive. The King and his Council can always go back on a 
settlement, particularly if it was not recent or if it was made under chiefs 
who no longer hold their official positions. 
This is how the emergence of the notion of 'land to be built on', with a 
much higher monetary value than land for agriculture, has led to several 
conflicts over land which had been legally settled a long time ago (for 
example, Matalaa point, the Sia land). 
This uncertainty and the costs of litigation mean that there is a need for 
reforms. Without these the common law will quickly impose itself on the 
local court which, by being the guardian of ancient traditions and of a 
strong cultural identity, will not have adapted to ensure it's own 
continuation. 
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Finally, the old rule that 'the law of the Uvean government is that all 
the people residing in Uvea are subject to it . . .  ' continues to prevail, because 
as it still applies to litigation, in a local law context, between a Wallisian 
and a Futunese if they both live in Uvea. 
In Futuna, on the other hand, a case between a person from Alo and 
another from Sigave has its own unique procedure, which is linked to the 
specific history of these two kingdoms. 
As there is no supreme authority, an agreement is sought between the 
representatives of the two kingdoms. There is an understanding, however, 
that, in terms of protocol, the kingdom of Alo, which won the last war in 
the middle of the nineteenth century, has precedence over that of Sigave. 
I will now tum to the organisation of the jurisdiction of local law which 
is outlined in the statutory law and was implemented by the decree of 20 
September 1978. 
Custom a ry cou rts of l aw (estab l ished u nder  the l aw 
of 29 J u ly 1 96 1 )  
In the Territory of Wallis and Futuna, local law is administered by three 
first degree courts, a second degree court, and the chambre d' annulation of 
the Noumea Court of Appeal. 
Customary law has validity and responsibility in the first degree courts 
and can be appealed against in the second degree courts for 
• disputes between citizens governed by a local law status, and 
for issues bearing on the application of that status 
disputes having to do with goods possessed according to 
custom. 
Any judgments made by the customary law jurisdiction can be attacked 
in the chambre d' annulation on the grounds of incompetence, abuse of power, 
and violation of the law, as set out in the conditions under part IV of the 
decree. 
For all decisions made in customary matters, Article 49 of the decree 
establishes that 
. . .  judgments and statements made in customary law matters will include the 
names of the members of the court and the court clerk, an indication of the 
custom invoked by each of the parties, the name and position of the 
interpreter, the name, sex, age, occupation, residence of each of the parties, a 
summary of the claim and possibly the observations made by the court; the 
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name, sex, age, occupation and residence of each witness, as well their 
kinship relation with the parties, the oath they took, and their statements; 
finally, a complete elucidation of the custom applied. 
The fi rst deg ree courts 
The first degree courts cited in Article 1 of the decree are located in Wea 
(Wallis), Alo and Sigave (Futuna). There are plans to set up a first degree 
court in each circumscription. 
Each tribunal consists of a president, six assessors for the first degree 
court of Uvea, and four assessors for each of the first degree courts of Alo 
and Sigave. These assessors have a deliberative role and are designated 
for a year by decree of the chief of the Territory on a joint submission from 
the president of the section of the common law court at Mata-Utu and the 
customary chief of the circumscription in question. 
The president and the assessors are chosen amongst the traditional 
authorities who are recognised as such according to customary rules, as 
well as other respected members of the community. Their mandate is 
renewable. They take an oath before the president of the section of the 
common law court at Mata-Utu, or, according to the magistrates' formula, 
a local hearing. 
The president and the assessors work for free, but the state allots some 
funding to them. The head of the Territory sets the amount monthly on an 
inclusive basis. 
The court responsible for settlement is the one which sits where the 
claimant resides. In real estate matters, however, the case is brought to the 
court which sits in the area of the real estate, and, for inheritance matters, 
to the court of the place where the deceased person last lived. 
The clerk's office is held by a French citizen who is designated in a 
statement from the head of the Territory and on the submission of the 
president of the section of the common law court. The clerk receives a 
salary from the state which is set on an inclusive basis by the head of the 
Territory. On the proposal of the president of the section of the common 
law court, the organisation and functions of the clerk's office are set out in 
a statement written by the head of the Territory. The claimant either submits 
a written request or formulates his or her demands orally to the clerk. He 
or she must unambiguously indicate their identity, the identity of the 
defendant, the object of litigation and the witnesses they wish to call. 
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The hearing is free, but certain costs, particularly the salaries of the 
technicians, are billed to the losing party. The court, however, can decide, 
on well-founded grounds, to impose a fraction or the totality of the costs 
on another party. 
The clerk writes the request in a special register and convenes-usually, 
but not always by official letter-the parties to obtain an agreement. Prior 
to the hearings, an attempt to get an agreement must be made in front of 
the president of the first degree jurisdiction or an assessor designated by 
him. In either case, they will be assisted by the chiefs of the villages of 
both the claimant and the defendant as well as the court clerk. If an 
agreement is reached, an official statement is written up, which is equal to 
a judgment. If no agreement can be reached, then the court clerk convenes 
the parties for a legal hearing, and the hearing must mention the attempt 
at agreement. 
An interrogation takes place during the debates and the procedure is 
oral. The clerk records the debates and incidents during the hearing. The 
notes are then certified by the president. The president can order any 
measures he deems useful to be carried out, including visits to the site, 
expert advice, and investigations. The hearings are open to the public. If 
the final judgment is not given immediately, the president informs the 
parties of the date on which it will be made. The final judgment is 
announced publicly and immediately inscribed in a special register, and 
copies are sent to the parties who request them. 
An appeal can be launched against any decision made by a first degree 
court. It is made by letter to the clerk of the court that passed the initial 
judgment. The clerk records it in a special register and notifies the opposing 
party in accordance with Article 16. Within eight days of the appeal 
declaration, the clerk passes a copy of the judgment and all relevant 
material to the clerk of the second degree court. 
The appeal can be made, under the same conditions, directly to the 
clerk of the second degree court. In that case, the clerk of this jurisdiction 
immediately informs the clerk of first degree court, who then passes a 
copy of the judgment made, and all relevant material, to him within eight 
days. 
The appeal can be lodged by the parties or their representatives. The 
head of the Territory also has the option of lodging an appeal. To do this, 
he has exactly 15 days, starting from the day when he was notified of the 
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decision by the clerk, to get the approvat as is outlined in Article 51 of the 
decree. 
Judgments are not carried out automatically, and a plaintiff judged by 
default has the right to appeal. The first degree court is summoned again 
by the plaintiff. The parties are assembled and the affair is brought to an 
ordinary hearing. 
The second deg ree j u risd i ction 
The second degree court is situated in the Territory's administrative centre. 
It can nevertheless sit before a local hearing at the administrative centre of 
each circumscription in Futuna. It has its own office clerk who is a French 
citizen under the same conditions as those set out for the first degree courts. 
Provisions have been made for this clerk to be replaced in the case of a 
local hearing, by the clerk of the first degree court sitting in the jurisdiction 
of the appeal. 
The second degree court consists of two sections-the Wallis section 
and the Futuna section. It is composed of a president and eight assessors. 
The presidency is assumed by the president of the common law jurisdiction. 
The Wallis section includes the president and four assessors chosen 
from the circumscription of Uvea. 
The Futuna section includes the president and four assessors, two of 
whom are chosen from the circumscription of Alo, and two from that of 
Sigave. If one of them is absent, the youngest member of the circumscription 
that is over-represented stands down. 
The assessors should not belong to any of the first degree jurisdictions. 
They are designated for a year by decree of the head of the Territory on the 
j oint submission of the president of the section of the common law court 
and the customary chief of the circumscription in question. They are chosen 
amongst the traditional authorities who are recognised as such according 
to customary rules, as well as other respected members of the community. 
The assessors take the oath prescribed by Article 6 before the president 
of the common law court. Each section can legitimately sit with two 
assessors. If the Wallis section only consists of three assessors, then the 
president prevails in the case of a split vote. 
Each section of the second degree court is a jurisdiction of appeal for 
decisions made by the first degree courts under its responsibility. For cases 
involving a party from Wallis and another from Futuna, however, decisions 
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are made by the joint sections. This also happens if the president chooses 
to convene the case in that way. 
The joint sections of the second degree court sit once a year in the 
administrative centre of the Territory. The Wallis section sits in the 
administrative centre of the Uvea circumscription. The Futuna section sits 
in the administrative centre of the circumscription of the claimant, or, for 
real estate matters, in the circumscription where the real estate is situated, 
or else, in inheritance matters, of the last place of residence of the deceased 
person. The clerk draws up the brief and convenes the parties. 
The procedure to be followed in the second degree courts is identical 
to that of the first degree courts. 
Within eight days of the final judgment, the clerk sends a copy of it to 
the head of the Territory and to the attorney general of the N oumea Court 
of Appeal. 
If judgment is by default, an appeal can be lodged under the same 
conditions as those set out for the first degree courts. 
The chambre d ' a n n ul ation (Chamber of A n n u l ment) 
The chambre d'annulation sits in Noumea. It is made up of 
the first president of the Noumea Court of Appeal, or the 
magistrate responsible for replacing him 
two magistrates designated by the first president of the Court 
of Appeal 
in a consulting capacity, the heads of the offices of the islands 
of Wallis and Futuna to the high-commission in Noumea, and 
two assessors who are particular status citizens from Wallis 
and Futuna and speak French. They are appointed by the High 
Commissioner of the Republic to the Pacific Ocean from a list 
of 12 respected members of the community. 
The functions of the public ministry are exercised in this court by the 
Attorney-General of the Noumea Court of Appeal or by the court 
magistrate acting as his substitute. The functions of the clerk are carried 
out by the court clerk himself or his substitute. 
An appeal against the annulment of judgments made as a last resort in 
matters of customary law, can be made to the chambre d' annulation. The 
appeal can be made directly by the concerned parties, by the head of 
Territory, or the Attorney-General to the Noumea Court of Appeal. It is 
Custom and the law 
made by verbal or written declaration to the clerk's office of the court 
which made the decision being questioned. This is subject to the conditions 
set out in Article 15 of the decree. The clerk then sends the appeal to the 
clerk of the chambre d'annulation. The appeal is also made to the clerk's 
office of the chambre d' annulation in Noumea, under the same conditions. · 
These are the compulsory provisions of this institution, which was 
approved in 1978, after many meetings held by two successive magistrates. 
Although approval was given by the three Kings and their councils, the 
elected representatives of the Territory, and the administrative and legal 
authorities, the institution has in fact never been set up. 
So what can we learn from this situation in which local law litigation, 
and specifically that relating to land tenure, is being governed by a chiefly 
system which is finding it increasingly difficult, and whose authority is 
being questioned? Furthermore, local law litigation is carried out under 
unreliable conditions which are seen as an obstacle to the economic 
development of the Territory, whose size and small population already 
make such development an uncertainty. 
But isn't this just an excuse, when an, albeit imperfect, instrument for 
basic understanding of customary rules, with all their contradictions and 
debates, actually exists? It is perhaps true that the islands of Wallis and 
Futuna, like New Caledonia, are, as Jean-Claude Boulard described in 'Au 
pays des trois royaumes'1 , confronted with the introduction of a monetary 
economy which the fragile equilibrium of social structures, based on a 
mix of customary rules and religious precepts, may not resist for long. 
Such is the power of money, and the difficulties of controlling it. 
Yet it seems to me that Wallisians and Futunese, whose remarkable 
powers of adaptation I have already mentioned, possess all the qualities 
needed to take up the challenge. This is at a time when metropolitan France 
is going through its own evolution. There seems to be a growing desire, 
even if it is timid, to recognise the rights of those regions that wish to see 
their own cultural identities concretely incorporated into the institutions 
they live with. 
The islands of Wallis and Futuna still hold a valuable trump card­
their small size, relative isolation, and strong traditions up until recently, 
have sheltered them from the imperialism of powerful external economic 
interests, such that the Territory's land has remained in the hands of its 
inhabitants. 
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Do we need to oppose custom to the law, making the latter synonymous 
with progress, when, as Professor Rouland explained, business law and 
industrial law are heavily governed by custom 'in the sense that the rules 
applied, and the models of conflict management are largely produced by 
the social groups concerned'? 
The revival of customary legal proceedings would reassure the 
customary authorities in their traditional roles, and would serve to clarify 
the essentials of customary rules progressively through a process of 
decisions which would come to form a jurisprudence. This can be done by 
implementing the institution created in 1978, even if it needs to be improved 
by taking into account the evolution of the Territory and the behaviour of 
its inhabitants since then, or by establishing it immediately, before 
instigating reforms that experience itself would dictate. 
Was it not the court of Tananarive which reminded us on 8 August 
1929, that 
[a] custom is not inert matter; it automatically evolves over time and can 
transform itself according to the needs of the day or even disappear when 
the circumstances that made it necessary no longer exist. 
This procedure seems to be the one that the customary authorities of the 
Territory are following. 
Emeli Simete invoked a similar idea 
if we had to forgo the notion of customary power, we would need to hang on 
to custom as a collection of positive traditions, I am persuaded we would not 
regret it. 
Being in full agreement with her perspective-which is also that of many 
Wallisians and Futunese who wish to engage with the modem world 
without losing their cultural identity-I am convinced that the customary 
authorities would be able to give a balanced, controlled, and progressive 
answer to this request. This will happen if they remain attentive to the 
changes in their environment, and will be carried out by decisions 
stemming from the essential principles of a particular local law which is 
concerned not to sacrifice the collectivity to the individual. 
Note 
1 Collective work: Au pays des trois royaumes, Paris, ed. Pacifique (Ministere des 
DOM-TOM), p. 14. 
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Prof. J ean-Yves Faberon, C h a i r  
A question has come from the audience concerning the status of Wallisians and 
Futunese in the territory of New Caledonia. Do they come under particular law 
status and how are they managed on this territory? Which authorities manage 
their problems in New Caledonia? 
Judge Emili Simete answered that we first need to take into account 
Mr Agniel's statement about the confusion that currently pervades the 
territory of New Caledonia regarding Wallisians and their status. Why? 
Because any Wallisian who arrives in New Caledonia seems to be 
considered a common law citizen since they are inscribed in the common 
law register as soon as they arrive. Yet, each commune should have its 
own separate register like those that belong to particular status in the 
Melanesian community. But in practice, this right seems so unknown to 
Wallisians that in New Caledonia they are confronted with the general 
principles of the rules of the Civil Code. Judge Simete believes that in all 
the rulings that have been rendered, there have only been a few cases 
where Wallisians came under a particular status. 
Olivier Aimot would like comment on two issues. The first concerns 
citizens of particular status, specifically the Wallisians to whom we have 
just referred. The fact that their life acts are inscribed in a determined 
register does not, legally speaking, modify their personal status. Both the 
Constitution and the fundamental rules of the Statute of 1961 formally 
specify that a Wallisian of particular status retains that status as long as he 
or she has not explicitly rejected it. Therefore this first point must be 
mentioned today because we have based ourselves on the notion that a 
citizen, whether he or she be Wallisian or Kanak, was inscribed in a common 
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law register so as to make he or she come under common law status. This 
is an error that we must take note of, discuss, and highlight. 
The second point relates to the problem of a particular law citizen. 
Contrary to certain provisions which exist in New Caledonia, there are no 
provisions which govern particular status in Wallis and Futuna. There is 
the exception of the jurisdiction of local law of 1978, which is discussed in 
Part Two, but which has no practical existence and is an issue currently 
being debated. This state of affairs complicates things considerably since, 
in the eyes of the legislator, a citizen of particular status is one who 
continues to live a traditional lifestyle, as mentioned by Guy Agniel 
(Chapter 2). But when this citizen has a good knowledge of French and 
lives like Europeans do, then for all purposes he or she eventually loses 
his or her particular status. That is why, as in Chapter 5 (Trouilhet-Tamole 
and Simete), a Wallisian or Futunese in New Caledonia is not considered 
to belong to a distinct status as he or she appears to live as a Westerner. 
This issue has raised tough questions which have been brought to the 
attention of the working groups that were installed following the Matignon 
Accord, especially the working group on particular status. These questions 
have been asked in view of the presence of Wallisians within this context. 
Another person in the audience is interested to know why there is no particular 
status in French Polynesia given that the Constitution seems to allow for this 
possibility for all inhabitants of every TOM? What does the Constitution stipulate 
on this point and why are there no particular status citizens in French Polynesia ? 
Rene Calinaud answered that the situation stems essentially from the 
particular history of the territory of French Polynesia. One can say that in 
general there is no longer any particular status in the Kingdom of Pomare 
V that Bruno Saura told us about. This includes the island of Tahiti and its 
dependencies since 1869-80, the beginning of the implementation of the 
Civil Code and the Law of Annexation. Particular civil status disappeared 
in the Kingdom of Tahiti at that time. It continued until 1945 in those islands 
which were not dependent on the Kingdom of Tahiti, the Leeward Islands 
and part of the Austral Islands. At that point, the decree of 1945 extended 
citizenship to all the inhabitants of what was the French Union, and after 
that there was a special decree for the entirety of what was known as the 
French Establishments of Oceania, the old name for French Polynesia. This 
decree suppressed the indigenous jurisdictions which had survived until 
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then in the Leeward Islands and parts of the Austral Islands. Both the 
indigenous jurisdictions and the codified laws that supported them were 
suppressed at that time and particular status ceased to exist The entire 
population of French Polynesia came under common law status. 
Jean-Yves Faberon is wondering whether customary law in New Caledonia, which 
is recognised by statutory law-as opposed to the situation in French Polynesia­
really stems from the provinces as seems to be the claim in the contemporary 
statute of New Caledonia. As far as he knows there are no texts about customary 
law existing in the South Province. Yet there have been problems in Lifou which 
could have been managed by customary norms that the South Province should 
have established, which would have been an astonishing situation! He is also 
wondering whether the provincial Assemblies of the other provinces, which have 
legal authority, could elaborate rules relating to customary law if the statutory 
texts were to allow it. He asked Guy Agniel if he could provide some comments. 
Guy Agniel indicated that to the best of his knowledge no text has been 
ratified by the Provinces. 
Jean-Yves Faberon stated that traditional customary rules and modern 
rules could be joined at any time but that this has not happened. 
Olivier Aimot mentioned that, within the framework of the working 
group on particular status, this is an issue currently being explored by the 
customary authorities themselves-which is essential to the process-as 
well as by the representatives of the political parties who are associated 
with it. They are the ones who, either directly or by mandate in the 
provincial assemblies, have the possibility of enacting it. This would 
happen if a consensus or a strong idea could be extracted from the 
discussions, even if it is premature to guess what will emerge from these 
debates. From what one reads in the minutes of the meetings of the 
Customary Council of the Territory, it does seem that much thought and 
work is going into what would be needed to integrate the various provincial 
provisions. 
Jean-Luc Delahaye, the President of the Chamber, states that while he 
has no particular authority to speak on behalf of the Northern Province or 
the Islands Province, he nevertheless believes that work has commenced 
in the Islands Province on creating reports of palavers. He cannot confirm 
whether or not any decisions or implementations have been reached, but 
in any case the provincial assemblies have started working in that direction. 
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The case is not simply one of a total void, although he cannot say if an 
agreement or resolution has been passed on the palaver reports. 
A member of the assembly has put forward another question which addresses the 
general themes of this symposium, bringing up the notion of respect for Kanak 
and Oceanic customs and law. 
Paul de Deckker indicated earlier that certain French people who go 
and stay with a tribe try to respect their custom, meaning that they go to a 
Kanak place respecting the Kanak people and their right to their land, and 
this is a notion that seems to be missing from the generalities of this 
symposium. And if the dominant society is trying to pay attention to Kanak 
society and its laws and customs, isn't it also respectful of the Kanak 
representatives to create the necessary space to offer a customary 
welcoming to John Ah Kit, who is present with us today, and who is the 
representative of the Nitmiluk nation, an Australian Aboriginal people, 
one of the oldest existing cultures today. Yet this indigenous population is 
one of the youngest since it is less than 100 years old, having only been 
legally recognised in 1967 by the dominant Australian society. We must 
ask whether land rights is not a crucial notion for this symposium. 
The president of the session answered that the symposium's brief is 
not to take decisions, nor to write declarations (or resolutions), but to ask 
questions, as has just been done. They will remain unanswered. 
A town clerk asked the panel if children of mixed marriage between a particular 
law husband and a common law wife can claim to the rights of their father or not? 
Guy Agniel stated that this is what he meant by saying that the current 
regulations make provisions for the child to be a common law citizen, and 
that this is inadequate. It would be better for a child to be a particular 
status citizen, and then to be given the right to choose a status when he or 
she obtains legal age. 
Someone else asked about the renunciation of particular law. For example, the 
case of particular law parents who lived in the New Hebrides (not yet the 
independent Republic of Vanuatu), and who were indigenous New Caledonians 
working in Vanuatu who had registered their child under common law. On their 
return to New Caledonia the child is a common law citizen whereas the parents 
come under a particular legal status. Is there any possibility for these people to 
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renounce their common law status so that they can reintegrate into particular 
law and be like the Caledonians from here. 
Guy Agniel stated that the issue was a material concern that could easily 
enough be rectified by a court hearing 
The next question was about the renunciation of adoption and whether it allowed 
Melanesians of particular status to adopt children of a de facto union who come 
under common law. These children carry the patronymic name of the adoptive 
father, who is a particular status citizen, but retain common law status. Are there 
any answers to these questions? 
The First President stated that as far as the registers are concerned, he 
thought he had expressed himself clearly, because what is indicated on a 
register does not lead to a change of status. Therefore, and undeniably so, 
if there are particular status citizens who are inscribed in common law 
registers and for whom this has consequences both in daily life and on a 
legal levet then clearly a request of rectification should be made by 
demonstrating their right to belong to particular civil status. He thinks 
that the conditions are that there be no difficulties in establishing their 
belonging to particular legal status, and that there is sovereign recognition 
to that effect. 
The court has relatively recently answered the second part of the 
question, which is that of a common law child who, because he was born 
of a mixed union, is then adopted on a customary level. While the texts 
relating to this are much more difficult to master, the court has been clear 
on two points-first, there is no dominance of one status over the other. A 
recent decision by the Noumea Court of Appeal confirmed this decidedly. 
Second, a common law child who is likely to be adopted according to the 
terms of plenary adoption by two people of particular status, in the sense 
that the common law understands it-and that is the essential point-can 
change status if the customary rules and the different parties, meaning the 
clan chiefs and all the other customary people who have the authority to 
say whether the adoption is allowed by custom, have given their agreement. 
In such a case the common law child is given particular law status. 
According to the First President, these two decisions, which date from 
1991, distinctly confirm this principal. It is also clear, from what he said, 
and in light of the fact that the Cour de Cassation has not passed any 
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comments on the issue, that he cannot guarantee that the solution would 
be recognised by the Cour de Cassation. The solution does exist and in 
terms of common law it is in prefect harmony with what plenary adoption 
entails: a break with the biological family to enter fully into the adoptive 
family. None of this contradicts our general principles of law as long as 
customary law allows for a common law child to be fully adopted and to 
have particular legal status. There should be no problems in principle, but 
First President Aimot specified that all his answers are still academic at 
this stage. 
Lou ise Peltzer, Cha i r  
Jean Guiart would like to take the opportunity presented by this discussion 
first state how much he has appreciated the nuances which have been 
gradually been incorporated into legal practice, which is reassuring for 
the future. But he would also like to point out that the two concepts that 
have been explored today pose a serious inconvenience, that of being 
discussed in French. None of the words used to analyse Oceanic societies, 
whether it be in French or English, properly translate vernacular concepts. 
Indeed, the vernacular concepts are quite distant from terms like tribe, 
clan, property, chief, king, that we have used a lot here. This poses a 
problem-why is it that when Pacific Islanders themselves have spoken, 
they too have used these terms? 
Last century they had little choice in the matter as our words were 
imposed upon them every time there was a need to describe, resolve, or 
comprehend a situation in their society. He also says that he appreciated 
the fact that Monsieur le Procureur Generale (Chief Justice, Attorney-General) 
spoke of Melanesian civilization, because it is only recently that the word 
civilisation has been utilised in this context. Civilisation is a much more 
interesting term than custom in so far as custom stands for a set of rules in 
our civilization, whereas Kanak civilization is a totality within which there 
are institutions, behaviours and procedures. 
The president of the customary council, who spoke very nicely but also 
firmly at times, utilised certain words and then specified that they did not 
correspond to actual situations, in particular the words 'chief' and 'subject'. 
We have known for a long time that they do not correspond at all to 
Melanesian tradition, nor do they reflect the Polynesian context. The 
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relations between individuals are not of the hierarchical order that has 
been imagined and that Ulysse de la Hautiere, Secretary to Governor 
Guillain, imagined when he said that in Canala there was a chiefly system 
and a council of elders and that the chiefs had rights of life and death over 
their subjects. This is the kind of idea that has resulted in what has 
sometimes been a total misunderstanding by the representatives of the 
western world. These chiefly entities were transformed by missionaries 
into a kind of Christian royalty that they set up everywhere. Through the 
unfolding of history they controlled these areas either directly or indirectly, 
and when it was indirectly they did so by maintaining their own legal 
tradition. People who come from these societies, and who live out their 
own civilization and their own religion, have reinstated certain ancient 
religious concepts and practices in the last few decades and these have 
their own political and social strategies. To succeed in doing this they end 
up having to use the cards that have been dealt to them, sometimes 
innocently, by the western society that has installed itself in the region. 
We need to explore how the concepts we apply to Oceanic societies 
have developed over a century. The word 'tribe' for example, has a Latin 
origin and was applied by Julius Caesar to Gaul to explain that the Gallic 
tribes were constantly quarrelling amongst themselves, and from this it 
was transposed everywhere last century. But how does it survive in the 
region today? In Fiji, it has been totally abandoned and is no longer used 
in reference to Indigenous Fijians. It has also been abandoned in Papua 
New Guinea, where one could not imagine speaking of tribes in so far as 
this could provoke dramas. It is, however, still used in two places-New 
Caledonia and New Zealand. 
In New Zealand, the Maoris superimposed onto the term tribe the 
concept of the descendants of canoe crews who were said to have come to 
Polynesia in the eighth century A.D. In New Caledonia, Melanesians have 
practically imposed their point of view on how the word tribe is used, and 
interestingly, we can see through texts how it has evolved over the century. 
For Melanesians, the tribe is a locality, or place (lieu-dit) . We were told 
quite clearly this morning that it is a locality where there is a habitat, and 
that the tribe is only that, which all has interesting advantages for 
Melanesians. If tribes were spoken of as entities recognised as moral 
persons in the middle of last century, it was mainly to justify collective 
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punishments and not quite with charitable intentions. Once the word 'tribe' 
is used only to cover a locality where there are houses, it is not quite the 
same thing and we are protected from the first type of interpretation. 
In talking about chiefs the elder-brother was mentioned this morning, 
but that is something else. We find ourselves with a problem that has 
already been posed by Maurice Leenhardt and was illustrated by a text of 
the Caledonian writer, Jean Mariotti. Mariotti reflects on the opposition 
between a true chief and a false chief, meaning that the true chief would 
efface himself by putting someone else forward whose nomination as chief 
was acceptable to the administration and did this because he considered 
it beneath his moral authority and prestige to be in the service of the colonial 
administration. Sometimes the administration would impose someone 
because they spoke better French and would try to make people accept 
that person in the role of a traditional chief. If we examine things in detail, 
over the whole of the territory, we see that there are in fact no true or false 
chiefs, only people recognised by the French administration. Nevertheless, 
those who were recognised did not necessarily correspond to what the 
administration thought they were. To resolve the problem represented here, 
we cannot sweep out the false chiefs and leave only authentic chiefs. Each 
person who received official recognition by the system imposed during 
the colonial era, nevertheless had some sort of status or authority. They 
could have been the head of a lineage and thus benefit from a real authority 
from the local perspective, but that might have been for an area next to, or 
extending beyond, the circumscriptions for which they had been invested 
with official authority. Changes, some very interesting, occurred in these 
c ircumscrip tions last century, because there were blatant 
misunderstandings based on poorly documented reports. Even today, we 
continue to encounter problems in relation to chiefly systems (chefferies) in 
as far as we do not really know what their limits are and what their function 
on an administrative level is. 
If we consider the term 'clan', there is a whole set of other issues and 
this is the subject I would like to emphasise here. The word clan was 
introduced to New Caledonia by Maurice Leenhardt, and I myself have 
used it for a long time, but do so much less now because it has serious 
inconveniences. It was adopted by Melanesians who then sent it back to 
us having invested it with the meanings they wanted it to hold. Today we 
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don't really know what a clan is, we don't really know when we are 
speaking about one, and we don't really know what it consists of. This 
was made very clear in the presentation by the President of the Customary 
Council (Chapter 3, Annex). Does it mean the small local group, which 
includes 25-30 people or more, and relate to an entity that has a specific 
name within a specific village, or does it refer to the series of local groups 
who claim a common origin and which, according to the case, could include 
300-3,000 people? What about the clan organising the report of a palaver 
to give a ruling on a property in town? It is something that is as 
extraordinary on a legal level as it is on the level of Kanak tradition. It was 
clearly explained today that tradition is based on residence, that individuals 
retain rights according to residence, and that this was a constant in the 
Pacific. When one is no longer a resident, one loses one's rights. This 
residence corresponded to specific places in space, and was not exercised 
beyond those specific places. Today, as the high commissioner mentioned 
in his introductory speech, we find ourselves in a situation which reflects 
a real strategy for the reappropriation of space, and urban space in 
particular. At the same time, however, it is in contradiction with Melanesian 
tradition itself, in that it could not be applied to places in space other than 
those where families and lineages resided. French legal tradition is getting 
mixed up in this affair. It would be inappropriate to maintain that the 
entire history of the application of legal or pseudo-legal concepts in Oceania 
is a history which consists only of a dominant group, or people in a position 
of force, and a dominated group, or people in a position of weakness, and 
that this was permanent. We must pay attention to the analyses that 
Melanesian and Polynesian indigenous societies make of western concepts 
and the ways in which they seek to utilise those concepts for their own 
benefit.1 
Wassisi lopue is wondering what happened to the traditional landowners of the 
Moruroa atoll? Do they still have customary rights? If they have lost them, what 
was the legal instrument that allowed them to be abolished? 
Rene Calinaud answers by pointing out that, in his opinion, according 
to the legal system as it exists in French Polynesia, if the inhabitants of 
Moruroa had customary rights of land tenure, then from 1888 onwards 
they would have been able to have had them written down. However, he 
himself is not aware whether they had had them inscribed or not. If they 
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had not had their rights of land ownership inscribed, then they lost them 
both by virtue of French law, (through a decree of 1887) and by virtue of 
the Oceanic customary practice we have just discussed, because, from that 
point onwards, they have not resided on that land. Otherwise, they did 
register their rights of land ownership, in which case they and their 
descendants remain titular holders of ownership rights, unless their 
ancestors sold those rights. If the issue has not been brought to the courts, 
it is simply because everybody knows that the Territorial Assembly, which 
consists of people who have been democratically elected by the population 
of the Territory, leased the atoll to the French State. That means that the 
Territorial Assembly thought, either correctly or incorrectly (and Rene 
Calinaud says he has no idea which is the case), that the atoll belonged to 
the Territory. In any case, if people have the opportunity to bring them to 
the courts to try and make them legally valid and binding. If they have 
rights of ownership, the courts will recognise these. 
Paul de Deckker adds that, according to the oldest texts about Murorua, 
from the 1820s, the island was uninhabited. This was taken into account 
when, on a political level, France was trying to obtain Murorua and 
Fangataufa democratically. Research was undertaken into the possibility 
of land claims and, apparently, it was no longer possible to find a 
genealogical connection to a human settlement on Murorua. 
Jean-Yves Faberon wonders about the interface of customary law and penal law 
in New Caledonia. Starting from the idea that the problems posed by custom are 
the most apparent and the most real in New Caledonia, he would like to ask the 
highest authorities of the court sitting in Noumea present in the auditorium today, 
what their opinion is on the pertinence of setting up a procedure which leads to a 
punishment when it deals with actions that have already been the focus of 
customary sanctioning, even if this was a customary pardon. Of course, he specifies, 
the public service is set in motion by the users when they lodge a complaint. But 
the representative of the Consulting Customary Council pointed out that it was 
surprising for many to note that those who had inflicted a punishment, and 
therefore appear to be judges, were being attacked in the courts by those who had 
received the punishment. He would like to ask what they feel about such a state of 
affairs? 
Bernard de Gouttes, Attorney-General of Noumea, said that his own 
personal feeling is that there are only real institutions in so far as people 
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adhere to those institutions. The example given is an one of how the 
customary institution functions, but in this case there is no adherence as 
the punished person decided to lodge a complaint. And for him, that is 
the criterion to follow. If there is consensus for social regulation by the 
customary authorities, then that social regulation should proceed 
autonomously, although there needs to be some nuance. If on the other 
hand, acquiescence turns into protest, then the magistrates are duty-bound 
to answer that protest. Otherwise there is a denial of justice. When someone 
appeals to the French Republic's justice system, the court judge is duty­
bound to respond to that appeal. The judiciary works through the Procureur 
de la Republique, because it is a matter of penal law, and it is up to him or 
her to decide on the possibility and validity of such an act. 
A second hypothesis exists-if there was an acceptance of the customary 
punishment, but the punishment severely infringed on the person's human 
rights. Once more, we need to take a pragmatic approach. We need to 
know if the facts have been properly revealed, not by the customary 
authorities or the victim, but by other voices. Here too, we need a very 
pragmatic attitude based on the proportional relation between the fault 
committed against custom and the punishment set out by custom. This 
seems to me to be the approach required in New Caledonia. 
Olivier Aimot, first president of the Noumea Court of Appeal, would 
like to point out that this is precisely the approach that was achieved for 
Wallis and Futuna and continues today. The difference is that 15 years ago 
the judge for the section of the Mata-Utu court, who held the powers of 
prosecution and judgement, rigorously applied the same approach, and 
the same questions, that have just been discussed here today. 
High Chief Au.gust Parawi-Reybas has a question, which is not meant to be a 
criticism-he wonders whether we have not talked too much about Wallis and 
Futuna at the expense of the problems of the Kanaks, the original inhabitants of 
New Caledonia. 
On 12 October 1 992, he submitted a proposal to the follow-up committee of 
the Matignon Accords, and the Minister of the DOM-TOM (overseas departments 
and territories), to instruct the government delegate to set up a committee 
responsible for studying the problems of particular status and local law in New 
Caledonia. Where is this at today? 
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In 1914-18, Kanaks went to France to defend the French flag, which 
was not their own, and their opinion was not sought. In 1939-45 the 
situation was the same, and he himself with his brothers answered the 
calls of General de Gaulle. But he would like to specify that they are not 
French, but Kanak with their local law particular status. 
In 1948, the National Assembly abolished the indigenous law of forced 
labour, which he himself had endured: working on the stations for six 
francs a day so that he could pay the head tax. In his opinion, the Kanak 
situation today in 1994, has not really improved. 
He thinks that many people were surprised by the reaction of the Kanak 
population in 1984-85, but wonders who pushed the Kanaks to claim their 
land, if it wasn't Giscard's minister, Dijoud, who came to New Caledonia 
and recommended to the Kanaks to 'find your clan land'. But where were 
these clan lands situated? They were the private properties of New 
Caledonia. It was not the Kanaks, but a minister, who encouraged us to 
claim them. Then, in 1983, at Nainville-les-Roches, he [High Chief August 
Parawi-Reybas] participated in the elaboration of the law that was followed 
by all the statutory laws that were applied until they were abolished when 
the regions were set up in New Caledonia. Today, it is the law of the 
referendum act that is applied, and Mr Parawi-Reybas would like to see 
the Kanak problems of this country finally being taken into consideration. 
For that, he would like to see, as the follow-up committee suggested, the 
rights of women, the rights of children, and those of Kanak property, being 
properly addressed. When a Kanak gets married in custom, he or she is 
not married in civil law. So, to what extent can we in fact not recognise the 
rights of women, children, as well as those of goods? 
It is high time, he adds, to do something concrete for the Kanak 
population of this country. This is his deepest wish, because the Minister 
instructed the government delegate to set up committees on putting 
particular status local law into place. This is why he wants to thank Jean 
Guiart for attending, as his comments have clarified the problems of 
terminology and concepts in New Caledonia. Mr Parawi-Reybas stated 
that it is time for all parties to start working because the year 2000 is only 
six years away, after 150 years of French presence in New Caledonia, and 
50 years of French presence in Wallis and Futuna. We cannot continue 
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waiting and doing nothing. We have to set up something to resolve the 
problems of the Kanak people, the first inhabitants of this land. 
The audience applauds. Louise Peltzer, session president, thanks Mr 
Parawi for his input and says that she feels convinced that the participants 
of the symposium are ready to assist him, as he wishes, within the working 
group which was instigated by the Minister for the DOM-TOM. 
Notes 
1 Jean Guiart (1994) has since published a most interesting article on the questions 
of terminology that he brought up in the debates: 'Une derive de la coutume?', 
Etudes Melanesiennes, No. 29, Noumea:57-71. 
